Couer D\u27Alene Tribe v. Johnson Clerk\u27s Record Dckt. 44478 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
12-12-2016
Couer D'Alene Tribe v. Johnson Clerk's Record
Dckt. 44478
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Couer D'Alene Tribe v. Johnson Clerk's Record Dckt. 44478" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6525.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6525
Coeur D'Alene Tribe, a 
federally recognized Indian 
Tribe~ 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
Kenneth Johnson and Donna 
Johnson, 
Defendant/ Appellant 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OFTHE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
SUPREME COURT CASE# 44478 
CLERK'S RECORD OF APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in 
and for the County of Benewah 
Norman Semanko 
Attorney for the Appellant 
'-l'-/1/78 
Peter J. Smith/ Jillian H. Caires 
Attorney for the Respondent 
Volume I 
PY 
DEC 1 2 2016 
Scipiuiui . 
Enleled on ATS by 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF IDAHO, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
Coeur D'Alene Tribe, a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff /Respondent 
vs. 
Kenneth Johnson and Donna Johnson, 
Defendant/ Appellant 
) 
) 
) 
) SUPREME COURT CASE# 44478 
) 
) 
) 
CLERK'S RECORD OF APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, in and for the County of Benewah 
Norman Semanko 
Attorney for the Appellant 
PO BOX 829 
Boise, ID 83701 
HONORABLE SCOTT WAYMAN 
Peter J. Smith/ Jillian H. Caires 
Attorney for the Respondent 
1250 W. Ironwood Dr. Ste 316 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
I 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page no. 
1. REGISTER OF ACTIONS 1 
2. AFFIDAVIT/PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT 
AS PER I.C. 10-1303-January 22nd, 2016 5 
3. JUDGMENT CREDITOR'S NOTICE OF FILING OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT-
January 2s1\ 2016 10 
4. AFFIDAVIT OF EVERETT B. COULTER, JR IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S 
MOTION FOR ORDER OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT-
March 7'\ 2016 17 
5. MOTION FOR ORDER OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT-
March 7'\ 2016 41 
6. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ORDER 
OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT-March 7'\ 2016 43 
7. MOTION FOR ORDER OF DISQUALIFICATION OF ASSIGNMENT OF 
NEW JUDGE PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 40(D)(l)-March 7th, 2016 50 
8. ORDER OF DISQUALIFICATION (Proposed)- March 9th, 2016 51 
9. ORDER ASSIGNING MAGISTRATE ON DISQUALIFICATION- March 11 th, 2016 54 
10. MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ORDER 
OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT-May 6th, 2016 56 
11. ORDER REASSIGNMENT OF JUDGE- May 13th, 2016 84 
12. COURT MINUTES- May 13th, 2016 85 
13. COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
ORDER OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT- May 23rd, 2016 86 
14. ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT- May 23rd, 2016 103 
15. AFFIDAVIT OF KENNETH JOHNSON IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR ORDER OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT-
June 2nd, 2016 · 105 
16. COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE'S MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF KENNETH 
JOHNSON- June 8th, 2016 113 
17. MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
AFFIDAVIT OF KENNETH JOHNSON- June st\ 2016 123 
18. COURT MINUTES- June 10th, 2016 132 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
IA 
19. MEMORANDUM OPINION- July 15th, 2016 134 
20. JUDGMENT-July 15th, 2016 154 
21. ORDER STA YING ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT- July 15th, 2016 156 
22. NOTICE OF APPEAL-August 26 th, 2016 160 
23. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE-November 2nd, 2016 187 
24. CERTIFICATE OF RECORD-November 2nd, 2016 188 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii 
INDEX 
Page no. 
1. AFFIDAVIT OF EVERETT B. COULTER, JR IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S 
MOTION FOR ORDER OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT-
March 7th, 2016 1 7 
2. AFFIDAVIT OF KENNETH JOHNSON IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR ORDER OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN WDGMENT-
June 2nd, 2016 
3. AFFIDAVIT/PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT 
105 
AS PER J.C. 10-1303-January 22nd, 2016 5 
4. CERTIFICATE OF RECORD-November 2nd, 2016 188 
5. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE-November 2nd, 2016 187 
6. COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE'S MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF KENNETH 
JOHNSON- June 8th, 2016 113 
7. COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
ORDER OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT- May 23rd, 2016 86 
8. COURT MINUTES- May 13th, 2016 85 
9. COURT MINUTES- June 10th, 2016 132 
10. JUDGMENT- July 15th, 2016 154 
11. mDGMENT CREDITOR'S NOTICE OF FILING OF FOREIGN mDGMENT-
January 28th, 2016 10 
12. MEMORANDUM OPINION-July 15th, 2016 134 
13. MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ORDER 
OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT- May 6th, 2016 56 
14. MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
AFFIDAVIT OF KENNETH JOHNSON- June 8th, 2016 123 
15. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ORDER 
OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT- March 7th, 2016 43 
16. MOTION FOR ORDER OF DISQUALIFICATION OF ASSIGNMENT OF 
NEW JUDGE PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 40(D)(l)-March 7th, 2016 50 
17. MOTION FOR ORDER OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN WDGMENT-
March 7th, 2016 41 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii 
IC 
18. NOTICE OF APPEAL-August 26th, 2016 160 
19. ORDER ASSIGNING MAGISTRATE ON DISQUALIFICATION- March 11th, 2016 54 
20. ORDER OF DISQUALIFICATION (Proposed)- March 9th, 2016 51 
21. ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT-May 23rd, 2016 103 
22. ORDER REASSIGNMENT OF JUDGE- May 13th, 2016 84 
23. ORDER STA YING ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT- July 15th, 2016 156 
24. REGISTER OF ACTIONS 1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii 
f b 
Date: 12/6/2016 
Time: 02:58 PM 
Page 1 of 4 
First Judicial District Court - Benewah County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2016-0000025 Current Judge: Scott L Wayman 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe vs. Kenneth Johnson, etal. 
User: SBRADBURY 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe vs. Kenneth Johnson, Donna Johnson 
Date 
1/22/2016 
1/28/2016 
2/26/2016 
3/7/2016 
3/9/2016 
3/11/2016 
3/22/2016 
3/25/2016 
5/6/2016 
Other Claims 
Judge 
New Case Filed - Other Claims Douglas Paul Payne 
Filing: K7 - Filing a foreign judgment Paid by: Evans Craven & Lackie, Atty Douglas Paul Payne 
Receipt number: 0000158 Dated: 1/22/2016 Amount: $27.00 (Check) For: 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe (plaintiff) 
Affidavit/Petition for Recognition of Foreign Judgment 
Clerk's Notice of Filing of Foreign Judgment 
Plaintiff: Coeur d'Alene Tribe Appearance Everett B Coulter Jr 
Judgment Creditors Notice of Filing of Foreign Judgment 
Hearing Scheduled (Tentative Hearing-Paperwork not filed 03/23/2016 
11 :00 AM) motion on foreign judgment (John Harper, Atty) 
Filing: K7 - Filing a foreign judgment Paid by: Coulter, Everett B Jr 
(attorney for Coeur d'Alene Tribe) Receipt number: 0000522 Dated: 
3/7/2016 Amount: $27.00 (Check) For: Coeur d'Alene Tribe (plaintiff) 
Douglas Paul Payne 
Douglas Paul Payne 
Douglas Paul Payne 
Douglas Paul Payne 
Douglas Paul Payne 
Douglas Paul Payne 
Motion for Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment Douglas Paul Payne 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Order of Recognition of Douglas Paul Payne 
Foreign Judgment 
Affidavit of Everett B. Coulter, Jr., in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Douglas Paul Payne 
Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment 
Note for Hearing Re: Plaintiff's Motion for Order of Recognition of Foreign Douglas Paul Payne 
Judgment 
Motion for Order of Disqualification and Assignment of New Judge 
Pursuant to IRCP 40(0)(1) 
Douglas Paul Payne 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled on 03/23/2016 11 :00 AM: Douglas Paul Payne 
Hearing Vacated motion on foreign judgment (John Harper, Atty) -
Disqualification Of Judge - Self 
Order Assigning Magistrate on Disqualification (McGee) 
Change Assigned Judge 
Douglas Paul Payne 
Daniel J. McGee 
Daniel J. McGee 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 05/13/2016 09:30 AM) Motion re Daniel J. McGee 
Recognition of Foreign Judgment 
Notice Of Hearing Daniel J. McGee 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Daniel J. McGee 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: NIWRA Receipt number: 0000680 Dated: 
3/22/2016 Amount: $16.00 (Cash) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Daniel J. McGee 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Moffatt Thomas, Attys Receipt number: 0000713 
Dated: 3/25/2016 Amount: $21.00 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Court Assistance Services Fee Paid by: Moffatt Daniel J. McGee 
Thomas, Attys Receipt number: 0000713 Dated: 3/25/2016 Amount: 
$3.00 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Moffatt Thomas, Daniel J. McGee 
Attys Receipt number: 0000713 Dated: 3/25/2016 Amount: $3.00 (Credit 
card) 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Order of Recognition of Daniel J. McGee 
Foreign Judgment \E. 
Date: 12/6/2016 
Time: 02:58 PM 
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First Judicial District Court - Benewah County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2016-0000025 Current Judge: Scott L Wayman 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe vs. Kenneth Johnson, etal. 
User: SBRADBURY 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe vs. Kenneth Johnson, Donna Johnson 
Date 
5/6/2016 
5/13/2016 
5/18/2016 
5/23/2016 
6/2/2016 
6/8/2016 
6/10/2016 
7/15/2016 
Other Claims 
Judge 
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or petitioner Daniel J. McGee 
Paid by: Norman M Semanko, Atty Receipt number: 0001089 Dated: 
5/6/2016 Amount: $136.00 (Check) For: Johnson, Donna {defendant) and 
Johnson, Kenneth (defendant) 
Defendant: Johnson, Kenneth Appearance Norman M. Semanko Daniel J. McGee 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled on 05/13/2016 09:30 AM: Scott L Wayman 
Hearing Held Motion re Recognition of Foreign Judgment 
Court Minutes Scott L Wayman 
Order ReAssignment of Judge (Wayman) Daniel J. McGee 
Change Assigned Judge Scott L Wayman 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 06/10/2016 11:00 AM) motion on Scott L Wayman 
foreign judgment (cont. from 5.13) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Scott L Wayman 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Gazette Record Receipt number: 0001174 
Dated: 5/18/2016 Amount: $28.00 (Check) 
Order of Reassignment (Wayman) Scott L Wayman 
Affidavit of Kenneth Johnson In opposition fot Plaintiffs Motion for Order of Scott L Wayman 
Recognition of Foreign Judgment 
Coeurd'Alene Tribe's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Kenneth Johnson 
Memorandum in Oppostition to Plaintiffs motion to strike affidavit of 
Kenneth Johnson 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing date: 6/10/2016 
Time: 11:16 am 
Courtroom: District Courtroom 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Stacy Bradbury 
Tape Number: 
Scott L Wayman 
Scott L Wayman 
Scott L Wayman 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Scott L Wayman 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Carla Woempner Receipt number: 0001352 
Dated: 6/10/2016 Amount: $12.00 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Carla Woempner Scott L Wayman 
Receipt number: 0001352 Dated: 6/10/2016 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled on 06/10/2016 11 :00 AM: Scott L Wayman 
Hearing Held motion on foreign judgment (cont. from 5.13) 
Memorandum Opinion 
Judgment 
Scott L Wayman 
Scott L Wayman 
Order Staying Enforcement of Judgment Scott L Wayman 
Civil Disposition entered for: Johnson, Donna, Defendant; Johnson, Scott L Wayman 
Kenneth, Defendant; Coeur d'Alene Tribe, Plaintiff. Filing date: 7/15/2016 
(Motion for Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment granted) 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed Scott L Wayman 
Date: 12/6/2016 
Time: 02:58 PM 
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First Judicial District Court - Benewah County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2016-0000025 Current Judge: Scott L Wayman 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe vs. Kenneth Johnson, etal. 
User: SBRADBURY 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe vs. Kenneth Johnson, Donna Johnson 
Date 
7/28/2016 
8/26/2016 
8/29/2016 
8/30/2016 
9/7/2016 
9/13/2016 
9/21/2016 
9/23/2016 
10/6/2016 
10/7/2016 
Other Claims 
Judge 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Scott L Wayman 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Gazette Record Receipt number: 0001731 
Dated: 7/28/2016 Amount: $28.00 (Check) 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid Scott L Wayman 
by: Semanko, Norman M. (attorney for Johnson, Kenneth) Receipt 
number: 0001964 Dated: 8/26/2016 Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: 
Johnson, Donna (defendant) and Johnson, Kenneth (defendant) 
Notice Of Appeal Scott L Wayman 
Motion for Order Extending Stay of Enforcement of Judgment 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
STATUS CHANGED: Inactive 
Appeal Filed In District Court 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Appeal Filed In District Court 
STATUS CHANGED: Reopened 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 1966 Dated 8/26/2016 for 100.00) 
Bond Posted -Cash (Receipt 1967 Dated 8/26/2016 for200.00) 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 128 dated 8/26/2016 amount 
200.00) 
Notice Of Substitution Of Counsel 
Plaintiff: Coeur d'Alene Tribe Appearance Jillian H Caires 
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal 
Objection to Defendant' Motion for Order Extending Stay Enforcement of 
Judgment 
Hearing Scheduled (Tentative Hearing-Paperwork not filed 10/07/2016 
10:30 AM) Motion for Cont Stay 
Notice Of Hearing 
Motion to Appear Telephonically (Semanko) 
Order Granting Motion to Appear Telephonic-Norman Semanko 
208-385-5416 
Dj3fendant's Reply in Support of Motion to Stay Enforcement 
i 
Court Minutes 
H~aring type: Motion 
Hearing date: 10/7/2016 
T:ime: 10:54 am 
Courtroom: District Courtroom 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Stacy Bradbury 
Tape Number: 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 10/07/2016 10:30 AM: Hearing 
Held Motion for Cont Stay-Moffit Thomas 
Order Staying Enforcement of Judgment Upon Appeal 
Scott L Wayman 
Scott L Wayman 
Scott L Wayman 
Scott L Wayman 
Scott L Wayman 
Scott L Wayman 
Scott L Wayman 
Scott L Wayman 
Scott L Wayman 
Scott L Wayman 
Scott L Wayman 
Scott L Wayman 
Scott L Wayman 
Scott L Wayman 
Scott L Wayman 
Scott L Wayman 
Scott L Wayman 
Scott L Wayman 
Scott L Wayman 
Scott L Wayman 
Scott L Wayman 
Scott L Wayman 
3 
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First Judicial District Court - Benewah County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2016-0000025 Current Judge: Scott L Wayman 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe vs. Kenneth Johnson, etal. 
User: SBRADBURY 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe vs. Kenneth Johnson, Donna Johnson 
Other Claims 
Date Judge 
10/24/2016 Notice Of Lodging Transcript On Appeal- For Motion for Order of Scott L Wayman 
Recongnition of Foreign Judgment-Hearing Held June 10th, 2016 Reporter 
Valerie Nunemacher 
Transcript Filed-For Motion for Order of Recongnition of Foreign Scott L Wayman 
Judgment-Hearing Held June 10th, 2016 Reporter Valerie Nunemacher 
10/31/2016 Transcript Lodged-Byrl Cinnamon Scott L Wayman 
Notice Of Lodging Transcript On Appeal Scott L Wayman 
11/3/2016 Certificate Of Mailing- Appeals to the Attorneys Scott L Wayman 
FILE~ 
EVERETT B. COULTER, JR. 
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. 
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250 
Spokane, WA 99201-0910 
201&_101 ~2 rM,2: 14 
sy: __ ~_· --· DEl"tfTY 
(509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632 
Attorneys for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
COUER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally Case No. CV :).,D I lR - Q.::f2.5 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON , 
Defendant. 
STATE OF WASHINGTON ) 
) ss 
County of Spokane ) 
AFFIDAVIT/PETITION FOR 
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT 
AS PER I.C. 10-1303 
EVERETT B. COULTER, JR., being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says: 
I am over the age of eighteen, not a party hereto and am competent to testify: 
1. I am the attorney for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe with respect to the matter of the 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe vs. Kenneth and Donna Johnson. 
2. The Coeur d'Alene Tribe is a federally recognized Indian tribe with a tribal 
reservation in Benewah and Kootenai Counties in the State of Idaho. 
3. The Coeur d'Alene Tribe maintains a tribal court located in Plummer, Idaho. 
4. Judgment Debtors Kenneth and Donna· Johnson are residents of Benewah 
County, Idaho, and are owners of real property commonly referred to as 520 Shepherd Rd., St. 
Maries, ID 83861. 
5. The Coeur d'Alene Tribe filed suit against defendants in the Coeur d'Alene Tribal 
Court on October 8, 2014 by filing a Complaint for Damages and Eviction. Copies of the 
Summons and Complaint were mailed to defendants on October 13, 2014 and service of 
process of the Summons and Complaint were effected upon defendants on October 30, 2014. 
AFFIDAVIT/PETITION FOR RECOGNITION 
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT - page 1 
5 
6. Defendants did not appear in the time provided and an Order of Default was 
entered on March 17, 2015 by the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Court. The Coeur d'Alene Tribe moved 
the Tribal Court for entry of a Judgment and the Notice of Hearing and Motion for Entry of 
Judgment were mailed to defendants on March 24, 2015. Defendants did not appear and 
respond. 
7. On April 1, 2015, the Couer d'Alene Tribal Court entered a Judgment against 
defendants in the amount of $17.400 as evidenced by the certified copy of the Judgment 
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference hereto. The Tribal Court mailed a copy of 
the Judgment to defendants as evidenced by the Clerk's Certificate of Service on the certified 
Judgment attached hereto. 
8. The Judgment in Tribal Court remains unsatisfied. 
9. The State of Idaho recognizes Tribal Court Judgments as being entitled to full 
faith and credit and recognition in State Court as per Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Id. 1, 655 P.2d 
895 (1982). 
SUBS-~RiB-ED AND SWORN TO before me this Jj_ day of January, 2016. 
\\'"'"''''' ,,,, .... J Bc,9 ,,,, 
,..._ ~r •·•••••• ~d' ~ $ ~~ .. •;§,s\ON ~-•• ';)-~ ~ <t-;~~ ~-i~ 
:~:8 NOTARY~:~= 
- . . -
: ~\ PUBLIC J :c:~ 
'"·· -·o:: 
'-?· 1··1.::., ~ :>-,;-•• ~s-2s-\.··· 0 ~ 
;.,, ,- 0 '••····· ~~ ,, 
~,,, 'P WAS'<' ,,,, 
I I I II 111 ii\\\ 
AFFIDAVIT/PETITION FOR RECOGNITION 
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT - page 2 
C1ewl~~ 
NOTARY PUBUCinandfrthe 
State of WashirJ9ton 1 
Residing at: ':;; fl t I u,,.,/, 'L 
My Commission Expires: L /..Lr/ 17 
Lo 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on (date) //JcJ/J (p 
Kenneth and Oonna Johnson 
520 Shepherd Road 
I served a copy to: 
St. Maries, ID 838q 1 
AFFIDAVIT/PETITION FOR RECOGNITION 
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT - page 3 
0) By United States mail 
O Sy personal delivery 
0 By fax (number) ______ _ 
7 
EVERETT B. COULTER, JR. 
EVANS, CRAVEN &LACKIE, P.S. 
818 W. Riverside, Suite250 
Spokane, WA 99201-0910 
(509) 455-5200; (509) 455-3632 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE TRIBAL COURT OF THE COEUR D'ALENE E 
OF THE COEUR D'ALENE INDIAN RESERVATION 
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH AND DONNA JOHNSON, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-SC-201 -0260 
JUDGMENT 
ORI GINA 
FILED 
Date: '-\,. \, \$" 
lime:~·. \loW) 
Coeurd'Aiene 
TribalComt 
R? 
by: 
----
THIS MATTER having come on regularly for hearing upon 
application of the Plaintiff for entry of a judgment against Defendant. 
following: 
e Motion and 
Court find the 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to CTC 44-1.01, et seq., 
and Idaho v. United States and Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 533 U.S. 62 (2001); 
2. The Court finds Defendant has received notice of this suit, an further finds the 
Defendant is in default and an Order of Default has been ente d; and 
3. The Court finds that a judgment should be entered against th Defendant for a 
civil penalty in the amount of $ / /2, 'f Pe>. e.P, and ~ finding that the 
Defendant is trespassing upon tribally controlled lands, and I tly the Tribe is 
entitled to remove the encroachments. · 
NOW, THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED as follow : 
JUDGMENT 
Page I 
1. A judgment in the amount of$ / 7, '-/ f?o. ,:..f1' as a civil p nalty is entered 
a 
against Defendant and in favor of Plaintiff; 
2. It is the judgment of this Court that the Defendant has tr spassed against 
Plaintiff by maintaining encroachments without proper permits and 
, 201 
Coeur d'Alene I dian Reservation 
State of Idaho, ounty of BenE:wah 
I hereby certify his docun:9_nt 1s a t~~e 
and correct c y of the ongmal on fl,e 
in the office of e Clerk of the Court. 
Oate I- O'i- '=> 
-Clerk of Court 
~= ~~~..i..¥..i~--
CLERK.'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies under penalty of perjury under the la 
of Idaho, that on the _J_ day of Apri ( , 2015, the foregoing was deliv 
following persons in manner indicated: 
Kenneth & Donna Johnson 
520 Shepherd Road 
St. Maries, ID 83861 
Everett B. Coulter, Jr. 
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. 
818 W. Riverside Ave., Ste. 250 
Spokane, WA 99201 
JUDGlv.lENT 
Page2 
Via Regular Mail 
Via Certified Mail 
Via Facsimile 
Hand Delivered 
Via Regular Mail [ 
Via Certified Mail [ 
Via Facsimile 509/455-3632 [ 
Hand Delivered l)ci 
.9 
F F1LEID ._~ 
REHE WAH COUNTY 
ZU/6 JAN 2B AH II: I fl 
B't: ··t,~ 
. · -.. ..,.,., ··. -·DEPUTY 
_EVERETT B. COULTER, JR. 
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. 
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250 
Spokane, WA 99201-0910 
(509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632 
Attorneys for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
COUER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON , 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV ;2 0 Jl_p- OOJ S-
JUDGMENT CREDITOR'S 
NOTICE OF FILING OF 
FOREIGN JUDGMENT 
TO: THE JUDGM.ENT DEBTORS/KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON 
You are notified that a judgment entered against you in the Tribal Court of the Coeur D'Alene 
Tribe of the Coeur D'Alene Indian Reservation, Case No. CV-SC-2014-0260, has been filed in 
the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in Benewah County, Idaho, in 
Case No. C V J t) J t, - D O ol ~- . A true and correct copy of the Affidavit/Petition 
filed in the Benewah County District Court is attached hereto and incorporated herein by 
reference thereto. 
Date: _;:s~A ...... N__..__..lA .... "-~r d--~J'--"-'1_,_1-""o?-_l)_J _lR __ 
Typed/printed 
JUDGMENT CREDITOR'S NOTICE OF FILING FOREIGN JUDGMENT 
CAO CvPi 10-9 4/7/2010 
PAGE 1 
I() 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on (date) / /42 U /! lP 
Kenneth and Donn<;:1 Johnson 
520 Shepherd Road 
I served a copy to: 
fil By United States mail 
0 By personal delivery St. Maries, ID 83861 D By fax (number) ______ _ 
~ CZ uvJ v"'~ ~ Barbara Bergstrom~ 
JUDGMENT CREDITOR'S NOTICE OF FILING FOREIGN JUDGMENT 
CAO CvPi 10-9 4/7/2010 
PAGE2 
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EVERETT B. COULTER, JR. 
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. 
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250 
Spokane, WA 99201-0910 
2016 J~t.-! ~2 f!H ,1~ 14 
SY• ~ .SEf'UfY 
(509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632 
Attorneys for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
COUER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON , 
Defendant. 
STATE OF WASHINGTON ) 
) SS 
County of Spokane ) 
Case No. (!_,U JOt ~ - c.:::o~ 
AFFIDAVIT/PETITION FOR 
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT 
AS PER I.C. 10-1303 
EVERETT 8. COULTER JR, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says: 
I am over the age of eighteen, not a party hereto and am competent to testify: 
1. I am the attorney for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe with respect to the matter of the 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe vs. Kenneth and Donna Johnson. 
2. The Coeur d'Alene Tribe is a federally recognized Indian tribe with a tribal 
reservation in Benewah and Kootenai Counties in the State of Idaho. 
3. The Coeur d'Alene Tribe maintains a tribal court located in Plummer, Idaho. 
4. Judgment Debtors Kenneth and Donna · Johnson are residents of Benewah 
County, Idaho, and are owners of real property commonly referred to as 520 Shepherd Rd., St. 
Maries, ID 83861. 
5. The Coeur d'Alene Tribe filed suit against defendants in the Coeur d'Alene Tribal 
Court on October 8, 2014 by filing a Complaint for Damages and Eviction. Copies of the 
Summons and Complaint were mailed to defendants on October 13, 2014 and service of 
process of the Summons and Complaint were effected upon defendants on October 30, 2014. 
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6. Defendants did not appear in the time provided and an Order of Default was 
entered on March, 17, 2015 by the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Court. The Coeur d'Alene Tribe moved 
the Tribal Court for entry of a Judgment and the Notice of Hearing and Motion for Entry of 
Judgment were mailed to defendants on March 24, 2015. Defendants did not appear and 
respond. 
7. On April 1, 2015, the Couer d'Alene Tribal Court entered a Judgment against 
defendants in the amount of $17,400 as evidenced by the certified copy of the Judgment 
attached hereto ;and incorporated herein by reference hereto. The Tribal Court mailed a copy of 
the Judgment to defendants as evidenced by the Clerk's Certificate of Service on the certified 
Judgment attache(:I hereto. 
8. The Judgment in Tribal Court remains unsatisfied. 
9. The State of Idaho recognizes Tribal Court Judgments as being entitled to full 
faith and credit and recognition in State Court as per Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Id. 1, 655 P.2d 
895 (1982). 
10. Pursuant to Idaho Code 10-1301, et. seq., the Tribal Court Ju ·gment is entitled 
to recognition by the State of Idaho in the Benewah 
SUBSC~IBED AND SWORN TO before me this /? day of January, 2016. 
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NOTARY PUBUCinandfrthe 
State of Washil)9ton 1 
Residing at: ';; f> t 1~ L 
My ~ommission xpires: L/.1.r/17 
\3 
CERTIFICAT~ OF SERVICE 
I certify that on (date) / /Jv /J lP 
Kenneth and Oonna Johnson 
520 Shepherd Ro~d 
I served a copy to: 
St. Maries, ID 838G1 
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0] By United States mail 
D ey persona, delivery 
D By fax (number) ______ _ 
{hJ"" ~\ 
Barbara Bergstrom 
\Y 
EVERETT B. COULTER, JR. 
EV ANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE, P.S. 
818 W. Riverside, Suite250 
Spokane, WA 99201-0910 
FILED 
Date: \.\-. \, \S: 
lime: =3: \lo pro 
Coeurd'Ateile 
Tribal Court 
R2 
(509) 455-5200; {509) 455-3632 
· Attorneys for Plaintiff 
by: 
----
IN THE TRIBAL COURT OF THE COEUR D'ALENE E 
OF THE COEUR D'ALENE INDIAN RESERVATION 
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally 
recognized Indian ~ribe, 
Case No. CV-SC-201 -0260 
JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNEIB AND DONNA JOHNSqN, 
Defendants. 
ORI GINA 
TIIIS MATTER having come on regularly for hearing upon 
application of the Plaintiff for entry of a judgment against Defendant 
following: 
e Motion and 
Court find the 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to CTC 44-1.01, et seq., 
and Idaho v. United States and Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 533 U.S. 62 (2001); 
2. The Court finds Defendant has received notice of this suit, an further finds the 
Defendant is in default and an Order of Default has been ent ; and 
3~ The Court finds that ajudgm.ent should be entered against th Defendant for a 
civil penalty in the amount of $ / 7., ':/Pe>, -e_P, and findmg that the 
Defendant is trespassing upon tribally controlled lands, and I y the Tribe is 
entitled to remove the encroachments. · 
NOW, THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED as folloW': : 
JUDGMENT 
Pagel 
15 
1. A judgment in the amount of$ / 7- 'f t:Jo. r:f as a civil , :ty is entered 
against Defendant and in favor of Plaintiff; 
2. It is the· judgment .of this Court that the Defendant has n 
Plaintiff by maintaining encroachments without proper permits and 
EVERETIB. COULTER, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
R ~.,.,· I 
1 
Coeur d'Alene dian Reservation 
State of Idaho, ounty of Benewah 
I hereby certify his document is a true 
and correct c y of the original on file 
in the office of e Clerk of the Court. 
Date ,~ 08'- ~ 
ty:·~~~"""'-":rr::,...,-
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies under penalty of perjury under the la s of the state 
of Idaho, that on the _J_ day of Apri l • 2015, the· foregoing was deliv d to the 
following persons in manner indicated: . · 
Kenneth & Donna Johnson 
520 Shepherd Road 
St. Maries, ID 83861 
Everett B. Coulter, Jr. 
Evans, Craven& Lackie, P.S. 
818 W. Riverside Ave., Ste. 250 
Spokane, WA 99201 
JUDGMENT 
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Via Regular Mail 
Via Certified Mail 
Via Facsimile 
Hand Delivered 
Via Regular Mail [ 
Via Certified Mail [ 
Via Facsimile 509/455-3632 [ 
Hand Delivered 
\ lo 
EVERETT B. COULTER, JR. 
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. 
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250 
Spokane, WA 99201-0910 
GY: ___ ~_-· _ or·nu-· 
.iuc JY 
(509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632 
Attorneys for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
COVER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF WASHINGTON ) 
) ss 
County of Spokane ) 
Case No. cv-2016-0025 
AFFIDAVIT OF EVERETT B. COULTER, 
JR., IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S 
MOTION FOR ORDER OF 
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN 
JUDGMENT 
EVERETT B. COULTER, JR., being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says: 
I am over the age of eighteen, not a party hereto and am competent to testify: 
1. I am the attorney for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe with respect to the matter of the 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe vs. Kenneth and Donna Johnson. 
2. The Coeur d'Alene Tribe is a federally recognized Indian tribe with a tribal 
reservation in Benewah and Kootenai Counties in the State of Idaho. 
3. The Coeur d'Alene Tribe maintains a tribal court located in Plummer, Idaho. 
4. Judgment Debtors Kenneth and Donna Johnson are residents of Benewah County, 
Idaho, and are owners of real property commonly referred to as 520 Shepherd Rd., St. Maries, ID 
83861. 
5. Defendants have never appeared or responded to the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's 
Summons and Complaint. 
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6. In addition to Defendant's being served a copy of the Summons and Complaint 
for Damages and Eviction, I mailed a copy of the same to Defendants Certified, First Class via 
the U.S. Postal Service. 
7. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and accurate copy of letter I sent to Defendants 
prior to filing suit in order resolve this dispute informally. 
8. Attached as Exhibit Bis a true and accurate copy of the Summons and Complaint 
for Damages and Eviction filed in the Coeur D'Alene Tribal Court, and Return of Service. 
9. Attached as Exhibit C is a true and accurate copy of the Order of Default entered 
by the Court on March 17, 2015, and mailed to Defendants on the same day 
10. Attached as Exhibit D is a true and accurate copy of the Notice of Hearing sent to 
Defendants on March 24, 2015. 
11. Attached as Exhibit E is a true and accurate copy of the Judgment entered by the 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe on April 1, 2015. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ~ day of March, 2016. 
,,,,111111,,,, 
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NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFIY that on the~ day of March, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to all counsel of 
record as follows: 
Kenneth and Donna Johnson 
520 Shepherd Road 
St. Maries, ID 83861 
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18) By United States mail 
D By personal delivery 
D By fax (number) ___ _ 
EXHIBIT A 
~Va/J'ld _, C?l,ca/t;,e//1,-[J/' :Zack w _, ~ 67. 
Spokane Office 
818 W. Riverside 
Suite 250, Lincoln Plaza 
Spokane, Washington 99201-091 O 
(509) 455-5200 
FAX (509) 455-3632 
Lawyers 
Coeur d'Alene Office 
1424 E. Sherman Avenue 
Eastlake Professional Suites, #300 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
(208) 667-8276 
· Respond to: Spokane 
June 5, 2014 
Sent Via Certified Return Receipt and First Class U.S. Mail 
Kenneth Johnson 
520 Shepherd Rd. 
St. Maries, ID 83861 
RE: Encroachment Upon Coeur d'Alene Tribal Submerged Land 
Dear Mr. Johnson: 
H. Terrence Lackie 
Gregory M. Kane• 
Patrick M. Risken** 
Michael E. McFarland, Jr.* 
Jon D. Floyd* 
James F. Topliff* 
Heather C. Yakely* 
James B. King 
Christopher J. Kerley• 
Robert F. Sestero, Jr.* 
Sean P. Boutz• 
Markus W. Louvier• 
Scott A. Flage 
Frieda K. Zimmerman 
Hugh 0. Evans - of counsel 
James S. Craven - of counsel 
Everett B. Coulter, Jr.* - of counsel 
• also admitted in Idaho 
•• also admitted In Idaho & Montana 
I have been retained to represent the Coeur d'Alene Tribe in respect to several Lake Coeur 
d'Alene property owners that have encroachments on Lake Coeur d'Alene and the St. Joe River. 
You have been identified as the owner of property with an encroachment upon tribal submerged 
land. That is, the information I have indicates you have a dock or pilings that constitute an 
encroachment upon tribal land, and you do not have a tribal permit nor a lease with the Tribe for 
continued use of the encroachment. 
The Tribe has instructed me to contact you initially by letter and request you either (1) remove 
the encroachment, or alternatively (2) obtain a permit and lease with the Coeur d'Alene Tribe. 
This request for either removal of the encroachment or obtaining the proper permit and lease 
requires your action by no later than July 15, 2014. 
Should you desire to obtain a permit and lease, please contact the following: 
Jason Brown 
Recreation Management Program 
850 A Street 
PO Box 408 
Plummer, ID 83851 
Phone: (208) 686-1118 
E-mail: jbrown@cdatribe-nsn.gov 
June 5, 2014 
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This letter shall serve as notice to you under Chapters 34 and 44 of the Coeur d'Alene 
Tribal Code. 
Lastly, you are notified that if you do not either remove the encroachment or obtain 
a permit and lease from the Coeur d'Alene Tribe in the time specified, I have been 
i~structed by the Tribe to bring a lawsuit in the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Court seeking 
an eviction of your encroachment on the tribal land, which includes damages, costs, 
and attorney's fees. 
r-
lT' 
Cl 
U1 
EBC/jh 
Very truly yours, . 
~()~ B. Lib~ I} 
EVERETT B. COULTER, JR. 
,..:i L _ _::.:.:.:..._..;:.:___...::....,_'.:.._::::.:...,-::~~:..:;:---..::;.;;....,...::.:"-:-'-'7":---' 
..n 
..n 
n, 
SENDER: COMPLETE THIS SECTION 
• Complete Items 1, 2, and 3, Also complete 
item 4 If Restricted Delivery is desired. 
• Print your name and address on the reverse 
so that we can return the card to you. 
• Att, ch this card to the back of the mail piece, 
or i n the front if space permits. 
1. Artii le Addressed to: 
D. Is delivery address different from Item 1? 
If YES, enter delivery address below: 
3. Service Type 
'Ja Certified Mall 
<a Registered 
CJ Insured Mall 
CJ Express Mall 
CJ Return Receipt for Merchandise 
CJ C.O.D. 
4. Restricted Delivery? (Extra Fee) CJ Yes 
2. Article Number 
(Transfer from seN/ce /abe~ 7011 1570 0003 3661 5097 
PS Form 3811, February 2004 Domestic Return Receipt 102595-02-M;-1$40 
' .. , .,~· 
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EVERETT B. COULTER, .TR. 
EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE, P .S. 
818 W. Riverside1 Suite250 
Spokane, WA 99201-0910 
(509) 455-5200; (509) 455~3632 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE TRIBAL COURT OF J'HE COEUR D' ALENE TRIBE 
OF THE COEUR D'ALENE lNDlAN RESERVATION 
COEUR D'ALENE TRlBE, a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH AND DONNA JOHNSON, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 
AND EVICTION 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff,. The Coeur d'Alene Tribe, a native sovereign entity, by 
and through its attorneys, Everett B. Coulter, Jr., of Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S., and 
herewith allege the following: 
PARTIES 
I. 
Plaintiff is the Coeur d'Alene Tribe, a federally recognized Indian Tribe and a 
sovereign government with a reservation located in Kootenai and Benewah Counties within 
the slate ofldaho. 
11. 
Defendants have an interest in real property abutting the lake Coeur d'Alene waterway, 
including Lake Coeur d'Alene and/or the St. Joe River, within the confines of the Coeur 
d'Alene Tribal Reservation. 
COMPLAINT FOR DA.MAG.ES AND EVICTION 
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illRlSDICTION & VENUE 
III. 
The Coeur d'Alene Tribe (hereinafter the "Tribe") is legally entitled to the 
exclusive use and occupancy of the submerged lands and waters within the Coeur d'Alene 
Reservation and regulates the use of the submerged lands. See Idaho v. United States and 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 533 U.S. 262 (2001). 
IV. 
The Coeur d'Alene Tribe exercises exclusive sovereignty and dominion over the 
submerged lands and waters within the Coeur d'Alene Reservation. The Coeur d'Alene Tribal 
Court has exclusive jurisdiction over this case in controversy. 
V. 
Defendants are the owners or have an interest in real property abutting Lake Coeur 
d'Alene waterway, including Lake Coeur d'Alene and/or the St. Joe River, within the Coeur 
d'Alene Tribal Reservation. 
VI. 
Defendants have an encroachment, whether a dock, pier, or piling in or above the 
submerged lands of the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Reservation. 
VII. 
The Coeur d'Alene Tribe has adopted a tribal code, and specifically the Coeur d'Alene 
Tribal Code (hereinafter "CTC") 44-1.01, et seq., addresses encroachment such as the 
Defendants' encroachment. 
VIII. 
Pursuant to CTC 44-24.0l(e), the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Court has exclusive 
jurisdiction over any suit for possession, trespass, or civil penalty resulting from any 
violations of Chapter 44 of the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Code. 
CLAIM FOR CIVIL PENALTY 
IX. 
Plaintiff repeats· and realleges the preceding paragraphs and incorporates the same 
herein by reference thereto. 
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND EVICTION 
Page 2 
X. 
Defendants have maintained an encroachment in violation of the Coeur d'Alene Tribal 
Code. 
XI. 
Defendants have been provided with notice of the encroachment violation and failed to 
obtain a permit from the Coeur d'Alene Tribe to maintain the encroachment. 
XII. 
Plaintiff is entitled to recover civil damages in an amount to be proven at the time of 
trial for Defendants' violation ofCTC 44-24.01, et seq. 
XIII. 
CLAIM FOR TRESPASS 
Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding paragraphs and incorporates the same 
herein by reference thereto. 
XIV. 
Defendants' continued maintenance of the encroachment in violation of notice 
provided to Defendants constitutes a trespass pursuant to CTC 44-24.0l(f). 
xv. 
As a result of Defendants' trespass, the Plaintiff is entitled to damages. 
XVI. 
Defendants' trespass should be abated by eviction and removal of the Defendants' 
encroachment( s). 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for the following relief: 
1) For a judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants for damages 
as provided by tribal law; 
2) For a finding that Defendants' encroachment constitutes a trespass pursuant to 
the tribal code; 
3) For an order of evictionto abate the trespass permitting the Tribe to remove 
Defendants' encroachment(s); and 
4) For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable. 
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND EVICTION 
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VERIFICATION 
I hereby verify that I have read the above document, understand its contents and that 
the statements contained therein are the truth, except for those statements based on 
information or belief, which are true to the best of my information or belief. 
STATE OF \.Ua~ ~ .l "'-j ~ 
) ss. 
L---=,,,j~ 
Jason Brown, Program M ~ger 
for the Recreation Management 
Program of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe 
County of~ ~D Kci 't\.R__ 
. . . ~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _b_ day of October, 2014. 
- Notary Public -
State of Washington. 
JANICEMARIE R ROE 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 
. D.eCe~t:J6, 2016 
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND EVICTION 
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(.····: ~44¢f2rll'.l~ 
'·Njl,1 yPuolicfotMahe-~. 
~ Commission Expires: /o2-/~:r/ b 
0 ~ L1J > l'-<C LU ;z () L!.i 
0: =-(!) 
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0 
EVERETTB.COULTER,JR. 
EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE, P.S. 
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250 
Spokane, WA 99201-0910 
(509) 455-5200; (509) 455-3632 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
-~J~ED 
Date~Jf_l{. 
lime:l.l:...£Z.L____ 
Cceu.· c!'A!e~e 
Trib;;;l Court 
by· 
IN THE TRIBAL COlJRT OF THE COEUR D' ALENE-TRIBE ._.,,_.....,..____ 
OF THE COEUR D' ALENE INDIAN RESERVATION 
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH AND DONNA JOHNSON, 
Defendants. 
SUMMONS 
NOTICE: YOU HA VE BEEN SUED BY THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFF: THE 
COURT MAY ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE 
UNLESS YOU RESPOND WITHIN' 20 DAYS. READ THE INFORMATION BELOW. 
TO: The Above Named Defendants Kenneth and Donna Johnson 
You are hereby notified that in order to defend this lawsuit, an appropriate written 
response must be filed with the above designated court within 20 days after service of this 
Summons on you. If you fail to so respond the court may enter judgment against you as 
demanded by the plaintiff in the Complaint. 
A copy of the Complaint is served with this Summons. If you wish to seek the advice 
of or representation by an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that your 
written response, if any, may be filod in time and other legal right~ protected. 
An appropriate written response requires con1pliance with Tribal Court Rules of Civil 
Procedure and other !daho Rules of Civil Procedure and shall also include: 
1. The title and number of this case. 
SUMMONS 
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COEUR DALENE TRIBE 
-- VS --
DONNA & KENNETH JOHNSON 
PLAINTIFF(S) 
DEFENDANT(S) 
Court Clerk 
COURT: COEUR D'ALENE INDIAN 
RESERVATION by: 
CASE NO: CV-SC-2014-260 -----
PAPER{S) SERVED: 
COMPLAINT 
SUMMONS 
I, DAVID C RESSER, SHERIFF OF BENEWAH, STATE THAT THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS WERE DELIVERED TO 
ME FOR SERVICE ON THE 10TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2014. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT, ON THE 14TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2014, AT 11 :51 O'CLOCK AM., I, SHERIFF DAVID RESSER, 
BEING DULY AUTHORIZED, SERVED THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER UPON 
*•***KENNETH ALBERT JOHNSON"*•• • 
AT THE DWELLING HOUSE OR USUAL PLACE OF ABODE OF SAID PERSON(S), PERSONALLY DELIVERING A TRUE AND 
CORRECT COPY THEREOF TO 
* • * * * DONNA JOHNSON/SPOUSE * * * * * 
A PERSON OVER THE AGE OF 18 YEARSANDARESIDENTTHEREINAT 
SHERIFF'S FEES: 
TOTAL COLLECTED TO DATE: 
AMOUNT UNCOLLECTED: 
EVERETT B COULTER, JR. 
818 W RIVERSIDE, STE 250 
SPOKANE, WA 99201-0910 
520 SHEPHERD RD ST MARIES ID 83861 
WITHIN THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH, STATE OF IDAHO. 
40.00 
0.00 
40.00 
DATED THIS 14TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2014. 
DAVID C RESSER 
SHERIFF 
BY~~ 
SHE;,;;DA~ 
BY 
SERVING OFFICER 
LT SANDRALANXO 
RETURNING OFFICER 
./ FILE 
Date: lt'l(lo/t '1 
BENEWAH COUNTY SHERIFF T 
DAVIDCRESSER 701 WCOLLEGEAVESTE301 tme: q•.5~~ 
(208) 245-2555 ST MARIES ID 83861 Paper ID: 2o14oo733Coeur d'Alene 
· *~ *i~1,~Jl;~#t\ltf t . )t!itiif ~ltil\1'111i{~if [1f,I;" 
Court Clerk 
COEUR DALENE TRIBE 
-- VS -- PLAINTIFF(S) COURT: COEUR D'ALENE INDIAN by: RESERVATION -----
DONNA & KENNETH JOHNSON 
DEFENDANT(S) 
CASE NO: CV-SC-2014-260 
PAPER(S) SERVED: 
COMPLAINT 
SUMMONS 
I, DAVID C RESSER, SHERIFF OF BENEWAH, STATE THAT THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS WERE DELIVERED 
TO ME FOR SERVICE ON THE 10TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2014. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT, ON THE 14TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2014, AT 11:31 O'CLOCK AM., I, SHERIFF DAVID RESSER, 
BEING DULY AUTHORIZED, SERVED THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER UPON 
* * * * * DONNA LEE JOHNSON * • • * * 
PERSONALLY AT: 520 SHEPHERD ROAD ST MARIES ID 83861 
WITHIN THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH, STATE OF IDAHO. 
SHERIFF'S FEES: 
TOTAL COLLECTED TO DATE: 
AMOUNT UNCOLLECTED: 
EVERETT B COULTER, JR. 
818 W RIVERSIDE, STE 250 
SPOKANE, WA 99201-0910 
40.00 
DATED THIS 14TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2014. 
DAVID C RESSER 
SHERIFF 
40.00 
BY 
0.00 ~~ 
BY 
SERVING OFFICER 
LT SANDRA LANXO 
RETURNING OFFICER 
\. 
EXHIBIT C 
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EVERETT B. COULTER, JR. 
EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKJE, P.S. 
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250 
Spokane, WA 99201-0910 
(509) 455-5200; (509) 455-3632 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
FILE 
Date: ·3/,:z..[ls 
Time: z : c:_e, €½ 
Coeur d'Alene 
Tribal Court 
Court Clerk 
IN THE TRIBAL COURT OF THE COEUR D' ALENE TRIBE by: ___ _ 
OF THE COEUR D'ALENE INDIAN RESERVATION 
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
· Plaintiff, 
VS. 
KENNETH AND DONNA JOHNSON, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-SC-2014-0260 
ORDER OF DEFAULT 
THIS CAUSE coming on regularly for hearing upon the motion of the Plaintiff for an 
Order of Default against the Defendants KENNETH ALBERT JOHNSON and DONNA LEE 
JOHNSON, and it appearing from the records and files herein that service was made upon the 
Defendants as required by law, and the Defendants have not entered their appearance, and the 
time for Defendants' Answer has now lapsed, and Defendants have not answered and are 
wholly in default, and the Court being fully advised, now, therefore, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendants be and are hereby in 
default, and the default of said Defendants is hereby entered, and Plaintiff is hereby allowed to 
introduce evidence and move for judgment herein. 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this/ 7'9 day of March, 2015. 
:\'''"""''''~ ~~ ~.b~.€~~ § ~---~~IB,-4., "<'...oa 
·~~!( ~d~:. 
~OJ o o,~: . TRIBAL COURT WDGE 
:::of-' :Cl ;: 
::: .\< . ~:•;:: 
-=~~ ~in.,.~ 
~..,.~..... ..~~ 
· ~flilferr·tl~,~ 
'//111111111·,,,,, 
ORDER OF DEFAULT 
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Presented by: 
By ___ -=---___,,~----+--+-----
EVERETT B. COULTER, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
ORDER OF DEFAULT 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 11!!:_ day of H-A:lc'CJd , 2015, the 
foregoing was delivered to the following persons in manner indicated: 
Kenneth Johnson 
Donna Johnson 
520 Shepherd Rd. 
St. Maries, ID 83861 
Everett B. Coulter, Jr. 
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. 
818 W. Riverside Ave., Ste. 25 0 
Spokane, WA 99201 
ORDER OF DEFAULT 
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Via Regular Mail 
Via Certified Mail 
Via Facsimile 
Hand Delivered 
Via Regular Mail 
Via Certified Mail 
Via Facsimile 509/455-3632 
Hand Delivered 
!Kl. 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
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.LJ l,'.""i 
> -c:::) ("J 
-u r---
) C\.'! Q:: 
~ <C ~ 
-
-
( 
EVERETT B. COULTER, JR. 
EV ANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE, P.S. 
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250 
Spokane, WA 99201-0910 
(509) 455-5200; (509) 455-3632 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE, P,S. 
RECE.IVEO 
APR 2 2015 
IN THE TRIBAL COURT OF THE COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE 
OF THE COEUR D'ALENE INDIAN RESERVATION 
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH AND DONNA JOHNSON, 
Defendants. 
TO: Defendants Kenneth and Donna Johnson 
Case No. CV-SC-2014-0260 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
ALEO 
Date: 3· 3D-lS-
Time: 4·. tpprn 
· Coeurd'Alene 
Tribal Co.wt 
w 
CourtClett 
by: 
----
You and each of you will PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff, by and through its 
attorney Everett B. Coulter, Jr., intend to bring on its Motion for Entry of Judgment for 
hearing before the above-entitled Court on the / ~
7 
day of ~el': \ , 2015 
commencing at 3 : 00 fJn before the Honorable Kenneth Nagy in the Coeur d' Alene Tribal 
Court. 
~ 
DATED this f£_ day of March, 2015. 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
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EV AN CRAVEN & LA KIE, P.S. 
EVERETT B. COULTER, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
30 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state 
of Washington, that on the)!/._ day of March, 2015, the foregoing was delivered to the 
following persons in manner indicated: 
Kenneth & Donna Johnson 
520 Shepherd Road 
St. Maries, ID 83861 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
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Via Regular Mail 
Via Certified Mail 
Via Facsimile 
Hand Delivered 
tr 
[ ] 
[ ] 
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EXHIBIT E 
EVERETT B. COULTER, JR. 
EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE, P.S. 
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250 
Spokane, WA 99201-0910 
(509) 455-5200; (509) 455-3632 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE TRIBAL COURT OF THE COEUR D' ALENE TRIBE 
OF THE COEUR D'ALENE INDIAN RESERVATION 
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH AND DONNA JOHNSON, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-SC-2014-0260 
JUDGMENT 
ORIGINAL 
l=n .. t:D 
Date: 4,. \, \$" . 
Time:~·. \loPQJ_ 
Coeur d'Alene 
TlibalComt 
R? 
Court Clerk 
by; 
---~= 
THIS MATTER having come on regularly for hearing upon the Motion and 
application of the Plaintiff for entry of a judgment against Defendant. The Court find the 
following: 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to CTC 44-1.01, et seq., 
and Idaho v. United States and Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 533 U.S. 262 (2001); 
2. The Court finds Defendant has received notice of this suit, and further finds the 
Defendant is in default and an Order of Default has been entered; and 
3. The Court finds that a judgment should be entered against the Defendant for a 
civil penalty in the amount of $ / ") 'f Pe:>. 2._P, and a finding that the 
/ . 
Defendant is trespassing upon tribally controlled lands, and lastly the Tribe is 
entitled to remove the encroachments. · 
NOW, THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED as follows: 
JUDGMENT 
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1. A judgment in the amount of$ / -Z 'I ~o. ,:.? as a civil penalty is entered 
" 
against Defendant and in favor of Plaintiff; 
2. It is the judgment of this Court that the Defendant has trespassed against 
Plaintiff by maintaining encroachments without proper permits; and 
3. The Tribe is entitled to remove the encroachments. 
DONE IN OPEN CQ~~49is / .f.: day of // p.,- ,' I 
''" "-'P..LE,A,~ I ~~u .......... ~,l  §\~·~·;;,,_RIB-4(··~ A 
, 2015. 
~010 ~~= r" 
~Oi-.1 2,itn°i ------------1-------
-... ! ct ..... :. ~ 
::* L., ~=-~ - ·,~ ... ~: -:s: ;.,o•. J') ,T/fi.'~ 
·:~re;.····· ,- ..... -~f 
~..,,"'Aie=1r·,Q~ ~ 
'//1111111/1 II I\ 
&L CKIE,P . 
EVERETT B. COULTER, . ISBA# 3768 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state 
of Idaho, that on the _J_ day of A.pri t , 2015, the foregoing was delivered to the 
following persons in manner indicated: 
Kenneth & Donna Johnson 
520 Shepherd Road 
St. Maries, ID 83861 
Everett B. Coulter, Jr. 
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. 
818 W. Riverside Ave., Ste. 250 
Spokane, WA 99201 
JUDGMENT 
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Via Regular Mail [ ] 
Via Certified Mail IX] 
Via Facsimile [ ] 
Hand Delivered [ ] 
Via Regular Mail [ ] 
Via Certified Mail [ ] 
Via Facsimile 509/455-3632 [ ] 
Hand Delivered ~] 
~ 
Clerk VD 
EVERETT B. COULTER, JR. 
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. 
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250 
Spokane, WA 99201-0910 
(509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632 
Attorneys for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe 
. _ FILE© 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
) 
COVER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2016-0025 
MOTION FOR ORDER OF 
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN 
JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff in the above case, by and through its attorneys, Everett B. 
Coulter, Jr., of Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S., and moves the Court for an Order Of Recognition 
of Foreign Judgment against the Defendants herein, KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON, 
individually and the marital community composed thereof. 
This motion is based upon the files and records herein and the Affidavit of Everett B. 
Coulter, Jr. A proposed Order is attached to this Motion. 
Dated this )rvci day of (n~ 2016. 
, JR., #6877 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MOTION FOR ORDER 
OF VALID REGISTRATION 
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT -1 
L\ \ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFIY that on the 1../A. day of March, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to all counsel of 
record as follows: 
Kenneth and Donna Johnson 
520 Shepherd Road 
St. Maries, ID 83861 
MOTION FOR ORDER 
OF RECOGNITION OF 
. FOREIGN JUDGMENT -2 
John Qarper 
~ By United States mail 
0 By personal delivery 
D By fax (number) ___ _ 
EVERETT B. COULTER, JR. 
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. 
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250 
Spokane, WA 99201-0910 
(509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632 
Attorneys for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
CODER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2016-0025 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ORDER OF 
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN 
JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff in the above case, by and through its attorneys, Everett B. 
Coulter, Jr., of Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S., and files this Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiffs Motion for Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment against the Defendants herein, 
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON, individually and the marital community composed 
thereof. 
I. RELIEF REQUESTED 
1. Coeur D'Alene Tribe respectfully requests this Court enter an Order which 
recognizes the Judgment from the Tribal Court of the Coeur D'Alene Tribe of the Coeur 
D'Alene Indian Reservation as validly registered and enforceable under Idaho State law. 
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II. BRIEF FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Kenneth and Donna Johnson (herein after "Defendants") own riverfront real property, 
commonly referred to as 520 Shepherd Rd., St. Maries, ID 83861, on the St. Joe River which has 
a dock extending in to the river. Affidavit of Everett B. Coulter. As acknowledged by the United 
States Supreme Court in Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001 ), the Coeur D'Alene Tribe 
(herein after "the Tribe") has exclusive sovereignty over the submerged lands and water within 
the Coeur d'Alene Reservation. This enables the Tribe, if they so choose, to charge a permit fee 
to those property owners who wish to have a dock. By way of a letter dated June 5, 2014, the 
Tribe informed Defendants of the permit requirement and instructed the Defendants on how to 
obtain the same. Affid. of Coulter, Ex. A. This letter was sent Certified Mail by the U.S. Postal 
Service. Id. Defendants received this letter on June 6, 2014, as is evidenced by the signature of 
defendant Donna Jonson on the Return Receipt. Id. This letter satisfied any notice requirements 
found in Chapters 34 and 44 of the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Code (herein after "CTC). Despite the 
Tribe's best efforts, Defendants refused to obtain the proper permit for their encroaching dock. 
Having been unsuccessful in resolving the dispute informally, the Tribe filed suit in the 
Tribal Court of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe (herein after "Tribal Court") against Defendants for 
damages and to evict their encroaching dock on October 8, 2014. Affid of Coulter, Ex. B. The 
Johnsons were served on October 14, 2014, with a copy of the Summons and Complaint but did 
not appear or answer. Affid. of Coulter. The Tribe entered an Order of Default on March 17, 
2015, and was mailed to Defendants on the same day. On March 24, 2015, Defendants were sent 
notice that the Tribe was seeking a default judgment in accordance with Coeur d'Alene Tribal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 53(a)(2) . Affid. of Coulter, Ex. D. Defendants still did not appear or 
respond. On April 1, 2015, the Tribal Court entered a default judgment against the Johnsons 
which imposed a civil penalty in the amount of $17,400 and permitted the Tribe to remove the 
trespassing dock. Affid. of Coulter, Ex. E. 
The amount sought by the Tribe in the default judgment proceedings underscores the 
good will of the Tribe in dealing with Defendant's encroachment. Under the Coeur d'Alene 
Tribal Code, Defendants were subject to a civil penalty of up to $500 per day for each day the 
encroachment was maintained. CTC 44-24.0l(C)(l). However, the Tribe only sought a $100 per 
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day penalty for 174 days even though the encroachment has been present for a much larger time. 
Affid. ofCoulter, Ex. F. 1 
On January 22, 2016, the Tribe filed Affidavit/Petition for Recognition of Foreign 
Judgment As Per JC. 10-1303, Case No. CV-2016-0025, with this Court. Attached to the 
Affidavit/Petition was a certified copy of the Tribal Judgment. In addition, the Tribe filed a 
Clerk's Notice of Filing of Foreign Judgment on January 22, 2016. The Tribe also mailed to 
Defendants a Judgment Creditor's Notice of Filing of Foreign Judgment on January 26, 2016. 
These procedures were in accordance with LC. § 10-1303 which governs the procedures for 
filing foreign judgments in Idaho. 
To date, Defendants, as Judgment Debtors, have not responded to the Tribe's Filing of 
Foreign Judgment. Idaho's statutory five day period which judgment creditors must wait prior to 
seeking execution or other process for enforcement of the foreign judgment has expired. The 
Tribe now seeks an order from the court which validates and recognizes the Tribal judgment in 
order to begin enforcement efforts. 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. Idaho Gives Judgments of Tribal Courts Full Faith and Credit. 
Idaho gives full faith and credit to tribal court judgments pursuant to Article 4, Section 1 
of the U.S. Constitution. See Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 7, 655 P.2d 895 (1982) ("Tribal 
court decrees, while not precisely equivalent to decrees of the courts of sister states, are 
nevertheless entitled to full faith and credit."). In order to implement the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 1738 which states, in pertinent part: 
Such ... judicial proceedings ... shall have the same full faith and credit in 
every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as 
they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or 
Possession from which they are taken. 
In Sheppard, the court held the phrase "Territory or Possession" to be "broad enough to 
include Indian tribes, at least as they are presently constituted under the laws of the United 
States." Sheppard, l 04 Idaho at 8. The court explained, "We believe that this holding will 
facilitate better relations between the courts of this state and the various tribal courts within 
Idaho." Id at 8. 
1 This is the number of days between the filing of the Complaint and entry of judgment. 
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Under the Full Faith and Credit clause, Idaho courts presume a final judgment entered by 
a competent court is valid. Sheppard, l 04 Idaho at 7. In other words, a "party asserting the 
invalidity of the judgment must carry the burden of proof sufficient to overcome the 
presumption" of validity. Id. at 7; Clear v. Marin, 86 Idaho 87, 92,383 P.2d 346,349 (1963). 
B. The Coeur D'Alene Tribe Has Jurisdiction Over Defendants' Encroachment. 
As noted above, a "party asserting the invalidity of the judgment must carry the burden of 
proof sufficient to overcome the presumption" that the final judgment is entitled to full faith and 
credit. Sheppard l 04 Idaho at 7. Defendants have not appeared at any point in this matter and 
have not argued the Tribal Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over their encroaching dock. 
However, even if they did assert such an argument, Defendants will not be able overcome the 
presumption that the Tribal Court Judgment is valid. 
The property at issue is owned by Defendants and located at what is commonly referred 
to as 520 Shepherd Rd., St. Maries, ID 83861. This property sits on the bank of, and has a dock 
which extends in to, the St. Joe River. Title to the land underlying this portion of the St. Joe 
River is held in trust by the federal government for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe. Idaho v. United 
States, 533 U.S. at 265.2 The Tribe has "exclusive sovereignty and dominion over the submerged 
lands and waters within the area now known as the Coeur d'Alene Reservation." CTC 44-1.01. 
Therefore, the Tribal Court had exclusive jurisdiction over Defendants' encroachment and any 
suit for possession, trespass, or civil penalty resulting from violation of Chapter 44 of the Coeur 
d'Alene Tribal Code. CTC 44-24.0l(e). 
C. Defendants Were Afforded Procedural Due Process Under Idaho and Tribal 
Law and Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Defendants were properly given ample notice and an opportunity to be heard in Tribal 
Court. The procedural due process "requirement is met when the defendant is provided with 
notice and an opportunity to be heard." Neighbors for a healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145 
Idaho 121, 127, 176 P.3d 126 (2007). "Procedural due process requires some process to ensure 
that the individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his or her rights in violation of the state or federal 
constitutions." Id. at 127. 
2 
"The question is whether the National government holds title, in trust for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe, to lands 
underlying portions of Lake Coeur d'Alene and the St. Joe River. We hold that it does." Idaho, 533 U.S. at 265. 
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In Idaho, a party who has not entered a notice of appearance is not entitled to receive 
notice of an application for default judgment. Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 288, 221 P.3d 
81 (2009); see also, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2). However, the Tribe's Rules of Civil 
Procedure contain an extra procedural safeguard above and beyond Idaho law by requiring the 
non-appearing party to receive notice of the default judgment. See, Coeur d'Alene Tribal Rules 
of Civil Procedure 53(a)(2). The Tribe complied with this requirement. Affid. of Coulter, Ex. C. 
Idaho law "imposes an obligation on defendants to seek counsel and does not permit 
willful ignorance of the proceedings." Meyers, 148 Idaho at 288. A defendant's due process 
rights are not violated when he receives "initial service of process and also a mailed notice of the 
Entry of Default but" does nothing. Id. at 288. 
Although not raised by Defendants since they have not appeared, Defendants received 
more than adequate due process under Idaho law. Defendants received service of the Summons 
and Complaint for Damages and Eviction on October 14, 2014. Affid. Coulter, Ex. B. In addition 
to being served, a copy of the Summons and Complaint for Damages and Eviction was addressed 
to Defendants and mail Certified, First Class with the U.S. Postal Service on October 9, 2014. 
Affid. Coulter. Having not appeared or responded to the Tribe's Complaint, on March 17, 2015, 
the Tribal Court entered an Order of Default against Defendants, a copy of which was mail to 
Defendants by the Clerk's Office. Affid. Coulter, Ex. D. In Idaho, the purpose of the court clerk 
sending notice of an Order of Default to a defendant "is to inform defendants of the judgment 
against them so they can either promptly satisfy the judgment to avoid post-judgment interest or 
file a motion to resist the judgment." Meyers, 148 Idaho at 292. Defendants still did not appear. 
Affid. Coulter. On March 18th, 2015, the Tribe sent a Notice of Hearing to Defendants alerting 
them of the Tribe's intention to bring its Motion for Entry of Judgment. Affid. Coulter, Ex. D. 
Defendants still did not appear and the Tribal Court entered a Judgment against Defendants on 
April 1, 2015. Ajjid. Coulter, Ex. E. Defendants were mailed a copy of the Judgment via 
Certified mail on the day it was entered. Affid. Coulter, Ex. E. Still, Defendants have not 
responded or appeared. Affid. Coulter. 
Nor can Defendants argue lack of jurisdiction. First, Defendants should not be permitted 
to now, after notice of all the proceedings and every opportunity to be heard, make this 
argument. See, Meyers, 148 Idaho at 288 (Idaho law does not permit defendants to be willfully 
ignorant of the legal issues). If Defendants believe the Tribe did not have jurisdiction then they 
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could and should have raised this issue in Tribal Court. Second, there is no doubt the Tribe has 
exclusive jurisdiction over encroachments on Tribal land. Idaho, 533 U.S. at 265; CTC 44-1.01 
and 44-8.01. Therefore, the Tribal Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the Tribe's legal action. 
As is evident, Defendants received adequate due process because they were given notice 
of the various proceedings and were afforded many opportunities to be heard. In addition, the 
Tribal Court had jurisdiction over the controversy. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There is no evidence before the Court that the Tribe's entry of final judgment was not 
valid. Therefore, the Tribe respectfully requests this Court grant its Motion for an Oder of Valid 
Registration of Foreign Judgment. 
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Dated this..?~ day of fnO'LCA., , 2016. 
VEN & LACKIE, P.S. 
-~ 
EVERETT B. COULTER, JR., #6877 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFIY that on the~ day of March, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to all counsel of 
record as follows: 
Kenneth and Donna Johnson 
520 Shepherd Road 
St. Maries, ID 83861 
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John~er 
@ By United States mail 
D By personal delivery 
D By fax (number) ___ _ 
EVERETT B. COULTER, JR. 
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. 
8 I 8 W. Riverside, Suite 250 
Spokane, WA 99201-0910 
(509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632 
Attorneys.for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
COUER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2016-0025 
MOTION FOR ORDER OF 
DISQUALJFICIATION AND 
ASSIGNMENT OF NEW JUDGE 
PURSUANT TO J.R.C.P. 40(D)(l) 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff in the above case, by and through its attorneys, Everett B. 
Coulter, Jr., of Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S., and moves the Court for an Order Of 
Disqualification and Assignment of New Judge. This motion is based upon Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 40(d)(l) and that Plaintiff does not believe it can receive a fair and impartial 
proceeding before the Honorable Judge Payne based on his prior work as a prosecutor. 
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION 
AND ASSIGNMENT OF NEW 
JVDGE -1 
Dated this ~day of &vcb. , 2016. 
EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE, P.S. 
By ~,/4-# '{~lb 
EERE B. COULTER, JR., #6877 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
EVERETT B. COULTER, JR. 
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. 
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250 
Spokane, WA 99201-0910 
ti y : _ ___.7Pt=..__ __  , DEPUJ1 
(509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632 
Attorneys for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
COVER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2016-0025 
[Proposed] 
ORDER OF DISQUALIFJCIATION 
THIS CAUSE coming on regularly for hearing upon the motion of the Plaintiff 
for an Order of Disqualification, and it appearing from the records and files herein and 
the Court being fully advised, now, therefore, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Honorable Judge Douglas 
Payne is hereby disqualified from acting further in this matter. 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this i day of March, 2016. 
--!+---
ORDER DISQUALIFICATION 
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Presented by: 
EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE, P.S. 
B y:_+---,-~-"---Jl- ~ <-(l b 
Everret . oul er, #3768 
Attorney for Defendants 
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. 
8 I 8 W. Riverside Ave., Ste. 250 
Spokane, WA 99201 
(509) 455-5200 
(509) 455-3632 facsimile 
ORDER DISQUALIFICATION 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFIY that on the JL day of March, 2016, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
all counsel of record as follows: 
Kenneth and Donna Johnson 
520 Shepherd Road 
St. Maries, ID 83861 
Everett B. Coulter, Jr. 
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. 
818 W. Riverside Ave., Ste 250 
Spokane, WA 99201 
ORDER DISQUALIFICATION 
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E( By United States mail 
D By personal delivery 
D By fax (number) ___ _ 
~By United States mail 
D By personal delivery 
D By fax (number) ___ _ 
F'ofl.ED ~1 
BENF~'AH COUNTY 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DIS:filU(J'rn 11 AH a: Ii 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF B'J!'Nt:ffltil · 
MAGISTRATE DMSION ~ . . 
gy; __________ ,OEPUJJ 
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally 
Recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETII and DONNA JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV16-25 
ORDER ASSIGNING MAGISTRATE 
ON DISQUALIFICATION 
WHEREAS the Honorable Douglas Paul Payne, being disqualified from proceeding 
further in the above-entitled action: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the HONORABLE DANIEL J. MCGEE, Magistrate 
of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, is hereby assigned to take jurisdiction of the 
above entitled-action for all further proceedings herein. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the District Court of Benewah County 
shall cause a copy of this Order Assigning Magistrate to be mailed to counsel for each of the 
parties, or, if either of the parties are represented pro se, directly to the pro se litigant. 
DA TED this l o\4' day of March, 2016. 
Karlene Behringer, 
Trial Court Administrator 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed this _J _I day of March, 
2016 to: 
Benewah County Case File - Original 
The Honorable Daniel J. McGee 
700 Bank Street 
Wallace, Idaho 83873 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. 
818 W. Riverside Ave., Ste. 250 
Spokane, WA 99201 
(509) 455-5200 
(509) 455-3632 Fax 
Defendants 
Deputy Clerk 
2 55 
Norman M. Semanko, ISB No. 4761 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
nms@moffatt.com 
26575.0000 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
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COME NOW the Defendants in the above case, KENNETH and DONNA 
JOHNSON, by and through their attorney, Norman M. Semanko of Moffatt Thomas, and file this 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion/or Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment. 
For the reasons set forth below, the Plaintiffs motion should be denied. 
I. ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND 
The government of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe ("Tribe") has asserted jurisdiction 
and control over a dock owned by the Johnsons, which is located on the St. Joe River. Upon 
their refusal to submit to the Tribe's demands for payment of $100 per year for the dock, going 
back to 2003, the tribal government has sought, and the tribal court has imposed, a civil penalty 
in the amount of$17,400. The Tribal Courtjudgment also orders the removal of the Johnsons' 
dock. 
Having no authority or jurisdiction to enforce its own penal judgment against the 
Defendants, the government of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe now seeks to have this Court recognize 
the judgment, thereby giving the tribal government an additional avenue to seek enforcement 
against the Johnsons. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The Tribal Court Judgment Cannot Be Recognized Under Idaho Code 
Section 10-1301 et seq. 
The Tribe claims that its judgment "is entitled to recognition by the State of Idaho 
in the Benewah County District Court ... Pursuant to Idaho Code 10-1301 et seq." 
Affidavit/Petition for Recognition of Foreign Judgment as Per LC 10-1303, 110 (Jan. 19, 2016). 
However, Idaho Code Section 10-1301 et seq. only applies to a "foreign 
judgment," which is defined as "any judgment, decree or order ... regarding the support of a 
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child, spouse, or former spouse or the establishment of paternity." IDAHO CODE§ 10-1301 
( emphasis added). It is only this type of judgment "which is entitled to full faith and credit in 
this state" pursuant to Idaho Code Section 10-1301 et seq. Id 
The Judgment issued by the Tribal Court pertains to alleged trespass upon tribally 
controlled lands, requested removal of an encroachment, and imposition of a civil penalty against 
the Johnsons. It is not a "foreign judgment," as that term is defined in Idaho Code Section 
10-1301, and therefore cannot be recognized by this Court. 
B. Principles of Comity Preclude Recognition of the Tribal Court Judgment. 
The Tribe relies upon Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 655 P.2d 895 (1992), 
for the notion that tribal court judgments are "entitled to full faith and credit and recognition in 
State Court." Affidavit/Petition for Recognition of Foreign Judgment as Per IC. 10-1303, ,r 9; 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment, 
pp. 3-4 (Mar. 2, 2016). 
As discussed above, the Tribe's argument is based upon a faulty reading ofidaho 
Code Section 10-1301 et seq., and the request to recognize the tribal judgment should be rejected 
on that ground. The act simply does not apply to the type of judgment now before the Court. In 
addition, the matter in Sheppard was "one of family law," involving a tribal court decree of 
adoption. Sheppard, 104 Idaho at 19,655 P.2d at 913. It is oflimited applicability. Moreover, 
the court's determination that the tribal judgment should be given full faith and credit was based 
upon federal court interpretations of 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which have since been supplanted. That 
statute, passed by the U.S. Congress, states in pertinent part: "Such ... judicial proceedings ... 
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories 
and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession 
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from which they are taken." Sheppard, 104 Idaho at 7,655 P.2d at 901. The question is whether 
Indian tribes are covered by this provision. 
In Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit 
explained that the full faith and credit clause "applies only to the states." Wilson, 127 F.3d at 
808. The Ninth Circuit explained that the Constitution does not afford full faith and credit to 
Indian tribal court judgments. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 808. The Ninth Circuit also held that 
Congress did not extend full faith and credit to tribal court judgments in the implementing statute 
found at 28 U.S.C. § 1738. The Ninth Circuit's decision is contrary to the earlier conclusion by 
the Idaho Supreme Court in Sheppard. However, interpretation of the federal statute is of course 
a matter of federal law. 
In its decision, the Ninth Circuit further explained that in the absence of a 
Congressional extension of full faith and credit, the recognition and enforcement of tribal 
judgments must inevitably rest on principles of comity. Wilson, 127 F .3d at 809. The Ninth 
Circuit then relied on two authorities for its comity analysis: (1) Section 482 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States; and (2) Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 
(1895). 
The Ninth Circuit stated that "[ w ]hile Hilton and the Restatement (Third) provide 
sound guidance for assessing legal judgments of other nations, special considerations arising out 
of existing Indian law merit some modification in the application of comity to tribal judgments." 
Wilson, 127 F.3d at 810 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit then laid out the following legal 
criteria: 
In synthesizing the traditional elements of comity with the special 
requirements oflndian law, we conclude that, as a general 
principle, federal courts should recognize and enforce tribal 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
ORDER OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT - 3 Client:4149493.1 le(:) 
judgments. However, federal courts must neither recognize nor 
enforce tribal judgments if: 
( 1) the tribal court did not have both personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction; or 
(2) the defendant was not afforded due process of law. 
In addition, a federal court may, in its discretion, decline to 
recognize and enforce a tribal judgment on equitable grounds, 
including the following circumstances: 
(1) the judgment was obtained by fraud; 
(2) the judgment conflicts with another final judgment 
that is entitled to recognition; 
(3) the judgment is inconsistent with the parties' 
contractual choice of forum; or 
( 4) recognition of the judgment, or the cause of action 
upon which it is based, is against the public policy of the United 
States or the forum state in which recognition of the judgment is 
sought. 
Wilson, 127 F.3d at 810. The Ninth Circuit revised the factors in Section 482 of the Restatement 
(Third) so that subject matter jurisdiction was a mandatory, rather than discretionary, factor for 
the review of tribal court judgments. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 811. 
1. The tribal court lacks the required jurisdiction for recognition of its 
judgment in state court. 
Both Sheppard and Wilson prohibit the recognition of a tribal judgment when the 
tribal court does not have jurisdiction, both over the person and the subject matter. 
A primary problem for the tribal court judgment in this matter is the tribal court's 
general lack of jurisdiction over non-tribal members, such as the Johnsons. 
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In Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., Inc., 554 U.S. 
316 (2008), the U.S. Supreme Court explained why it has been reluctant to subject non-tribal 
members to tribal jurisdiction: 
Tribal sovereignty, it should be remembered, is "a sovereignty 
outside the basic structure of the Constitution." The Bill of Rights 
does not apply to Indian tribes. Indian courts "differ from 
traditional American courts in a number of significant respects." 
And non-members have no part in tribal government-they have 
no say in the laws and regulations that govern tribal territory. 
Consequently, those laws and regulations may be fairly imposed 
on nonmembers only if the nonmember has consented, either 
expressly or by his actions. Even then, the regulation must stem 
from the tribe's inherent sovereign authority to set conditions on 
entry, preserve tribal self-.government, or control internal 
relations. 
Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 337 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
This statement in the majority opinion in Plains Commerce was taken from the 
concurring opinion of Justice Souter in Nevada v. Hicks: 
The ability of nonmembers to know where tribal 
jurisdiction begins and ends, it should be stressed, is a matter of 
real, practical consequence given "[t]he special nature of [Indian] 
tribunals," Dura v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990), which differ 
from traditional American courts in a number of significant 
respects. To start with the most obvious one, it has been 
understood for more than a century that the Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment do not of their own force apply to Indian 
tribes. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-385 (1896); 
F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 664-665 (1982 ed.) 
(hereinafter Cohen) ("Indian tribes are not states of the union 
within the meaning of the Constitution, and the constitutional 
limitations on states do not apply to tribes"). 
Hicks, 533 U.S. at 383-84 (emphasis added). Justice Souter also explained: 
Although the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA) makes a 
handful of analogous safeguards enforceable in tribal courts, 25 
U.S.C. § 1302, "the guarantees are not identical," Oliphant, 435 
U.S., at 194, and there is a "definite trend by tribal courts" toward 
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the view that they "ha[ve] leeway in interpreting" the ICRA's due 
process and equal protection clauses and "need not follow the U.S. 
Supreme Court precedents 'jot-for-jot,"' Newton, Tribal Court 
Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 
Am. Indian L. Rev. 285, 344, n. 238 (1998). In any event, a 
presumption against tribal-court civil jurisdiction squares with one 
of the principal policy considerations underlying Oliphant, namely, 
an overriding concern that citizens who are not tribal members 
be "protected . .. from unwarranted intrusions on their personal 
liberty," 435 U.S., at 210. 
Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384 (emphasis added). Justice Souter also listed other concerns with non-
tribal members being subjected to tribal courts: 
Tribal courts also differ from other American courts ( and often 
from one another) in their structure, in the substantive law they 
apply, and in the independence of their judges. Although some 
modem tribal courts "mirror American courts" and "are guided by 
written codes, rules, procedures, and guidelines," tribal law is still 
frequently unwritten, being based instead "on the values, mores, 
and norms of a tribe and expressed in its customs, traditions, and 
practices," and is often "handed down orally or by example from 
one generation to another." .... The resulting law applicable in 
tribal courts is a complex "mix of tribal codes and federal, state, 
and traditional law," . .. which would be unusually difficult for 
an outsider to sort out. 
Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384-85 (emphasis added). Finally, Justice Souter expressed concern that 
tribal courts are often subordinate to the political branch: 
The result, of course, is a risk of substantial disuniformity in the 
interpretation of state and federal law, a risk underscored by the 
fact that "{t/ribal courts are often 'subordinate to the political 
branches of tribal governments,'" Dura, supra, at 693 (quoting 
Cohen 334-335). 
Hicks, 533 U.S. at 385 (emphasis added). 
While Plains Commerce relied on the concurring opinion of Justice Souter in 
Hicks for this language regarding the limits of tribal courts, Justice Souter in Hicks relied on 
Dura v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), which is discussed more fully below. In turn, the majority 
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opinion in Duro relied on the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens in Merrion v. Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 172-73 (1982), where Justice Stevens wrote: 
The tribes' authority to enact legislation affecting 
nonmembers is therefore of a different character than their broad 
power to control internal tribal affairs. This difference is 
consistent with the fundamental principle that (i[n this Nation 
each sovereign governs only with the consent of the governed." 
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,426. Since nonmembers are 
excluded from participation in tribal government, the powers that 
may be exercised over them are appropriately limited. 
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 172-173 (emphasis added). 
Tribal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction, because a tribe's adjudicative 
jurisdiction is only as broad as its legislative jurisdiction. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 367 
(2001). And this tribal jurisdiction is limited to what is necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 359. Any "[t]ribal assertion of 
regulatory authority over nonmembers must be connected to that right of the Indians to make 
their own laws and be governed by them." Hicks, 533 U.S. at 361. 
In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), the Supreme Court 
established that Indian tribes do not have inherent criminal jurisdiction to try and to punish non-
Indians. This was explained further in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), which held that 
Indian tribes may not assert criminal jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian. See also United 
States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (there was no constitutional impediment to Congress 
providing tribes inherent authority to prosecute criminal misdemeanors). The Supreme Court 
explained why criminal punishment is not granted to Indian tribes: 
Criminal trial and punishment is so serious an intrusion on 
personal liberty that its exercise over non-Indian citizens was a 
power necessarily surrendered by the tribes in their submission to 
the overriding sovereignty of the United States. 
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Duro, 495 U.S. at 693. The Supreme Court explained the limitations of the tribal courts: 
The special nature of the tribunals at issue makes afocus on 
consent and the protections of citizenship most appropriate. 
While modem tribal courts include many familiar features of the 
judicial process, they are influenced by the unique customs, 
languages, and usages of the tribes they serve. Tribal courts are 
often "subordinate to the political branches oftribal 
governments," and their legal methods may depend on "unspoken 
practices and norms." It is significant that the Bill of Rights does 
not apply to Indian tribal governments. The Indian Civil Rights 
Act of 1968 provides some statutory guarantees of fair procedure, 
but these guarantees are not equivalent to their constitutional 
counterparts. 
Duro, 495 U.S. at 693 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Because of these limitations, the 
Supreme Court questioned whether Congress could subject American citizens to tribunals that do 
not provide constitutional protections as a matter of right: 
Our cases suggest constitutional limitations even on the ability of 
Congress to subject American citizens to criminal proceedings 
before a tribunal that does not provide constitutional protections as 
a matter of right. 
Duro, 495 U.S. at 693. The lack of constitutional protection from tribal power was a reason the 
Supreme Court declined to allow tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers of 
their tribe: 
This is all the more reason to reject an extension of tribal authority 
over those who have not given the consent of the governed that 
provides a fundamental basis for power within our constitutional 
system. 
Duro, 495 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). 
The same reasons that the Supreme Court has declined to extend criminal 
jurisdiction over nonmembers of a tribe should also compel this Court to decline to extend penal 
jurisdiction over nonmembers of a tribe by enforcing a judgment that arises from civil penalties. 
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Subject matter jurisdiction is also lacking in this matter. 
The Tribe claims an interest in land underlying the St. Joe River, held in trust by 
the United States pursuant to Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001). The Tribe asserts that 
the land underlying the portion of the St. Joe River over which the Johnsons' dock extends "is 
held in trust by the federal government for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe." Memorandum in Support 
of Plaintiff's Motion for Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment at 4. The Tribe claims 
"exclusive sovereignty and dominion over the submerged lands and waters within the area now 
known as the Coeur d'Alene Reservation." Id. (quoting Coeur d'Alene Tribal Code 44-1.01). It 
is clear from these statements, and the enforcement actions taken, that the tribal government 
asserts broad authority over all submerged lands and the waters overlying them, within the 
entirety of the current exterior boundaries of the reservation. 
In doing so, the Tribe fails to note that the U.S. Supreme Court and the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals specifically recognized that the United States reserved, or set aside, the 
submerged lands that existed prior to Statehood in 1890. See generally, Idaho v. United States, 
533 U.S. 262 (2001) and United States v. Idaho, 210 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding 
finding that the United States reserved 1873 submerged lands for the Tribe). It is these 
submerged lands within the reservation-and only these submerged lands-that are owned by 
the United States. It is well known that additional lands within the reservation boundary became 
submerged only after the construction of Post Falls Dam in 1907. See, e.g., In re Sanders Beach, 
143 Idaho 443, 147 P.3d 75 (2006); Erickson v. State, 132 Idaho 208,970 P.2d 1 (1998); 
Deffenbaugh v. Washington Water Power Co., 24 Idaho 514, 135 P. 247 (1913); Petajaniemi v. 
Washington Water Power Co., 22 Idaho 20, 124 P. 783 (1912); Washington Water Power Co. v. 
Waters, 19 Idaho 595, 115 P. 682 (1911). 
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While the ordinary high water mark (OHWM) is currently 2128 feet and has been 
at that level since 1907 (Erickson, 132 Idaho at 211, 970 P.2d at 4), this higher level is the result 
of"the dam [that] raised the water level. . .in both the lake and in the Coeur d'Alene and St. Joe 
rivers that feed into the lake." The dam has been recognized as "raising the elevation of the 
water ... approximately 6 1/2 feet .... This increased height in the dam naturally resulted in 
submerging the lands adjacent to Coeur d'Alene Lake and the streams flowing into the lake to an 
elevation of at least 2,126.5 feet." In re Sanders Beach, 143 Idaho 443, 147 P.3d 75 (emphasis 
added); see also, Deffenbaugh, 24 Idaho at 520-21, 135 P.2d at 253-54 ("the elevation is raised 
six or eight feet above the ordinary elevation of the water in the summer and fall"). 
It is these additional submerged lands-at least 6 1/2 feet and perhaps as much as 
8 feet-beyond those recognized in Idaho v. United States, that the Tribe asserts ownership over 
in the tribal code. This is the basis for the Tribe's asserted jurisdiction over the Johnson's, 
whose land is immediately adjacent to the artificially elevated portion of the St. Joe River. There 
is no basis for this ownership or the asserted jurisdiction over the J ohnsons. The United States 
only reserved those submerged lands that existed prior to Statehood. They did not--could not-
reserve lands that would not become submerged until after the dam was built in 1907. Indeed, 
Washington Water Power Co. compensated private landowners for flooding caused by the dam 
on these lands. Obviously, these lands were not owned by the United States. Simply because the 
tribal government asserts ownership and control over these additional submerged lands does not 
grant them that right. 
The extent of the submerged lands controlled by the Tribe is the subject of current 
litigation in the Coeur d'Alene-Spokane River Basin Adjudication ("CSRBA"), where the Coeur 
.d'Alene Tribe has filed multiple objections to individual water right claims along the St. Joe 
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River, claiming that the individuals' water diversion structures are encroaching upon the Tribe's 
submerged lands. In order to prove trespass, the Tribe will of course first need to establish 
ownership of the submerged lands in question. As in the instant matter, this ownership cannot be 
presumed, particularly where the submerged lands were not submerged until well after statehood. 
In Re CSRBA, Case No. 49576 (pending in the Fifth Judicial District of the State ofldaho) 
(CSRBA subcase litigation information available at www.srba.state.id.us/CSRBA1 .HTM). 
2. The Defendants were not afforded due process. 
Both Sheppard and Wilson require that due process be afforded to the defendants. 
Otherwise, the tribal judgment cannot be recognized by the court. 
The Ninth Circuit emphasized that due process is a fundamental requirement for 
the enforcement of tribal court judgments: 
The guarantees of due process are vital to our system of 
democracy. We demand that foreign nations afford United States 
citizens due process of law before recognizing foreign judgments; 
we must ask no less of Native American tribes. 
Wilson, 127 F.3d at 811 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit also explained its concept of due 
process, writing: 
Due process, as that term is employed in comity, encompasses 
most of the Hilton factors, namely that there has been opportunity 
for a full and fair trial before an impartial tribunal that conducts 
the trial upon regular proceedings after proper service or voluntary 
appearance of the defendant, and that there is no showing of 
preiudice in the tribal court or in the system of governing laws. 
Further, as the Restatement (Third) noted, evidence "that the 
iudiciary was dominated by the political branches ofgovernment 
or by an opposing litigant, or that a party was unable to obtain 
counsel, to secure documents or attendance of witnesses, or to have 
access to appeal or review, would support a conclusion that the 
legal system was one whose judgments are not entitled to 
recognition." Restatement (Third) Section 482 cmt. b. 
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Wilson, 127 F.3d at 811 (emphasis added). 
In addition to these criteria, the Ninth Circuit also explained that the enforcement 
of tribal court judgments should be based on federal law, rather than on state laws: 
We apply federal common law when a federal rule of decision is 
"necessary to protect uniquely federal interests." Banco Nacional 
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,426 (1964). Indian law is 
uniquely federal in nature, having been drawn from the 
Constitution, treaties, legislation, and an "intricate web of 
judicially made Indian law." Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 
435 U.S. 191,206 (1978). State law, especially the compacts 
between a state and a tribe, may be of substantial significance in a 
particular case. However, the quintessentially federal character of 
Native American law, coupled with the imperative of consistency 
in federal recognition of tribal court judgments, by necessity 
require that the ultimate decision governing the recognition and 
enforcement of a tribal judgment by the United States be founded 
on federal law. 
Wilson, 127 F.3d at 813 (emphasis added). 
Of course, in this matter the tribal court is dominated by the tribal government, 
which is the plaintiff seeking the judgment in the tribal court. The tribal government is 
particularly biased on questions of ownership regarding submerged lands, as reflected in the 
tribal cod~. In addition, it has not hesitated to impose a large civil penalty of $500 per day. 
Under these circumstances, it is very difficult to see how the Johnsons were afforded due 
process. 
C. Recognition of the Tribal Court Judgment Is Prohibited by the Penal Law 
Rule. 
The penal law rule is a "venerable and widely-recognized" rule that a state or 
country does not enforce the penal judgments of other states or countries, unless required to do 
so by treaty. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Cantre Le Racisme et L 'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 
1218 (9th Cir. 2006). A penal law is one where the wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong to 
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the public, rather than to an individual. In other words, a penal law is where the law punishes an 
offense against the government, rather than provide a private remedy to a person injured by the 
wrongful act. Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1219. In this case, the judgment against the Johnsons is 
issued in favor of the tribal government. 
The penal law rule is a part of the general principles of comity followed by the 
Ninth Circuit in Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1997). While comity allows 
the enforcement of judgments compensating private individuals for injuries or harm, comity does 
not allow the enforcement of judgments in favor of a government for harms to the public. 
The penal law rule was first established by the United States Supreme Court in 
The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 6 L. Ed. 268 (1825), when Chief Justice John Marshall 
explained that "[t]he Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." The Antelope, 23 
U.S. at 123; United States v. Federative Republic of Brazil, 748 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2014). 
Since Chief Justice Marshall's decision in The Antelope, the Supreme Court has 
continued to treat the penal judgment rule as an "incontrovertible maxim" over many years. In 
Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U.S. 265, 290 (1888), overruled in part on other 
grounds by Milwaukee County v. ME. White Co., 296 U.S. 268,278 (1935), the Supreme Court 
stated: 
By the law of England and of the United States, the penal laws of 
a country do not reach beyond its own territory, except when 
extended by express treaty or statute to offences committed abroad 
by its own citizens; and they must be administered in its own 
courts only, and cannot be enforced by the courts of another 
country. 
127 U.S. at 289-90 (emphasis added). 
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In the case of Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892), the Supreme Court ruled 
that Maryland was required to enforce a judgment from New York that imposed liability on a 
defendant to a plaintiff for money because of the defendant's false certificate misstating the 
capital stock of a company. The Supreme Court again referred to the words of Chief Justice 
Marshall that "[t]he courts ofno country execute the penal laws of another." 146 U.S. at 666. 
However, the Supreme Court ruled that the penal law rule did not apply in that case, because the 
judgment was to compensate a private individual for actual losses, rather than to punish the 
defendant for an offense against the state. 146 U.S. at 667. 
In the case of Oklahoma ex rel. West v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co., 
220 U.S. 290, 299 (1911), the Supreme Court decided that it did not have power to enforce the 
penal statutes of the State of Oklahoma. The Supreme Court relied on its 1888 decision in 
Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., which stated "[t]he rule that the courts of no country 
execute the penal laws of another .... " Wisconsin, 127 U.S. at 290; Oklahoma, 220 U.S. at 299. 
The Supreme Court wrote: 
Those principles must, in our opinion, determine the present case 
adversely to the State. Although the State does not ask for 
judgment against the defendant railroad company for the penalties 
prescribed by the Oklahoma statutes for violations of its 
provisions, she yet seeks the aid of this court to enforce a statute 
one of whose controlling objects is to impose punishment in order 
to effectuate a public policy touching a particular subject relating 
to the public welfare. The statute viewed as a whole is to be 
deemed a penal statute. The present suit, although in form one of 
a civil nature, is, in its essential character, one to enforce by 
injunction regulations prescribed by a State for violations of one 
of its penal statutes and is, therefore, one of which this court 
cannot take original cognizance at the instance of the State. 
220 U.S. at 300 (emphasis added). 
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In the case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,413 (1964), 
the Supreme Court ruled that the act of state doctrine prevented a remedy for Cuba's 
expropriation of sugar in Cuba. The Supreme Court again recognized "the principle enunciated 
in federal and state cases that a court need not give effect to the penal or revenue laws of foreign 
countries or sister states." 376 U.S. at 413-14. 
In Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 360-61 (2005), the Supreme Court 
held that a conspiracy to violate the United States' wire fraud statute as part of an attempt to 
evade Canadian liquor import laws was not subject to the penal law rule, because the statute at 
issue was a United States statute. In that case, the Supreme Court again quoted Chief Justice 
Marshall's statement that "[t]he Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." 544 
U.S. at 361. The Supreme Court explained that "[t]he rule against the enforcement of foreign 
penal statutes, in turn, tracked the common-law principle that crimes could only be prosecuted in 
the country in which they were committed." 544 U.S. at 361. 
The Second Circuit recently reaffirmed and explained this history, in United 
States v. Federative Republic of Brazil, 748 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2014). In that case, the Second 
Circuit held that a judgment of a Brazilian court forfeiting proceeds of crime to the Brazilian 
government would not be enforced by the United States courts, because the judgment was a 
penal judgment for purposes of the penal law rule. Brazil could enforce its foreign judgment 
only through a statutory procedure established through the United States Attorney General. 28 
U.S.C. § 2467. In Federative Republic, the Second Circuit wrote that Judge Learned Hand had 
explained the rationale for the penal law rule, by pointing to the danger in requiring United 
States courts to "pass upon the provisions for the public order of another state," something that 
"is, or at any rate should be, beyond the powers of a court." Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 
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(2d Cir. 1929) (L. Hand, J., concurring), off on other grounds, 281 U.S. 18 (1930). The Second 
Circuit had explained that enforcement of foreign criminal laws would enmesh the courts in "the 
relations between the states themselves," a matter outside judicial competence and, in any event, 
"intrusted to other authorities" under the United States' system of separation of powers. Moore, 
30 F.2d at 604; Federative Republic, 748 F.3d at 92; Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 109-20 (2d Cir. 2001) (expounding uponjustifications for 
revenue rule, including "respect for sovereignty, concern for judicial role and competence, and 
separation of powers"). 
Section 483 of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States provides as follows: 
Courts in the United States are not required to recognize or to 
enforce judgments for the collection of taxes, fines, or penalties 
rendered by the courts of other states. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 483 (1987). 
The comment to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law defines what constitutes a 
penal law as follows: 
A penal judgment, for purposes of this section, is a judgment in 
favor of a foreign state or one of its subdivisions, and primarily 
punitive rather than compensatory in character. A iudgment for a 
fine or penalty is within this section; a judgment in favor of a 
foreign state arising out of a contract, a tort, a loan guaranty, or 
similar civil controversy is not penal for purposes of this section. 
Nor is a judgment for damages rendered in an action combining 
claims of civil and criminal responsibility, as is possible in some 
states, for example in respect of vehicle accidents or nonsupport of 
dependents. Actions may be penal in character, however, and 
therefore governed by this section, even if they do not result from 
judicial process, for example when a government agency is 
authorized to impose fines or penalties for violation o{its 
regulations. 
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RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LA w OF THE UNITED Sr A TES § 483 cmt. b 
(1987) ( emphasis added). 
The Ninth Circuit relied on the penal law rule in Section 483 of the Restatement 
in its en bane decision in Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Cantre Le Racisme Et L 'Antisemitisme, 433 
F.3d 1199, 1219 (9th Cir. 2006): 
California courts follow the generally observed rule that, "'[u]nless 
required to do so by treaty, no state [i.e., country] enforces the 
penal judgments of other states [i.e., countries]."' In re Manuel P., 
215 Cal.App.3d 48, 81,263 Cal.Rptr. 447 (1989) (Wiener, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Restatement§ 483 cmt. 3); see also In re 
Marriage o/Gray, 204 Cal.App.3d 1239, 1253, 251 Cal.Rptr. 846 
(1988). This is consistent with the Restatement's declaration that 
"fc/ourts in the United States are not required ... to enforce 
iudgments (from foreign countries/ for the collection of . .. fines 
or other penalties." Restatement§ 483; see also 30 Am.Jur.2d 
Execution and Enforcement of Judgments § 846 (2004) ("Courts in 
the United States will not recognize or enforce a penal judgment 
rendered in another nation."). A number of states have adopted an 
identical version of California's Uniform Act, see Enforcing 
Foreign Judgments in the United States and United States 
Judgments Abroad 28-32 (Ronald A. Brand ed., 1992), and the 
common law rule against the enforcement of penal judgments is 
venerable and widely-recognized. See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 
U.S. 657, 673-74, 13 S.Ct. 224, 36 L.Ed. 1123 (1892); see also 18 
James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice§ 130.05 
(2002). 
Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d 1199, 1219 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit again quoted Section 483 
later in its opinion: 
In short, the label "civil" does not strip a remedy of its penal 
nature. Thus, for example, an American court is not required to 
enforce an order of contempt or an award of punitive damages in a 
civil action. Cf Frankv. Reese, 594 S.W.2d 119, 121 
(Tex.Civ.App. 1979) ("Other jurisdictions are reluctant to give full 
faith and credit to an order for contempt due to its punitive 
nature[.]"); Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
821 F.Supp. 292,295 (D.N.J. 1993) (refusing to enforce Philippine 
law providing for punitive damages); see also Third Restatement 
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.§ 483 cmt. b ("Some states consider judgments penal for purposes 
of nomecognition if multiple, punitive, or exemplary damages are 
awarded1 even when no govermnental agency is a party."). 
Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1219-20. 
The 2005 Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgments Recognition Act revised 
the 1962 act of the same name. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 
Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act (July 21, 2005) ("Uniform Law"). 
These acts codify the most prevalent common law rules with respect to the recognition of money 
judgments rendered in other countries. Uniform Law, at 1. This Uniform Law provides the 
means to enforce the judgments of a govermnent, except for the United States or its possessions, 
and except for any other govermnent that is subject to the Full Faith and Credit clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. Uniform Law, § 2. 
However, this Uniform Law does not allow for the enforcement of penal 
judgments. Instead, the law states: 
(b) This [act] does not apply to a foreign-country 
judgment, even if the judgment grants or denies recovery of a sum 
of money, to the extent that the judgment is: 
(1) 
(2) 
a judgment for taxes; 
a fine or other penaltv .... 
Uniform Law, § 3 ( emphasis added). The National Conference explained this rule as follows: 
Foreign-country iudgments for taxes and iudgments that 
constitute fines or penalties traditionally have not been 
recognized and enforced in U.S. courts. See, e.g., Restatement 
Third of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §483 
(1986). Both the "revenue rule," under which the courts of one 
country will not enforce the revenue laws of another country, and 
the prohibition on enforcement of penal judgments seem to be 
grounded in the idea that one country does not enforce the public 
laws of another. See id. Reporters' Note 2. The exclusion of tax 
judgments and judgments constituting fines or penalties from the 
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scope of the Act reflects this tradition. Under Section 11, however, 
courts remain free to consider whether such judgments should be 
recognized and enforced under comity or other principles. 
Uniform Law, at 7 ( emphasis added). The National Conference also explained: 
Courts generally hold that the test for whether a judgment is a fine 
or penalty is determined by whether its purpose is remedial in 
nature, with its benefits accruing to private individuals, or it is 
penal in nature, punishing an offense against public justice. 
Uniform Law, at 7. 
The 2005 Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgments Recognition Act has been 
adopted by Idaho, as Idaho Code Section 10-1401 et seq. Idaho Code Section 10-1403 provides 
as follows: 
(2) This chapter does not apply to a foreign country 
judgment, even if the judgment grants or denies recovery of a sum 
of money, to the extent that the judgment is: 
(a) A judgment for taxes; 
(b) A fine or other penalty; 
IDAHO CODE § 10-1403(2). 
In Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224 (1970), the Supreme Court recognized that the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require that sister states enforce a foreign penal judgment: 
Since the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require that 
sister States enforce a foreign penal judgment, Huntington v. 
Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892); cf Milwaukee County v. ME. White 
Co., 296 U.S. 268,279 (1935), California is free to consider what 
effect, if any, it will give to the North Carolina detainer in terms of 
George's present "custody." 
Nelson, 399 U.S. at 229 (emphasis added). 
In the case of City of Oakland v. Desert Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 267 P.3d 48 
(Nev. 2011), the Nevada Supreme Court considered whether it was required to enforce a 
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California civil judgment against a sign company for violation of a section of the City of 
Oakland's municipal code dealing with signage. The Nevada Supreme Court determined that 
Nevada was not required to enforce a California judgment that was penal in nature: 
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has determined that 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not apply to penal 
judgments. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 666, 672-73 
(1892); Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224,229 (1970) (reiterating 
that "the full faith and credit clause does not require that sister 
states enforce a foreign penal judgment"). 
City of Oakland, 267 P.3d 48 (emphasis added). As a result, Nevada did not enforce California's 
judgment. 
Other states follow this approach, holding that the Full Faith and Credit clause 
does not require the enforcement of a sister state's penal judgment. Philadelphia v. Austin, 429 
A.2d 568,572 (N.J. 1981) ("the United States Supreme Court has continued to recognize the 
vitality of the penal exception," but does require enforcement of the tax and revenue judgments 
of sister states); Schaefer v. H B. Green Transp. Line, 232 F.2d 415,418 (7th Cir. 1956) ("It is 
generally recognized that penalties fixed by state laws are not enforc[ e ]able in federal courts or 
even in other State courts."); People v. Laino, 32 Cal. 4th 878, 888, 87 P.3d 27 (Cal. 2004) 
("[W]e have stated that the full faith and credit clause 'does not require that sister States enforce 
a foreign penal judgment.'") ("If California need not give full faith and credit to penal judgments 
of another state, then it is free to determine under its own laws whether defendant's Arizona plea 
constitutes a conviction for purposes of the three strikes law"); Farmers & Merchants Trust Co. 
v. Madeira, 261 Cal. App. 2d 503,508, 68 Cal. Rptr. 184, 188 (Ct. App. 1968) ("If the judgment 
is a penal judgment it is not enforceable in this state under either the full faith and credit clause 
of the United States Constitution or as a matter of comity.") ("It is the prevailing rule throughout 
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this country that no action can be maintained in one state to recover money extracted as 
punishment for a civil wrong committed under the laws of another state."); SH v. Adm 'r of 
Golden Valley Health Ctr., 386 N.W.2d 805, 807 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (while not deciding the 
merits of the case, recognizing that the "full faith and credit clause ... does not require a state to 
enforce the penal judgment of another state"); MGM Desert Inn, Inc. v. Holz, 411 S.E.2d 399, 
402 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) ("One exception to the full faith and credit rule is a penal judgment; a 
state need not enforce the penal judgment of another state."); Russo v. Dear, 105 S.W.3d 43, 46 
(Tex. App. 2003) (recognizing that penal judgments are not entitled to full faith and credit as 
they are among the recognized exceptions to the full faith and credit requirements). 
The scope of the penal law rule covers remedies that go to the public, rather than 
to private individuals. In Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., the Supreme Court wrote that the 
penal law rule applied to all suits in favor of the State for the recovery of pecuniary penalties for 
any violation of municipal laws. 127 U.S. at 290. The Supreme Court explained: 
The rule that the courts of no country execute the penal laws of 
another applies not only to prosecutions and sentences for crimes 
and misdemeanors, but to all suits in favor ofthe State for lite 
recovery of pecuniary penalties for any violation of statutes for 
tlte protection o(its revenue, or other municipal laws, and to all 
iudgments for suclt penalties. If this were not so, all that would 
be necessary to give ubiquitous effect to a penal law would be to 
put tjle claim for a penalty into the shape of a judgment. 
Wisconsin, 127 U.S. at 290 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court held that a judgment of the 
state of Wisconsin for a penalty against a Louisiana insurance company for failure to properly 
register was not enforceable by the federal courts. The Supreme Court explained: 
The cause of action was not any private injury, but solely the 
offence committed against the State by violating her law. The 
prosecution was in tlte name oftlte State, and tlte whole penaltv. 
when recovered, would accrue to the State, and be paid, one half 
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into her treasury, and the other half to her insurance commissioner, 
who pays all expenses of prosecuting for and collecting such 
forfeitures. 
Wisconsin, 127 U.S. at 299 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court went on to explain: 
The real nature of the case is not affected by the forms provided by 
the law of the State for the punishment of the offence. It is 
immaterial whether, by the law of Wisconsin, the prosecution must 
be by indictment or by action; or whether, under that law, a 
judgment there obtained for the penalty might be enforced by 
execution, by scirefacias, or by a new suit. In whatever form the 
State pursues her right to punish the offence against her 
sovereignty, every step of the proceeding tends to one end, the 
compelling the offender to pay a pecuniary fine by way of 
punishment/or the offence. 
Wisconsin, 127 U.S. at 299 (emphasis added). 
In Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892), the Supreme Court explained the 
distinction between penal laws and laws that compensate individuals for damages. 146 U.S. at 
668. The Supreme Court explained: 
Crimes and offences against the laws of any State can only be 
defined, prosecuted and pardoned by the sovereign authoritv of 
that State; and the authorities, legislative, executive or judicial, of 
other States take no action with regard to them, except by way of 
extradition to surrender offenders to the State whose laws they 
have violated, and whose peace they have broken. 
Huntington, 146 U.S. at 669 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court also explained: 
The test whether a law is penal, in the strict and primary sense, is 
whether the wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong to the 
public, or a wrong to the individual, according to the familiar 
classification of Blackstone: "Wrongs are divisible into two sorts 
or species: private wrongs and public wrongs. The former are an 
infringement or privation of the private or civil rights belonging 
to individuals, considered as individuals; and are thereupon 
frequently termed civil injuries: the latter are a breach and 
violation ofpublic rights and duties, which affect the whole 
communitv, considered as a communitv; and are distinguished by 
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the harsher appellation of crimes and misdemeanors." 3 Bl. Com. 
2. 
Huntington, 146 U.S. at 668-69 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court also gave the following 
distinction: 
The question whether a statute of one State, which in some aspects 
may be called penal, is a penal law in the international sense, so 
that it cannot be enforced in the courts of another State, depends 
upon the question whether its purpose is to punish an offence 
against the public iustice ofthe State, or to afford a private 
remedy to a person iniured by the wrongful act. 
Huntington, 146 U.S. at 673-74 (emphasis added). 
The Ninth Circuit explained that penal judgments are those intended to punish an 
offense against the public justice of the foreign state. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Cantre Le Racisme 
Et L 'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1219 (9th Cir. 2006) (en bane). The test to determine the 
penal nature of a judgment 
is not by what name the statute [ on which the judgment is based] is 
called by the legislature or the courts of the State in which it was 
passed, but whether it appears to the tribunal which is called upon 
to enforce it to be, in its essential character and effect, a 
punishment of an offense against the public, or a grant of a civil 
right to a private person. 
Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1219 (emphasis added); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 
376 U.S. at 413 n.15 (a penal law for purposes of the penal law rule "is one which seeks to 
redress a public rather than a private wrong"). 
The Ninth Circuit has ruled that the law for the enforcement of tribal judgments is 
the law of comity applied to judgments issued by foreign countries. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 
F.3d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1997). The application of the penal law rule is consistent with the 
Supreme Court's limitation of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers to "consensual relationships." 
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Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. The majority opinion wrote that the term '"other arrangement' is 
clearly another private consensual relationship, from which the official actions at issue in this 
case are far removed." 533 U.S. at 359 n.3. Justice O'Conner disagreed with the breadth of this 
statement, and the majority opinion responded as follows: 
The concurrence exaggerates and distorts the consequences of our 
conclusion, that the term "other arrangements" in a passage from 
Montana referred to other "private consensual" arrangements - so 
that it did not include the state officials' obtaining of tribal 
warrants in the present case. That conclusion is correct, as a fuller 
exposition of the passage from Montana makes clear: 
"To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power 
to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-
Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. 
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other 
means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual 
relationships with the tribe or its members, through 
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other 
arrangements." 
450 U.S., at 565. 
The Court (this is an opinion, bear in mind, not a statute) obviously 
did not have in mind States or state officers acting in their 
governmental capacity; it was referring to private individuals who 
voluntarily submitted themselves to tribal regulatory jurisdiction 
by"the arrangements that they (or their employers) entered into. 
533 U.S. at 371-72 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
This distinction between voluntary or consensual relationships is similar to the 
distinction in the penal law rule between fines and penalties and contractual relationships for 
purposes of the penal law rule of Section 483: 
A judgment for a fine or penalty is within this section; a judgment 
in favor of a foreign state arising out of a contract, a tort, a loan 
guaranty, or similar civil controversy is not penal for purposes of 
this section. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
ORDER OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT - 24 Client:4149493.1~ \ 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LA w OF THE UNITED STA TES § 483, cmt. b 
(1987). 
In this way, the penal law rule is consistent with Montana's first exception, both 
of which preclude jurisdiction where the claim of jurisdiction is based on tribal government 
compulsion of nonmember conduct. Similarly, both allow jurisdiction if the person has 
voluntarily entered into a contractual relationship with the government. 
Based on these rules, it seems clear that the judgment at issue in this case is based 
on a penal law, or a law that punishes an offense against the public or the Tribe as a whole. As a 
result, it should not be recognized by this Court. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Defendants respectfully request that the tribal 
government's motion be denied. 
DATED this 6th day of May, 2016. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By ,J----- ""\,-~~ 
Norman M. Semanko - ~e Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
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the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Everett B. Coulter Jr. 
EV ANS CRAVEN & LACKIE, PS 
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Facsimile (509) 455-3632 
Attorneys for P la inti.ff 
Courtesy Copy: 
Honorable Daniel J. McGee 
SHOSHONE COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT 
700 Bank St. 
Wallace, ID 83873 
Facsimile (208) 556-1910 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
~vemight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
{ '):.Overnight Mail 
iXJ Facsimile 
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PlL.fl 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO nFNF W:A. 8 r0UNTY 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe 
vs. 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
701 WEST COLLEGE A VENUE, SUITE 203 
ST. MARIES, IDAHO 83861 
2016 HAY 13 8¥:a 
Case No: CV-2016-0000025 
,DEPUl:S 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER REASSIGNMENT OF JUDGE 
Kenneth Johnson, etal. 
Based upon the Judgment Exceeding $10,000 in this case.It is Hereby Ordered that the above 
~ssigned case previously appointed to Honorable Daniel McGee is hereby now appointed to 
Honorable Scott Wayman in the District Court of Benewah County. 
Copies to: 
Everett B Coulter 
Norman M Semanko 
Case #CV2016-0025 Gut-\ Tribe v Johnson - Mtn re Foreign Jdn .. 3B-COURTROOM1 
Time Speaker Note 
8:52:40 AM jJudge Wayman Parties Present: Everett Coulter, Atty for Plaintiff; Norman 
iClerk Batson Semanko, Atty for Defendants; Kenneth & Donna Johnson, 
.......................................... .1. .................................................... Defendants ......................................................................... b! .. C\ ..... Q.L Affill\6n ............................ . 
9:31 :58 AM l Judge Calls Court 
9:33: 15 AM • Judge Wayman This case was Orginally assigned to Judge Payne and 
Reassigned to Judge McGee. I had lunch with Judge McGee 
yesterday and he had a funeral to go to so I was happy to cover 
1his case. I have reviewed the file. There is a Judgment in the 
!amount of over 17,000 and should have been assigned to the ! District Court. So I have signed an Order assigning to District 
lCourt. Idaho rule of Civil Procedure you may disqualify new 
Judge within 7 days of the Order of reassignment. It appears to 
me the Plaintiff has already exercised the right, but the Johnson 
do have the right. If you would like more time to exercise the 
Disqualification I will vacate this hearing and reschedule this 
case. Another option is to agree to allow me to hear the case 
land waive the right to the Disqualification and we can go forward 
!today. We could also continue this hearing till later today so you 
jean talk to your clients. This happens sometimes and I want to 
!make sure everyone rights are protected. I want to make sure 
lyou are comfortable with me serving as your Judge. 
9:39:43 AM iMr Coultre jThe Johnson Reply Memorandum I did not get it till Tueday. We 
l !would like an oppurtunity to reply and address under federal 
! lindain law. I would like till next friday to file response and breif 
j ~ 
9:40:44 AM lMr Semenko lvou presiding will not be an issue with us. We had it over 
l \nighted to arrive on Friday. I am here an awful lot so I have no 
l /problem being here for hearing. I would like 60 seconds to refer 
l )o my clients on the diqualification. My Clients have no desire to 
l ldiqualify you under idaho rule. 
9:42:58 AM I Mr Coultre I The issues in the brief we do not need oral arguement. Would 
1 /like it set down the road. 
9:44: 11 AM t Mr Semenko iwe have no problem we would like oral agruement. I think this ! !will need 1 /2 hour and fine with rescheduling or proceeding 
' !today. 
9:44:58 AM Judge 1 I hate continuiing things. I will vacate today hearing and 
\ reschedule till another day you will have 14 days to file you 
response. Reset for June 10th at 11 :00 
.............................. ·············r··········· ...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................  
9:46:57 AM !Judge Mr & Ms Johnson hopfully I can give you a decision June 10th 
9:47:29 AM Judge jEnd 
5/13/2016 1 of1 e,5 
-~' L i J. y..._1 
EVERETT B. COULTER, JR. 
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. 
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250 
Spokane, WA 99201-0910 
(509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632 
Attorneys for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
COUER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2016-0025 
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE'S REPLY IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ORDER 
OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN 
JUDGMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The underlying case is about the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's ("the Tribe") ability to 
exclude structures from encroaching on tribal land. The Tribal Court entered a default 
judgment against the Johnsons after they failed to appear in the case and refused to either 
pay a fee or remove their encroachment prior to the Tribe bringing suit. To be clear, the 
Tribal Court judgment has two parts. The first part is an order which directs the removal. 
of the encroaching dock. The second part is a civil penalty in the amount of $17,400. 
The matter currently pending before this Court is the Tribe's Motion for an Order 
which recognizes the validity of the Tribal Court judgment in order that the Tribe may 
enforce the judgment rendered in Tribal Court. The Johnsons, who only just recently 
appeared in this matter, oppose the Tribe's currently pending motion. 
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE'S 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR ORDER OF RECOGNITION Page 1 
Idaho law holds, as stated by the Idaho Supreme Court, a judgment by a tribal 
court is entitled to Full Faith and Credit under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 and the U.S. 
Constitution. Sheppard v. Sheppard, l 04 Idaho 1, 7-8 (1982)("Tribal court decrees, while 
not precisely equivalent to decrees of the courts of sister state, are nevertheless entitled to 
full faith and credit" and "More recently the Supreme Court has indicated, citing Cox 
with approval, that full faith and credit analysis is appropriately applied to tribal courts. 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65-66 n.21 (1978)). 
In Idaho, "A final judgment entered by a court of competent jurisdiction is 
presumed valid and therefore the party asserting the invalidity of the judgment must carry 
the burden of proof sufficient to overcome the presumption." Sheppard, l 04 Idaho at 7. 
Since the Johnsons oppose the judgment of the Tribal Court they bear the burden to 
overcome the presumption of validity. Just as in Sheppard where the objecting party was 
not able to provide sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of validity and the 
Court recognized the tribal judgment, the Johnsons have not presented any evidence 
overcoming the presumption that the Tribal judgment in this case is valid. Rather than 
relying on any evidence, the J ohnsons rely on bare assertion. 
The Johnsons object to the validity of the tribal court judgment on the following 
ground: 1) I.C. § 10-1301 is not applicable; 2) the Tribal Court lacked personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction as required by comity; 3) insufficient due process; and 4) 
recognition of the judgment is barred by the Penal Law Rule. 
As set forth below: 1) the Johnsons simply misread I.C. § 10-1301; 2) the Tribe 
does have personal and subject matter jurisdiction because the Tribe has the power to 
exclude encroachments from Tribal land, 3) the Johnsons received more due process than 
required under Idaho law; and 4) there is no legal authority suggesting the Penal Law 
Rule is applicable to Tribal judgments. 
It is important and significant to note the Johnsons have not presented any 
evidence to the Court substantiating any of their factual claims. Absent any evidence, the 
Johnsons simply cannot overcome a presumption of validity. See, Sheppard, 104 Idaho at 
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8-9 ("Absent such evidence, he has failed to carry his burden of proving that the tribal 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.") 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Johnsons Misstates The Plain Language Of Idaho Code§ 10-1301 
The Johnsons argues Idaho Code § 10-1301 applies only to orders "regarding the 
support of a child, spouse, or former spouse or the establishment of paternity." 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, p. 1-2. The Johnsons have significantly 
misread this statute. In full, Idaho Code§ 10-1301 states: 
In this act "foreign judgment" means any judgment, decree, or order of a 
court of the United States or of any other court or an order of an 
administrative body of any state regarding the support of a child, spouse, 
or former spouse or the establishment of paternity which is entitled to full 
faith and credit in this state. 
I. C. § 10-1301 ( emphasis added). By its plain language, this statute is a definition and list 
of items which qualify as foreign judgments. Each item on the list is separated by the 
word 'or.' I.C. § 10-1301. The term 'or' "should ordinarily be given its normal 
disjunctive meaning .... " Filer Mt. Telephone Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 76 
Idaho 256, 261, 281 P.2d 478 (1995). "The word 'or' is defined as a function word to 
indicate (1) an alternative between different or unlike things, states, or actions ... ; (2) [a] 
choice between alternative things, states, or courses .... " WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993)." State v. Rivera, 131 Idaho 8, 11, 951 P.2d 
528 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Although the statute had two parts the J ohnsons interpretation of Section 10-1301 
eliminates the first portion of the statute which states '"foreign judgment' means any 
judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other court .... " 
(Emphasis added). The second portion of Section 10-1301 goes on to include certain 
family law orders by stating " . . . or an order of an administrative body of any state 
regarding the support of a child, spouse, or former spouse or the establishment of 
paternity which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state." (Emphasis added). 
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Clearly, the Johnsons have misread Section 10-1301 and their request to deny the 
Tribe's pending Motion on this basis should be denied. 
B. Idaho Recognizes the Judgments of Tribal Courts Through The Full Faith 
and Credit Clause 
Defendants ask this Court to overrule the Idaho Supreme Court by evaluating 
whether to recognize a judgment from the Tribal Court under the principles of comity 
rather than the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Defendants' 
Memorandum in Opposition, p. 2. Further, the Johnsons appear to argue Sheppard only 
applies to family law cases. Although Sheppard was a case involving family law issues, 
the Johnsons' cite in support of the argument that Sheppard is limited only to matters of 
family law does not reveal any language in the text which appears to support the same. 
Rather, the Idaho Supreme Court in Sheppard engaged in a comprehensive analysis of 
authorities supporting a full faith and credit analysis and authorities supporting a comity 
analysis. The Sheppard court concluded, "Tribal court decrees, while not precisely 
equivalent to decrees of the sister states, are nevertheless entitled to full faith and credit." 
Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 7, 655 P.2d 895 (1982). In so holding, the Idaho Supreme Court 
cited the United States Supreme Court case Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 
65-66 n. 21 (1978) and United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe, 18 How. 100, 15 L.Ed. 299 
(1856). 
Even if this Court were to consider recognizing the Tribal Court Judgment under 
the principals of comity the Judgment should be recognized. "As a general principle, 
Federal courts should recognize and enforce tribal judgments" so long as the tribal court 
has "both personal and subject matter jurisdiction" and "the defendant ... was afforded 
due process of law." Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997). As set 
forth below, the Tribal Court had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction and the 
Johnsons were afforded more than adequate due process. 
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Still, the law of Idaho is that Idaho courts are to determine whether to recognize a 
tribal judgments through the framework of full faith and credit. Therefore, this Court 
should decline the Defendant's invitation to change Idaho law. 
C. Coeur D'Alene Tribe Has Jurisdiction Over Land Within Its Boundaries 
The Johnsons next argue that the Tribal Court lacked personal and subject matter 
jurisdiction. However the "Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate 
forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and 
property interests of both Indians and non-Indians." Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 65. 
There is no dispute in the federal courts that a tribe's civil authority includes the authority 
to exclude from its land. See, e.g., Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. 
LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 201l)("In considering the extent of a tribe's civil 
authority over non-Indians on tribal land, we first acknowledge the long-standing rule 
that Indian tribes possess inherent sovereign powers, including the authority to 
exclude."); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333 (1983)("A tribe's 
power to exclude nonmembers entirely or to condition their presence on the reservation is 
... well established."). 
The Tribe has engaged in this litigation to rectify the issue of the Johnsons' 
encroaching dock since October 14, 2014. Prior to this litigation, the Tribe unsuccessfully 
attempted to settle their dispute with the Johnsons. Once settlement efforts failed the 
Johnsons received service of process of the Summons and Complaint. The Johnsons did 
not appear but continued to receive notice of each action in Tribal Court. The Johnsons 
now challenge the jurisdiction of the Tribal Court after appearing for the first time after 
nearly nineteen months of litigation. Since tribes have the jurisdiction over the lands, 
which includes the power to exclude from their land, the Tribe has jurisdiction in this 
matter. 
a. Johnsons were required to exhaust jurisdictional objections in Tribal 
Court of Coeur D'Alene Tribe 
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The United States Supreme Court has held litigants in tribal court are required to 
challenge the jurisdiction of the tribal court in tribal court. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987) ("[T]he federal policy supporting tribal self-government 
directs a federal court to stay its hand in order to give the tribal court a full opportunity 
to determine its own jurisdiction ... unconditional access to the federal forum would 
place it in direct competition with the tribal courts, thereby impairing the latter's 
authority over reservation affairs."). 
The Supreme Court cases of Iowa Mutual Insurance Company ("Iowa Mutual") 
and National Farmers Union Insurance Companies ("National Farmers Union") is 
controlling in this case. Both Iowa Mutual and National Farmers Uniion involved civil 
defendants who did not challenge the jurisdiction of the tribal court in tribal court. Iowa 
Mutual, 480 U.S. 9 (1987); National Farmers, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). Instead the 
defendants in both cases waited to challenge the jurisdiction of the tribal court in federal 
court. In National Farmers the Supreme Court declined to address the issue of personal 
jurisdiction until the issue was first resolved by the tribal court. National Farmers, 471 
U.S. at 857 ("Until petitioners have exhausted the remedies available to them in the 
Tribal Court system ... it would be premature for a federal court to consider any 
relief.") In Iowa Mutual, the Court reaffirmed National Farmers by holding, 
[T]he exhaustion rule announced in National Farmers Union 
applies here as well. Regardless of the basis for jurisdiction, the 
federal policy supporting · tribal self-government directs a 
federal court to stay its hand in order to give the tribal court a 
"full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction. 
*** 
As National Farmers Union indicates, proper respect for tribal 
legal institutions requires that they be give a "full opportunity" 
to consider the issues before them and "to rectify any errors." 
471 U.S., at 857, 105 S.Ct., at 2454. The federal policy of 
promoting tribal self-government encompasses the 
development of the entire tribal court system, including 
appellate courts. At a minimum, exhaustion of tribal remedies 
means that tribal appellate courts must have the opportunity to 
review the determinations of the lower tribal courts .... Until 
appellate review is complete, the Blackfeet Tribal Courts have 
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not had a full opportunity to evaluate the claim and federal 
courts should not intervene. 
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 16-17. Just as in National Farmers Union, the Court in 
Iowa Mutual declined to answer the issue of jurisdiction and reversed the lower court's 
dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
The recent Ninth Circuit case Grand Canyon Skywalk Development, LLC v. 'Sa' 
Nyu Wa Inc., 715 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2013), further explained the requirement that a 
litigant exhaust tribal remedies before challenging the jurisdiction of the tribe in other 
courts. 715 F.3d at 1200. In Skywalk the plaintiff, Skywalk, was a nonmember limited 
liability corporation in a contractual relationship with the Hualapai tribe. In the course of 
their business relationship the tribe utilized eminent domain to acquire Skywalk' s 
interest in the contract through tribal court. Skywalk responded by seeking injunctive 
relief and challenging the tribe's jurisdiction in federal district court. Id. at 1199-1200. 
The Skywalk court declined to consider Skywalks jurisdictional challenge by 
explaining "Federal law has long recognized ... deference to the tribal court as the 
appropriate court of first impression to determine its jurisdiction." Id. at 1200. The court 
further explained its understanding of National Farmers "as determining that tribal court 
exhaustion is not a jurisdictional bar, but rather a prerequisite to a federal court's 
exercise of its jurisdiction. Therefore, under National Farmers, the federal courts should 
not even make a ruling on tribal court jurisdiction . . . until tribal remedies are 
exhausted." Id. at 1200. 
Although this Court is obviously a court of Idaho and not a federal court, the 
same policy considerations which are present in federal court apply equally to state 
court. See, e.g., Sheppard, 104 Idaho at 8 ("We believe that this holding [recognizing a 
tribal judgment] will facilitate better relations between the courts of this state and the 
various tribal courts within Idaho.") Since the Johnsons have not challenged, let alone 
exhausted, the issue of jurisdiction in Tribal Court this Court should decline to examine 
the issue. 
b. The Tribe Has Personal Jurisdiction Over The Johnsons 
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE'S 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR ORDER OF RECOGNITION Page 7 
Tribal courts have jurisdiction to regulate the encroachments of non-members on 
tribal land because it has the power to exclude non-members from their land. See, Water 
Wheel, 642 F.3d at 808 ("[W]e first acknowledge the long-standing rule that Indian tribes 
possess inherent sovereign powers, including the authority to exclude."). 
The Johnsons incorrectly argue the Tribe did not have personal jurisdiction over 
them. Further, the Johnsons' brief fails to provide any real and substantive analysis on 
the issue of jurisdiction that incorporates the facts of the case and the law. Instead, the 
Johnsons generally state, "A primary problem for the tribal court judgment in this matter 
is the tribal court's general lack of jurisdiction over non-tribal members, such as the 
Johnsons." Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, p. 4. Forgetting for a moment that 
this is an inaccurate statement of the law, the J ohnsons then provide four pages of quotes 
and citations to various United States Supreme Court cases. Unfortunately the Johnsons 
do not apply the cited law to the facts of the current case and therefore do not provide 
any real legal analysis regarding the issue of personal jurisdiction. The Johnsons' 
invitation for this court to rule on the issue of personal jurisdiction in a civil case based 
on Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), highlights a lack of 
understanding regarding the developed case law regarding personal jurisdiction in tribal 
courts over non-tribal members for conduct occurring on tribal land in civil actions. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court in National Farmers explained why Oliphant does not apply 
to civil cases. See, e.g., National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 854-55; Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 
15 ("although the criminal jurisdiction of the tribal courts is subject to substantial federal 
limitations, see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe ... their civil jurisdiction is not 
similarly restricted. If state-court jurisdiction over Indians or activities on Indian lands 
would interfere with tribal sovereignty and self-government, the state courts are 
generally divested of jurisdiction as a matter of federal law.") 
In Iowa Mutual the Court did not rule on the issue of jurisdiction but explained, 
"Tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important 
part of tribal sovereignty." 480 U.S. at 18. The Ninth Circuit recognized this rule when it 
stated, "From a tribe's inherent sovereign powers flows lesser powers, including the 
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power to regulate non-Indians on tribal land." Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, 
Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 808-09 (9th Cir. 2011). In so holding the Ninth Circuit 
relied on the United State Supreme Court case South Dakota v. Bourland which held "a 
tribe's power to exclude includes the incidental power to regulate." Water Wheel, 642 
F.3d at 809 (relying on Bourland, 508 U.S. at 689). In another case, the Supreme Court 
stated "A tribe's power to exclude nonmembers entirely or to condition their presence on 
the reservation is ... well established." New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 
U.S. 324,333 (1983). 
The case law on this issue makes clear that before determining whether a tribe has 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant certain factual determinations must be made: the 
identity of the defendant and the factual circumstances under which the alleged injury 
occurred. For example, the answer to the issue of personal jurisdiction is different 
depending on whether the alleged injury occurs on tribal land as compared to non-Indian 
fee land. In Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), the narrow issue was "the 
tribe's ability to exercise its power to exclude only as applied to the regulation of non-
Indians on non-Indian land, not on tribal land." Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 810 (emphasis 
added). As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Water Wheel, the Supreme Court case 
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144-145 (1982), decided one year after 
Montana v. United States and without applying the Montana analysis, held a tribe has 
"inherent authority to exclude non-Indians from tribal land." 642 F.3d at 810. The Ninth 
Circuit has stated "as a general rule, both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have 
recognized that Montana does not affect this fundamental principle as it relates to 
regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians on Indian land." Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 812. 
In the present case, the Johnsons' are non-Indians but own a dock which 
encroaches in to the waterway of and rests on the submerged land of the Coeur D'Alene 
Tribal Reservation. Thus, the case involves the activity of non-Indians on Tribal land. In 
this circumstance, as noted above, the whole weight of federal Indian law holds, 
Tribal authority over activities of non-Indians on reservation 
lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty. Civil 
jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the 
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tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty 
provision or federal statute. 
Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18. 
The present case is similar to Water Wheel. In Water Wheel the lawsuit was "an 
action to evict non-Indians who have violated their conditions of entry and trespassed on 
tribal land." 642 F.3d at 812, n. 7. There the Ninth Circuit held personal jurisdiction for 
trespass existed and explained the trespass "directly implicat[ ed] the tribe's sovereign 
interest in managing its own lands. See Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 334-35." 642 
F.3d at 812, n. 7. In the present case, the Johnsons have not obtained permission to 
maintain an encroachment on tribal land and have violated the conditions which the Tribe 
places on entry and encroachments to the same. Therefore, there can be no doubt the 
Tribal Court had personal jurisdiction to adjudicate the Johnsons encroaching and 
trespassing dock. 
c. The Tribe Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Encroachments On Tribal 
Land 
In addition to personal jurisdiction, a tribal court must have subject matter 
jurisdiction. Here, the tribe has subject matter jurisdiction because the controversy 
involves conduct (the encroachment) occurring on Tribal land. In addition, just as is the 
case regarding personal jurisdiction, the Johnsons are required to exhaust their subject 
matter jurisdiction arguments to the Tribal Court prior to raising them here. 
The Johnsons dispute the Tribe has subject matter jurisdiction based on an 
argument that the submerged lands existing at the time of statehood has increased by 
approximately 6.5 feet due to a dam. The Johnsons further assert that their dock is located 
within this "additional" 6.5 feet of submerged land. The problem with the Johnsons' 
argument and factual assertions is that they have submitted no evidence to rebut the 
finding of the Tribe that the dock encroaches on Tribal land. 
The property at issue is owned by the Johnsons and located at what is commonly 
referred to as 520 Shepherd Rd., St. Maries, ID 83861. This property sits on the bank of, 
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and has a dock which extends in to, the St. Joe River. Title to the land underlying this 
portion of the St. Joe River is held in trust by the federal government for the Coeur 
d'Alene Tribe. Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. at 265. 1 The Tribe has "exclusive 
sovereignty and dominion over the submerged lands and waters within the area now 
known as the Coeur d'Alene Reservation." CTC 44-1.01. Therefore, the Tribal Court had 
exclusive jurisdiction over the Johnsons' encroachment and any suit for possession, 
trespass, or civil penalty resulting from violation of Chapter 44 of the Coeur d'Alene 
Tribal Code. CTC 44-24.01 (e). The Johnsons' bare assertions to the contrary are 
unsupported by any evidence in the record. 
Despite having full notice of the proceedings against them, the Johnsons chose 
not to appear to challenge any portion of the Tribe's claims. The Johnsons now argue the 
Tribe's ownership "cannot be presumed." The Johnsons had notice and a full opportunity 
to contest the issue of whether their dock encroached on tribal land and thus had subject 
matter jurisdiction. They chose not to. Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 288, 221 P.3d 
81 (2009) ("Idaho law imposes an obligation on defendants to seek counsel and does not 
permit willful ignorance of the proceedings."). The Tribe respectfully requests this Court 
not permit the Johnsons to be willfully ignorant and ignore the Tribal Court proceedings 
for over a year-and-a-half, despite notice of the proceedings, and now challenge the result 
because they do not like the outcome. The Johnsons should have exhausted their 
jurisdictional challenges in tribal court and should not now be permitted to challenge the 
merits of the case or jurisdiction here. 
d. The Tribe Has Given Def end ants More Due Process Than Idaho Law 
Entitles Litigants. 
The Johnsons argue they did not receive the minimum amount of due process 
necessary for the Tribal Court judgment to be recognized in Idaho. Defendants' 
Memorandum in Opposition, p. 12. The procedural due process "requirement is met when 
1 
"The question is whether the National government holds title, in trust for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe, to 
lands underlying portions of Lake Coeur d'Alene and the St. Joe River. We hold that it does." Idaho, 533 
U.S. at 265. 
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the defendant is provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard." Neighbors for a 
Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 127, 176 P.3d 126 (2007). 
The J ohnsons makes vague and unsupported accusations that the trial court is "of 
course ... dominated" by tribal government, biased "as reflected in the tribal code," and 
that the Tribe "has not hesitated to impose a large civil penalty of $500 per day." 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, p. 12. The Johnsons offer absolutely no 
evidence to support these conclusory allegations and bare assertions. Further, the 
Johnsons' brief completely fails to recognize any of the notice of proceedings they 
received from the Tribe even though they did not appear. The Tribe fully identified the 
notice and due process given to the non-appearing Defendants in the Tribes previously 
filed Memorandum in Support of Motion For an Order of Valid Registration of Foreign 
Judgment at page 2-3. For the sake of brevity the Tribe will only list the notice and due 
process the Defendants have received: 
• Served with Summons and Complaint on October 14, 2014 
• Copy of Order of Default on March 17, 2015 
• Notice of Hearing for Motion of Entry of Judgment on March 24, 2015 
• Clerk's Notice of Filing of Foreign Judgment on January 26, 2016 
• Notice of Hearing Re: Plaintiffs Motion for Order of Recognition of 
Foreign Judgment mailed and all supporting papers on March 4, 2016 
The Johnsons in this case received a copy of the Summons and Complaint and 
therefore received "notice and an opportunity to be heard." See Neighbors for a Healthy 
Gold Fork, 145 Idaho at 127 (The procedural due process "requirement is met when the 
defendant is provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard."). As previously 
mentioned by the Tribe, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not entitle defendants who 
have not appeared in a lawsuit to receive notice of an application for default judgment. 
Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283,288,221 P.3d 81 (2009); see also, Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 55(b)(2). However, the Tribe's Rules of Civil Procedure contain the extra 
procedural safeguard which is above and beyond Idaho law by requiring the non-
appearing party to receive notice of the default judgment. See, Coeur d'Alene Tribal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 53(a)(2). The Tribe complied with the notice requirement found 
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in the Tribal Code which resulted in the Tribe providing the Johnsons with four more 
"layers" of due process than they would have been entitled to in the courts of Idaho. See, 
e.g., Meyers, 148 Idaho at 288 ("initial service of process and also a mailed notice of the 
Entry of Default" satisfies due process even when the defendant does nothing). 
As it relates to the accusation that Defendants did not receive due process as a 
result of the "particularly biased" tribal court, this argument should be rejected as 
baseless. The Supreme Court has previously rejected arguments of "local bias and 
incompetence" when objecting to tribal court jurisdiction. In Iowa Mutual the Supreme 
Court held, 
Petitioner also contends that the policies underlying the grant of 
diversity jurisdiction-protection against local bias and 
incompetence-justify the exercise of federal jurisdiction in this 
case. We have rejected similar attacks on tribal court jurisdiction in 
the past. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S., at 65, 
and n. 21, 98 S.Ct., at 1680, and n. 21. The alleged incompetence 
of tribal courts is not among the exceptions to the exhaustion 
requirement established in National Farmers Union, 471 U.S., at 
856, n. 21, 105 S.Ct., at 2454, n. 21, and would be contrary to the 
congressional policy promoting the development of tribal courts. 
Moreover, the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302, provides 
non-Indians with various protections against unfair treatment in the 
tribal courts. 
480 U.S. at18-19. 
Defendant also argues the Tribe "has not hesitated to impose a large civil penalty 
of $500 per day." The Tribe is unclear if the Johnsons are arguing the Tribe has not 
hesitated to impose a $500 per day civil penalty in this case or in other cases. To the 
extent the Johnsons were referencing other cases, such facts would be irrelevant to 
determining the issue of due process in the present case even if those alleged cases had 
been identified. 
To the extent the Johnsons are arguing the Tribe did not hesitate to "impose a 
large civil penalty of $500 per day" in the present case, they are simply wrong. First, 
although the Coeur D'Alene Tribal Code does authorize a civil penalty in the amount of 
$500 per day, CIC 44-24.01, the Tribe only sought and received a penalty of $100 per 
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day. The Tribe's decision to only seek 20% of what they were entitled to seek was made 
to demonstrate the Tribe's good will towards its neighbors even when those neighbors 
fail to respect the sovereignty of the Coeur D'Alene Tribe. Second, the J ohnsons do not 
provide any argument or comparative analysis of other penalties which demonstrates a 
$500 per day penalty is "a large civil penalty" or this it violates due process. In any event, 
the point is not relevant as the Tribe did not seek or receive a $500 per day penalty 
against the Johnsons. 
The evidence in this case, Supreme Court case law, and Idaho law refutes each of 
the Johnsons' arguments regarding a deficiency in due process. The Johnsons received 
more due process than required by Idaho law. The Supreme Court has previously rejected 
an allegation of bias as reason to not exhaust tribal remedies. Finally, the argument of 
$500 per day fines being excessive is not relevant since the Tribe did not seek this 
penalty. Therefore, this Court should reject Defendant's arguments that the Johnsons did 
not receive adequate due process. 
D. Penal Law Rule Does Not Apply 
The Johnsons argue the Penal Law Rule prohibits this Court from recognizing the 
monetary penalty imposed by the Tribal Court against them for their encroachment. The 
Johnsons do not argue application of the Penal Law Rule to the order ejecting the 
encroachment, only the fine. Significantly, the Johnsons have not cited any case law 
applying the Penal Law Rule to tribal judgments. 
Comity generally holds that "one notation affords recognition within its territory 
to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation." US. v. Federative 
Republic of Brazil, 748 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2014). The Penal Law Rule is an exception to 
the principles of comity and the Full Faith and Credit clause. Id at 91. The Penal law 
Rule holds that the Courts of one country will not execute the penal laws of another. Id. 
at 92 (citing The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825). 
The policy reasons on which the Penal Law Rule rest are not applicable to the 
judgment of tribal courts. Further, the trust relationship between federally recognized 
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tribes and the United States is significantly different that the relationship between the 
various states and between the United States and other nations. This Court should deny 
Defendants' application of the rule to this case. 
In Sheppard v. Sheppard the Idaho Supreme Court indicated that courts should 
consider holdings that "facilitate better relations between the courts of this state and the 
various tribal courts within Idaho." This reasoning is a reflection of the special 
relationship between tribes, the federal government, and the State of Idaho. In Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, Chief Justice John Marshall described the relationship between tribes 
and the federal government as "domestic dependent nations" and which "resemble that of 
a ward to his guardian." 30 U.S. 1, 17. Justice Marshall went on to say "They look to our 
government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to 
their wants .... " Id. at 17. The unique position of Indian tribes "is perhaps unlike that of 
any other two people in existence .... But the relation of the Indians to the United States 
is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else." Id. at 16. 
Cohens 's Handbook of Federal Indian Law describes the trust relationship as, 
A robust and protective trust doctrine evolved in the contemporary 
era, however. Nearly every piece of modern legislation dealing 
with Indian tribes contains a statement reaffirming the trust 
relationship between tribes and the federal governments. Many 
administrative actions invoke the trust relationship as a basis for 
regulations implementing federal statutes. Most modem 
presidents' policy statements regarding tribes also reaffirm the 
trust relationship. 
§ 5.04(3)(a), 2012 Edition. Because of the unique relationship "which exist[s] nowhere 
else" this Court should decline to follow case law involving the relationship between the 
various states and the relationship between the United States and foreign nations. 
In essence, the Johnsons are asking this Court to do two things. First, the 
Johnsons ask this Court to breach the trust relationship afforded Indian tribes by refusing 
to recognize the judgment of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe. The Johnsons' request would 
foreclose a tribe's ability to use its judicial system to seek redress for injuries committed 
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by non-Indians against the tribe while on tribal land. This result is not supported by any 
policy or case law. Second, the Johnsons ask this state court to expand federal common 
law as it relates to the Penal Law Rule. In making this request Defendant offers no legal 
authority in the pantheon of Indian case law, treatises, or other secondary sources which 
supports the application of the Penal Law Rule to tribes. Nor has the Tribe been able to 
find such case law. Thus, this court would have to expand federal common law prior to 
applying it in this case. 
Therefore, this Court should deny the Johnsons invitation to enlarge federal 
common law by applying the Penal Law Rule to a circumstance in which it has never 
been applied. 
III. CONCLUSION 
As noted at the outset of the Tribe's Reply, in Idaho "A final judgment entered by 
a court of competent jurisdiction is presumed valid and therefore the party asserting the 
invalidity of the judgment must carry the burden of proof sufficient to overcome the 
presumption." Sheppard, 104 Idaho at 7. Therefore, the Johnsons must present evidence 
which overcomes the presumption of validity. The Johnsons' various arguments are 
unsupported by any evidence or case law. Therefore, the Tribe respectfully requests this 
Court deny each of the Johnsons' objections and grant the Tribe's Motion for an Order 
of Recognition of the Tribal Court judgment. 
DATED this ~May, 2016. 
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WHEREAS the Honorable Fred M. Gibler serving as District Judge of the First 
Judicial District has recently retired, and 
WHEREAS Scott Wayman has been appointed as District Judge for the First 
Judicial District, to fill the vacancy created by Judge Gibler's retirement, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all cases previously assigned to Judge Gibler as 
District Judge, #115, be and hereby are, assigned to the Honorable Scott Wayman, #009. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Order of Reassignment be 
placed in the file of each case reassigned to Judge Wayman. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the District Court of each county 
within the First Judicial District shall mail a copy of the Order of Reassignment to 
counsel for each of the parties, or, if either of the parties are represented pro se, directly 
to the pro se litigant in each case to be reassigned. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
COVER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Benewah ) 
Case No. CV-2016-0025 
AFFIDAVIT OF KENNETH JOHNSON 
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR ORDER OF 
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN 
JUDGMENT 
Kenneth Johnson, having been duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as 
follows: 
AFFIDAVIT OF KENNETH JOHNSON - 1 Client:4164279.1 lD~ 
1. I am over eighteen years of age and am a party to the above-entitled 
action. I make this affidavit upon my own personal knowledge and I am competent to testify 
regarding the matters contained herein. 
2. On May 19, 2016, I took measurement readings of the water levels on 
pilings in the St. Joe River, located at my property, 520 Shephard Road, St. Maries, Idaho 83861. 
My wife, Donna Johnson, took pictures of the measurement readings on the pilings on this date. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A, is a true and correct copy of a picture, taken 
by my wife on April 18, 2016, of the above-mentioned pilings. The picture depicts the location 
of the pilings from the shore, located at my property. The picture is a fair and accurate 
representation of the pilings and other objects in the picture. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit B, is a true and correct copy of a picture, taken 
by my wife on April 18, 2016, of the above-mentioned pilings. The picture depicts the location 
of the pilings from the shore, located at my property. The picture is a fair and accurate 
representation of the pilings and other objects in the picture. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit C, is a true and correct copy of a picture, taken 
by my wife on May 19, 2016, of the piling closest to the shore. The picture depicts the reading 
of the water measurement at a depth of three (3) feet, six (6) and a halfinches. The picture is a 
fair and accurate representation of the measurement on the piling closest to the shore on May 19. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit D, is a true and correct copy of a picture, taken 
by my wife on May 19, 2016, of the piling furthest from the shore. The picture depicts the 
reading of the water measurement at a depth of four ( 4) feet, eight (8) inches. The picture is a 
fair and accurate representation of the measurement on the piling furthest from the shore on May 
19. 
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7. On May 19, 2016, I observed that the water level of the St. Joe River was 
recorded on the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) website as 
2128.35 feet. Based on my personal knowledge, this is four ( 4) inches below the summer river 
level. 
8. My dock, the bulk of which I have caused to be removed, was affixed to 
the pilings described herein. 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
Ke~~~ 
. 3;s+ SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this-=--- day of May, 2016. 
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JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Everett B. Coulter Jr. 
EV ANS CRAVEN & LACKIE, PS 
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250 
Spokane, WA 99201-0910 
Facsimile (509) 455-3632 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
COUER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2016-0025 
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE'S MOTION 
TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF 
KENNETH JOHNSON 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff in the above case, by and through its attorneys, 
Everett B. Coulter, Jr., of Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S., and moves the Court for an 
Order Striking the Affidavit of Kenneth Johnson as untimely, irrelevant, expert testimony 
from an unqualified witness, and offers hearsay testimony. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The issue currently pending before this Court is whether the Coeur D'Alene 
Tribal Court Judgment (hereinafter "the Tribal Judgment") in favor of the Coeur D'Alene 
Tribe (hereinafter "the Tribe") and against the Johnsons should be recognized under 
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Idaho law. The Tribe initiated these proceedings by filing a motion and legal 
memorandum, the Johnsons filed a Response, and the Tribe filed a Reply. Then, on June 
2, 2016, the Coeur D'Alene Tribe received the Affidavit of Kenneth Johnson in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment 
(hereinafter "the Johnson Affidavit"). The Johnson Affidavit submits four pictures and 
other information regarding the water level of the St. Joe River. It is unclear how the 
information contained within the Johnson Affidavit is relevant to the issue of whether 
Idaho should recognize the Tribal Court judgment pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause (or principals of comity as the Johnsons have previously advocated) or what Rule 
of Idaho Civil Procedure the Johnsons rely on in submitting the same. In addition, the 
Johnsons never provided the information contained within the Johnson Affidavit to the 
Tribal Court for consideration in the underlying litigation. In short, it appears the 
Johnsons are attempting to litigate the underlying dispute on the merits before this Court 
even though the merits are not before this Court and even though the Johnsons willfully 
choose to not appear or answer the Tribe's Complaint in Tribal Court. 
Therefore, the Tribe respectfully requests this Court strike the Johnson Affidavit 
because it is untimely, irrelevant to the sole issue before this Court, scientific testimony, 
and, in part, prohibited by the rule against hearsay. 
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS 
A. The Johnson Affidavit Is Untimely and Not Permitted by the Rules. 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a motion and supporting brief 
shall be filed with the court and served on the parties at least fourteen days prior to the 
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hearing date. I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(E). The Rules further provide that any responsive briefs 
shall be filed with the court and served on the other parties "at least seven (7) days prior 
to the hearing." I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(E). The Rules finally allow the moving party to file a 
reply. I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(E); Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dept. of Admin., 159 Idaho 
813, 220 (2016). The Rules do not allow for the non-moving party to submit affidavits or 
other legal arguments after their responsive brief or after the moving party has replied. 
The Rules recognize litigants must serve opposing briefs and affidavits within certain 
time limits so that an opposing party may adequately respond. Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 
153 Idaho 801, 805 (2012) (discussing time requirements in connection with summary 
judgment proceedings). A court may strike affidavits not complying with time 
requirements. Id. at 805. 
In the present case, the Johnsons served a twenty-five page Response such that the 
Tribe received it on May 10, 2016. The hearing was scheduled for May 13, 2016. This 
three day window violated the Rules and provided an insufficient amount of time for the 
Tribe to draft an adequate reply. The Tribe did not move to strike this late Response but 
instead sought to reschedule the hearing in order to adequately reply. The Tribe filed their 
Reply on May 20. This should have been the final filing of the parties. However, the 
Johnsons now submit the Johnson Affidavit which attempts to improperly insert evidence 
in to the record. The Rules do not provide for further briefing, affidavits, or submissions 
of evidence from the parties regarding the issue before the court. 
In addition, the Johnson Affidavit does not set forth an adequate foundation which 
establishes Mr. Johnson is qualified to testify about scientific measurements of a river's 
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depth or explain other scientific observations of the river. Nor does the affidavit 
adequately set forth the method that was utilized in making the purported measurements. 
In short, there is simply no way to ensure the scientific reliability of the measurements or 
their import. 
Therefore, the Tribe respectfully requests this Court strike the Johnson Affidavit 
as untimely. 
B. The Johnson Affidavit is Irrelevant Because the Water Level Has No Bearing 
of Recognizing a Foreign Judgment 
Even if the Johnson Affidavit were timely filed, served and considered by this 
Court, its contents are irrelevant because the sole issue before this Court is whether to 
recognize a foreign judgment. The depth of the St. Joe River is irrelevant to the legal 
analysis of this issue. 
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that 
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401. "Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible." I.R.E. 402; State v. Elisondo, 114 Idaho 412, 430 (1988). As discussed in 
previous arguments already submitted to this Court, Idaho applies a full faith and credit 
analysis to determine whether to recognize a judgment from a tribal court. Sheppard v. 
Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 7 (1982). Therefore, a judgment from a tribal court with 
competent jurisdiction, "is presumed valid and ... the party asserting the invalidity of the 
judgment must carry the burden of proof sufficient to overcome the presumption." Id. at 
7. 
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In the present case, the Johnsons' Response argued the Tribal Court lacked 
subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The Tribe provided their Reply on May 20, 
2016. Now, the Johnsons submit the Johnson Affidavit without any legal analysis or 
other indication on how its information is relevant. It appears the Johnsons are attempting 
to introduce evidence in this proceeding after the Tribe pointed out in their Reply that 
there was no evidence in the record to support the Johnsons' factual assertions. By 
pointing out their evidentiary short fall and inability to overcome the presumption of 
validity, the Tribe was not extending an invitation for the Johnsons to insert evidence in 
this proceeding at the eleventh hour. Rather, the Tribe was highlighting the Johnsons' 
arguments on the merits of the case are not supported by the record because they 
deliberately chose to not appear in the Tribal Court proceedings. Syringa Networks, 159 
Idaho at 221 (litigants who make "strategic gamble not to argue the merits" of their case 
in lower proceedings may not argue a lack of fairness for not being given a second 
opportunity to do so when the gamble does not pay off). 
Even if the information provided by the Johnson Affidavit was relevant to the 
issue of jurisdiction, the Johnsons have not exhausted their tribal remedies on the issue 
of jurisdiction. As discussed in the Tribe's Reply, litigants must make and exhaust 
challenges to a tribe's jurisdiction in the tribal courts prior to making the challenge in 
other forums. See, e.g., Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987) ("[T]he 
federal policy supporting tribal self-government directs a federal court to stay its hand in 
order to give the tribal court a full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction ... 
unconditional access to the federal forum would place it in direct competition with the 
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tribal courts, thereby impairing the latter's authority over reservation affairs.") The same 
policy requiring federal courts to give tribal courts an opportunity to answer their own 
jurisdictional questions comports with the stated policy of Idaho courts. See, e.g., 
Sheppard, 104 Idaho at 8 (recognizing that facilitating "better relations between the 
courts of this state and the various tribal courts within Idaho" is an important judicial 
policy). 
Further, if the Johnsons are attempting to use the Johnson Affidavit to challenge 
the ownership of the land on which the dock rests, and therefore subject matter 
jurisdiction, this issue goes to the merits of the Tribal Case in addition to the issue of 
jurisdiction. The Johnsons deliberately gambled by choosing not to appear or respond in 
Tribal Court and should now be prevented from litigating the merits of the Tribe's 
Complaint in this Court. See, e.g., Syringa, 159 Idaho at 221, supra. 
C. Kenneth Johnson is not Qualified to Provide Expert Testimony 
"Under the rules, expert opinion testimony is only admissible when the expert is a 
qualified expert in the field, the evidence will be of assistance to the trier of fact, [ and] 
experts in the particular filed would reasonably rely upon the same type of facts relied 
upon by the expert in forming his opinion ... " Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 140 
(2009). "In determining whether expert testimony is admissible, a court must evaluate 
the expert's ability to explain pertinent scientific principles and to apply those principles 
to the formulation of his or her opinion. Admissibility, therefore, depends on the validity 
of the expert's reasoning and methodology, rather than his or her ultimate conclusion." 
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Id. at 140. An expert's opinion does not meet the required standards of reliability when it 
is based on a "mere temporal connection" between two events. Id. at 140. 
In the present case, there is no evidence that Mr. Johnson is qualified in the study 
of a relevant field (such as ecology, environmental sciences, geology, hydrology, or 
limnology1) such that he is competent to provide evidence regarding the depth of the St. 
Joe River. Mr. Johnson provides no explanation of methodology or explanation of how 
other factors may impact the purported depth. Nor does Mr. Johnson explain how the 
river's depth may fluctuate from day to day or between the seasons. Instead, Mr. Johnson 
attempts to make a "mere temporal connection" and offers the depth of the river at a 
single instant in time and leaves it to the Tribe and the Court to determine their 
significance. See, e.g., Coombs, 148 Idaho at 140, supra. Finally, and perhaps most 
significantly, Mr. Johnson provides no testimony regarding the location of the dock's 
pilings which would seem to be more important regarding the issue of land ownership. 
Thus, even if Mr. Johnson made accurate measurements the Johnson Affidavit must still 
be excluded because "admissibility ... depends on the validity of the expert's reasoning 
and methodology, rather than [the] ultimate conclusion." Coombs, 148 Idaho at 140. 
Therefore, the Johnson Affidavit must be excluded because it attempts to offer 
scientific testimony from an affiant who is unqualified to offer the same. 
1 Limnology is the study of inland waters. 
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D. The Johnson Affidavit Offers Hearsay Testimony 
Even if this Court decides to accept the Johnson Affidavit, the Johnson Affidavit 
should be excluded to the extent it offers hearsay testimony. Hearsay is a statement, 
including a written assertion, " ... offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted." I.R.E. 801. Hearsay is not admissible as evidence unless provided for by the 
Rules of Evidence or some other rule. I.R.E. 802. 
"A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to 
support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter." I.R.E. 602; 
Mitchell v. State, 160 Idaho 81, 369 P.3d 299, 303 (2015). An affidavit "based on 
hearsay, and not supported by personal knowledge" does not satisfy the requirements of 
an affidavit." Id. 
Paragraph Seven of the Johnson Affidavit offers testimony about statements 
purportedly made by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) on 
their website. The statement contained on the NOAA website is an out of court statement 
and the matter asserted is the depth of the St. Joe River. The Johnson Affidavit does not 
cite to any exception to the general rule against hearsay which would make the statement 
admissible. In addition, the offered testimony about the measurements of the St. Joe 
River are not based on Mr. Johnson's personal knowledge but are instead based on the 
knowledge of a third party. Therefore, the offered evidence is clearly hearsay, not based 
on personal knowledge, and prohibited by the Idaho Rules of Evidence. I.R.E. 801, 802. 
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Since the offered statement is inadmissible hearsay for which no exception 
applies and not based on personal knowledge, this Court should, at minimum, strike 
Paragraph Seven of the Johnson Affidavit. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Johnson Affidavit is untimely, irrelevant to the issues before the Court, and 
attempts to offer expert scientific evidence from an unqualified witness. Further, the 
Johnson Affidavit contains hearsay. The sole issue before the Court is whether the Tribal 
Judgment should be recognized in Idaho. Therefore, the Tribe respectfully requests this 
Court strike the Johnson Affidavit. 
DATED this_(,_ day of June, 2016. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY or BENEWAH 
COUER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2016-0025 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
AFFIDAVIT OF KENNETH JOHNSON 
COME NOW Kenneth and Donna Johnson ("Defendants") in the above case, by 
and through their attomeys, MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED, and file 
this Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Kenneth Johnson. 
For reasons set forth below, the Coner d'Alene Tribe's ("Plaintiff') motion should be denied. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF KENNETH JOHNSON - 1 Cllent417J836.1 
I I 
I. ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff's recollection of these court proceedings is incomplete. The Plaintiff. 
itself, has filed two affidavits in this matter, which they neglected to mention. On January 22, 
2016, Plaintiff initiated these proceedings by filing an Affidavit/Petition for Recognition of 
Foreign Judgment as Per LC. 10-1303. Then, on March 4, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment (the "Motion1') with a Memorandum in Support of the 
Motion and another affidavit, this time from Everett B. Coulter, Jr., in support of the Motion. 
Defondants filed a timely Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Order of 
Recognition of Foreign Judgment on May 6, 2016, and Plaintiff filed a Reply in Support of 
Motion for Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment on May 20, 2016. On June 1, 2016, 
Defendants filed the Affidavit of Kenneth Johnson in Opposition to Plainti1rs Motion for Order 
of Recognition of .Foreign Judgment ("Johnson Affidavit"). 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The Johnson Affidavit Is Timely According to the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Plaintiff argues that the Johnson Affidavit is untimely according to Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 7(b)(3)(E). Coeur d'Alene Tribe's Motion to Strike Affidavit, at 2-3 (June 6, 
2016). However, Plaintiff erroneously cites to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(3)(E). 
Instead, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b )(3 )(B) provides the rule on time limits for filing: 
affidavits and states the following: 
When a motion is supported by a:ffidavit(s), the affidavit(s) shall be 
served with the motion, and any opposing affidavit(s) shall be filed 
with the court and served so Chat it is received by the Qarties no 
later than seven (7) days before the hearing. 
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I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added). Therefore, according to the correct rule, Defendants have 
up to seven (7) days before the hearing to file an affidavit in opposition to the Motion. Contrary 
to Plaintiff's contention, there is no language in the rule providing that the nonmoving party 
cannot submit affidavits after their responsive brief is submitted. Under the plain language of the 
rule, Defendants may file opposing affidavits up to seven (7) days prior to a hearing_ 
Defendants filed and served the Johnson Affidavit on June 2, 2016, a full eight (8) 
days before the hearing on the Motion, which is scheduled for June 10, 2016. Therefore, the 
affidavit was timely filed and is pennitted by the rules. 
B. The Johnson Affidavit Is Relevant to Whether the Tribal Court Has Subject 
Matter and Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendants. 
PJaintiff argues that the contents of the Johnson Affidavit are irrelevant to the 
lcgaJ analysis of the issues. Coeur d'Alene Tribe's Motion to Strike Affidavit, at 4 (June 6, 
2016). However, Plaintiff is incorrect. "Relevant evidence means evidence having any lendency 
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it wouJd be without the evidence.,, T.R.E. 401. As stated in 
previous briefing, both Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 655 P .2d 895 (1992), and Wilson v. 
Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. I 997), prohibit the recognition of a tribal judgment when 
the tribal court does not have subject matter or personal jurisdiction. Here, the overriding legal 
question is whether the Coeur d'Alene Tribe tribal court has jurisdiction over the Defendants, 
which will help determine whether its foreign judgment will be recognized by this Court. One of 
the main issues in that analysis is whether the Coeur d'AJene Tribe owns the land underlying the 
St. Joe River at the location of Defendants' dock and pilings. The facts presented in the Johnson 
Affidavit relates directly to that issue. 
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In arguing that the depth of the water at the location of Defendants' dock and 
pilings is irrelevant, Plaintiff ignores clear issues of law and fact present in this case regarding 
jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have 
specifically recognized that the United States only reserved the submerged lands that existed 
prior to Statehood in 1890. See Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001); United States v. 
Idaho, 210 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding the finding that the United States reserved the 
1873 submerged lands for the Tribe). The Ninth Circuit specifically stated as follows: 
In construing the parties' pleadings, we bear in mind that the 
current physical situation in and around [Heyburn State) Park 
differs from the situation that existed in 1873, at the time of the 
executive reservation, and in 1908 and 1911, the years, 
respectively, that the Park was authorized and conveyed to the 
State. Due to the construction of [Post Falls] dam, three smaU 
lakes have combined wir.h the [Coeur d'Alene] Lake into one large 
body of water. We read the United States' complaint in light of the 
physical situation as it existed prior to the construction of the dam. 
United States, 210 F.3d at 1079, n. 18. 
It is well established that additional lands within the reservation boundary became 
submerged only afler ihe construction of Post Falls Dam in I 907. See, e.g., In re Sanders Beach, 
143 Idaho 443,147 P.3d 75 (2006); Erickson v. State, 132 Idaho 208,970 P.2d 1 (1998); 
Deffenbaugh v. Wash. Water Power Co., 24 Idaho 514, 135 P. 247 (1913); Petajaniemi v. Wash. 
Water Power Co., 22 Idaho 20, 124 P. 783 (1912); Wash. Water Power Co. v. Waters, 19 Idaho 
595, 115 P. 682(1911). ln fact, the dam has been recognized "as raising the elevation of the 
water ... approximately 6 l /2 feet . . . . This increased height in the dam naturally resulted in 
submerging the lands adjacent to Coeur d'Alene Lake and the streams flowing into the lands to 
an elevation of at least 2,126.5 feet." In re Sanders Beach, 143 Idaho 443, 147 PJd 75 
(emphasis added); see also Deffenbaugh, 24 Idaho at 520-21, 135 P.2d at 253-54 ("the elevation 
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is raised six or eight feet above the ordinary elevation of the water in the summer and fall"). 
Therefore, the depth of the water at the location of Defendants' dock and pilings is a relevant and 
important issue to this case, as it relates to the jurisdiction of the tribal court over these particular 
submerged lands. 
In addition, Plaintiff argues that Defendants did not exhaust their "tribal 
remedies" on the issue of jurisdiction. Coeur d'Alene Tribe's Motion to Strike Affidavit, at 5 
(June 6, 2016). Defendants have already addressed this issue in the context of the lack of due 
process afforded to them in the original tribal court proceeding. See Memorandum in Opposition 
to Plaintiff's Motion.for Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment, at 11-12 (May 6, 2016). 
Furthermore, there is a specific exception to the exhaustion requirement when the interests of 
justice so require. lochsa Falls, L.L.C. v. State, 147 Idaho 232,237,207 P.3d 963, 968 (2009). 
"'[F]ailure to exhaust ... remedies is not a bar to litigation when there are no remedies lo exhaust." 
Id at 40, 71. The Coeur d'Alene tribal code states that the Coeur d'Alene Tribe has ''exclusive 
sovereignty and dominion over the submerged lands and waters within the area now known as 
the Coeur d'Alene Reservation." CTC 44-1.01. Clearly, this tribal code supports broad 
authority of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe over all submerged lands and the water overlying them~ 
within the entirety of the current exterior boundaries of the reservation. This interpretation has 
been heavily reinforced by Plaintiff's briefing and the enforcement actions taken. It is pointless 
to Mgue otherwise in a court where tribal code governs. Therefore, there were no remedies for 
Defendant to exhaust in tribal court, which is governed by tribal law and assumptions, and 
Defendants are excepted from the exhaustion requirement. 
Plaintiff also argues that, by filing the Johnson Affidavit, Defendants ''insert 
evidence in this proceeding at the eleventh hour." Coeur d'Alene Tribe's Mo/ion to Strike 
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Ajjldavil, at 5 (June 6, 2016). However, this is a mischaracterization of Defendants' actions, 
First, as established above, Defendants timely filed the Johnson Affidavit in opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion. Second, Defendants took the pictures and completed the measurement 
readings before Plaintiff's request for more facts in the case. Mr. Johnson's wife, Donna 
Johnson, took the pictures of the pilings on April 18, 2016, and took the pictures of the 
measurements on May 19, 2016. See Johnson Affidavit, 11 3-6 (June 1, 2016). Plaintiff filed its 
reply brief asking Defendants for "facts of the case" on May 20, 2016. See Coeur d'Alene 
Tribe's Reply in Supporl of Motion/or Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment, at 8 (May 20, 
2016). Therefore, it is clear that Defendants collected the evidence provided in the Johnson 
Affidavit prior to the Plaintiff's request for more facts, and provided the facts in a timely manner. 
Therefore, the facts presented in the Johnson Affidavit are relevant to the issues at 
hand and are admissible. 
C. Kenneth Johnson Is Qualified as a Lay Witness to Testify about His Own 
Property. 
Plaintiff argues that Kenneth Johnson is not qualified to provide expert testimony 
about the depth of the St. Joe River. Coeur d'Alene Tribe's Motion to Strike Affidavir, at 6-7 
(June 6, 2016). First, the testimony provided by Mr. Johnson in the Johnson Affidavit is not 
expert testimony. Mr. Johnson did not take a11y specialized or expert readings of the depth of the 
river. He simply attached a ruler to the pilings near his property and read the measurements. It 
does not take an expert in the fields of ecology, environmental sciences, geology, hydrology or 
limnology to read a measurement on a mler. 
Second) Mr. Johnson is qualified as a lay witness under Rule of Evidence 701. 
Rule 701 provides: 
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If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the testimony of the 
witness in the fonn of opinions or inferences is limited to those 
opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the 
perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding 
of the testimony of the witness or the detennination of a fact in 
issue, and ( c) not based on scientific, technical or other specialized 
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. 
Mr. Johnson's testimony clearly fits the criteria for lay witness testimony. The 
pictures and measurements provided in the Johnson Affidavit are rationally based on 
Mr. Johnson's perception, they are helpful to a clear determination of the facts at issue and they 
are not based on any Specialized knowledge. In addition, "[a] landowner is a competent witness 
to the location of the boundaries of his own land if they are within his personal knowledge, and 
may testify to the same." Hook v. Horner, 95 Idaho 657, 663, 517 P.2d 554, 560 (1973). The 
landowner's interest in the outcome of the litigation may affect the weight given to his 
testimony, but will not affect its admissibility. Id. Mr. Johnson is competent to testify regarding 
his property since it is within his personal knowledge and his interest in this litigation will not 
affect the admissibility of that testimony. 
Therefore, Mr. Johnson is qualified as a lay witness to testify about his property. 
D. The Testimony Provided in the Johnson Affidavit Is Admissible Because It 
FaUs Under the Public Records Exception to Hearsay. 
Plaintiff argues that the testimony provided in the Joh11son Affidavit regarding the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's ("NOAA") measurements of the St. Joe 
River is hearsay. Coeur d'Alene Tribe's Molion to Strike Affidavit, at 8 (June 6, 2016). First, 
Mr. Johnson testified as to his recollection and personal knowledge of the NOAA measurement 
on May 19, 2016 and did not quote directly from website. 
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Second, even if the evidence presented was directly from the website, Rule of 
Evidence 803(8) provides an exception to hearsay for public records and reports. The rule 
describes the applicable documents under the exception as follows: 
l.R.E. 803(8). 
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations in any form of a 
public office or agency sttting forth its regularly conducted and 
regularly recorded activities> or matters observed pursuant to duty 
imposed by law and as to which there was a duty to report, or 
factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to 
authority granted by law, unless the opponent shows the sources of 
information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
NOAA regularly measures and reports the depth of the St. Joe River on its 
website for public review. This kind of public information falls under the public records 
exception to hearsay. I.R.E. 803(8); See also, Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm, Co_, 760 F. Supp. 2d 220, 
235 (D.N.H. 2011) (in an action based on the defective design ofa prescription drug, a Food and 
Drug Administration ("FDA") al1alysis was admitted into evidence pursuant to Federal Rules of 
Evidence 803(8) and 902 since it was a self-authenticating public record available on the FDNs 
website)_ The recorded measurements by NOAA are public records setting forth its regularly 
conducted and regularly recorded activities. 
Therefore, the testimony provided regarding the NOAA measurements falls under 
the public records exception to hearsay and is admissible. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Defendants respectfully request that Plaintiff's 
Motion be denied. 
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DATED this 8th day of June, 2016. 
MOFFA TT, THOMAS, BARRBTI, RocK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By~ HL 9,_ 
Sarah A. McConnack - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of June, 2016, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO STRlKE AFFIDAVIT OF KENNETH JOHNSON to be served by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Everett B. Coulter Jr. 
EVANS CRAVEN & LACKIE, PS 
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250 
Spokane, WA 99201-0910 
facsimile (509) 455~3632 
Altorneys for Plaintij)' 
( ) U.S, Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile 
Sarah A. McCormack 
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CV-2016-0000025 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe vs. Kenneth Johnson, etal. 
Hearing type: Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing date: 6/10/2016 
Time: 11:16 am 
Judge: Scott L Wayman 
Courtroom: District Courtroom 
Court reporter: Val N \) '{"€_ 'N\D,dr\.e< 
Minutes Clerk: Stacy Bradbury 
Tape Number: 
1116 Judge Calls Case 'c-1..)e,,e~\\ Lo V \-\u -r I ~(\fnu\/\ ~l)v\.eAt\ "- (.;) - 0 
1116 Mr Coulter addresses the court. The united state supreme court has give the tribe 
jurisdiction. A notice was sent to them, after judgment entered the only time the responded 
was to this action. They have had ample notice. Jurisdiction wants to be challenged in 
another court but not in the court over them. Argument re penal law rule somehow barrs 
recognition of this jdgmt. There was a $17,400 money jdgmt premised on $100/day. Also 
finding of trespass and eviction; not penal. They have dock in waters w / out permit. 
Applicable to $ amount not trespass. Pilings are there, CDA found. 
1127 Semanko addresses court for Johnsons. They've had the pilings/dock all the time 
they've been there. Refers to title 10 in re adoption ofrecogn code. We can argue about 
code 10.13.01. in re 10.13.09 no part of state will enforce order in re public policy of state. 
This is filed under 10.13.01. this provision added in 2015 but applies to all jdmts. Decision 
by CDA is contrary to decisions by ID. At time reservation was set aside, the portion of 
river did not exist. CDA tribal code was adopted w/out accountability and now johnsons 
have no right to vote on tribal matters. Even under Chap 13 believe there will be a problem. 
Chapters 13 and 14; need subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdic, and due process, 
cannot be penal judgmt. 10.14.04 court of this state will not recognize something rendered 
a penalty or fine. Penal law rule applies in full faith and credit. In re penal judgmt, it is penal 
to ask Johnsons to remove their dock. This is a tribal government enforcing rights of a tribe 
as a whole. We believe entire judgmt is penal in nature. We don't see how this judgment 
can be recognized by court under penal law rule. 
1134 Semanko in re jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction - not addressed in the 
affidavits. Tribal court says they have jurisdiction but order says nothing about personal 
jurisdiction over Johnsons. w /regard to personal jurisdiction, Johnsons aren't in this by 
consensual relationship. Pg 4 brief by plaintiff says they have exclusive sovereignty saying 
this point of river is held in trust by government by tribe. They think they own everything 
w /in reservation that is submerged, i.e., lagoons, flooded areas, reserved lands in 1800s. 
No limitation, no recognition of exactly what submerged lands. Sup. Court continually 
refers to 1873 and 9th cir confirmed. Dam has added 6.5-8 ft to rivers. Johnson dock is not 
out in the middle of the river. Add'tl submerged lands were not subject. Court says they 
were looking at land before dam was built and would not give them add'tl land when after 
dam was built.Tribe has admitted Johnson's dock is in the shallow waters. If there is no 
subject matter jurisdiction then there is no personal matter jurisdiction. 
1141 Coulter - counsel suggests a trespass is not an eviction - no authority to say that. In 
re personal and subject matter jurisdiction; regulatory and adjudicatory granted to tribes 
and that is the subject matter jurisd. No argument, no response; and you challenge the 
jurisdiction. Federal law is you need to give tribal court the opportu to look and make 
jurisdic challenges and deal w /it. Johnson's affidavits in re pilings, they don't seem to 
address it, very far down in the river bed. Asking not to overrule Shepherd in this case. not 
arguing under comedy, set up under full faith and credit. Asking tribal court judgment be 
entitled to recognition by this court. 
1144 Judge - I'm not going to give everybody a decision today. Thanks lawyers for doing a 
very good job for their clients. Court fully appreciates importance of this case to the 
Johnsons. Court also appreciates importance to tribe and appreciates potential impact of 
court's decision on anybody else in re same circumstance as Johnsons. Important to get 
this right.No matter which way I rule, somebody won't be happy and likely would appeal. 
Takes UNDER ADVISEMENT and more likely issue written opinion and order w /my 
findings and rationale. I will notify and send out order. 
1146 Nothing from either party. IN RECESS 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON, 
Defendants. 
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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Every year, in courts all across the State of Idaho, judgments entered in 
other state courts and federal courts are enforced in Idaho pursuant to the 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. I.C. §10-1301 et. seq. This case 
presents the question whether a judgment by the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Court 
against a non-tribal member may be enforced in similar fashion. While the 
question is simple to state, the answer is not so simple. The answer involves the 
interplay of state law, federal law, and tribal law. The answer also involves the 
examination of state court decisions, federal court decisions, and tribal court 
decisions. 
The Coeur d'Alene Tribe requests recognition of a default judgment issued 
by its tribal court in tribal case no. CV-SC-2014-260, fining defendants Kenneth 
and Donna Johnson, and entitling the Tribe to remove a dock encroaching on a 
riverbed held in trust for the tribe by the federal government. See, Idaho v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 262, 121 S. Ct. 2135, 150 L. Ed. 2d 326 (2001). The 
Johnsons oppose recognition of the judgment. 
This appears to be a case of first impression in Idaho. Neither party has 
cited the court to a controlling opinion from an Idaho appellate court. Nor has the 
Court's research found any controlling legal authority. 
II 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Plaintiff is the Coeur d'Alene Tribe (the Tribe), a federally recognized 
Indian Tribe. The defendants, Kenneth and Donna Johnson, (the Johnsons), 
own river front real property on the St. Joe River in Benewah County. The 
Johnsons have a dock and pilings that extend into the river from their property. 
The Johnsons are not members of the Tribe. The Tribe does not own the 
Johnson's real property. 
The Tribe filed a lawsuit against the Johnsons in the tribal court of the 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe seeking damages and removal of the Johnson's dock 
because the Johnsons did not obtain a dock permit from the Tribe to allow them 
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to encroach upon lands controlled by the Tribe: the submerged lands beneath 
the St. Joe River within the boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Reservation. 
Although the Johnsons were served with the summons and complaint in the tribal 
court proceeding, they did not appear or answer. As a result of their failure to 
appear in the tribal court proceeding, a default judgment was entered against 
them imposing a civil penalty of $17,400 and entitling the Tribe to remove the 
encroachments. 
The tribal court judgment was entered on April 1, 2015. It remains 
unsatisfied. 
On January 22, 2016 the Tribe filed an Affidavit/Petition for Recognition of 
Foreign Judgment seeking an order validating and recognizing the tribal court 
judgment in order to begin enforcement efforts. The Tribe has satisfied the 
procedural requirements of I.C. §10-1301 et seq. by filing a certified copy of the 
tribal court judgment and supporting affidavit. After receiving notice of the filing 
of the judgment, the Johnsons retained counsel and have objected to the Tribe's 
request to have the tribal court judgment recognized by the State of Idaho. 
Both parties have submitted legal memoranda in support of their 
respective positions. Both parties have submitted supporting affidavits. The 
Tribe has moved to strike the affidavit of Kenneth Johnson on the basis that it 
was untimely filed, is irrelevant, and contains hearsay. The Court will not strike 
the affidavit, but the Court will only consider the portions of the affidavit that 
would be admissible under the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
3 
Ill 
ISSUE 
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT SHOULD ISSUE AN ORDER 
RECOGNIZING A JUDGMENT FROM THE COEUR D'ALENE TRIBAL COURT 
AGAINST A NON-TRIBAL MEMBER FOR PURPOSES OF THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT. 
IV 
DISCUSSION 
A. The Coeur d'Alene Tribe's Motion 
The Tribe's legal position is very straight forward. Pursuant to the 
decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in Sheppard v Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 655 
P.2d 895, (1982), tribal court decrees are entitled to full faith and credit. The 
Tribe has satisfied the procedural requirements of I.C. §10-1301 et seq, and is 
now entitled to enforce the tribal court judgment in state court. 
The application of the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act in most 
cases is simply a ministerial act as long a judgment creditor complies with the 
procedural requirements of the act. Enforcement of the foreign judgment can 
begin five days after the date the judgment is filed. I.C. §10-1303(c). The Tribe 
has not sought to enforce its judgment. Instead, and to the credit of both parties, 
the Johnsons and the Tribe have sought a court ruling before any enforcement 
actions have been sought based upon the tribal court judgment. 
Whether or not an Idaho court will recognize a foreign judgment is a 
discretionary determination. Even if all of the procedural requirements of the 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Act have been satisfied, an Idaho court is not 
required to recognize a foreign judgment if the foreign judgment is not entitled to 
full faith and credit in this state. For example, if the court issuing the foreign 
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judgment allegedly did not have personal jurisdiction over the Idaho defendant, 
the Idaho Court can inquire into the jurisdictional basis of the foreign court's 
decision to see whether the judgment is entitled to full faith and credit. Schwi/ling 
v. Horne, 105 Idaho 294,669 P.2d 183,(1983). A similar challenge can be made 
to enforcement of a foreign judgment on the basis of a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction by the foreign court. Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 
596 P.2d 1068, (1978). 
Once the foreign judgment has been filed and recognized in Idaho, the 
judgment has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses, 
and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a district 
court of this state. I.C. §10-1302. If the foreign judgment has been reversed or 
modified by the issuing state, the Idaho court has the discretion to deny 
enforcement of the foreign judgment. P & R Enterprises, Inc. v. Guard, 102 
Idaho 671,637 P. 2d 1167, (1981). 
B. The Johnson's Objections 
The Johnsons arguments against recognizing the tribal court judgment 
against them may be summarized as follows. First, they contend that the tribal 
court judgment cannot be recognized under the plain language of I. C. § 10-1301. 
Second, they argue that the tribal court judgment should not be given full faith 
and credit ,or be recognized as a matter of comity, because the tribal court 
lacked both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, and that the 
Johnson's were denied due process of law. Third, they argue that enforcement 
5 
of the tribal court judgment is prohibited by the penal law rule. Each of these 
challenges will be addressed below. 
8(1) Can a Tribal Court judgment be recognized under Idaho Code §10-
1301? 
The Johnsons argue that the tribal judgment cannot be recognized by the 
state pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1301, which, according to the Johnsons, is 
limited to judgments regarding support or the establishment of paternity. That 
provision states: 
In this act "foreign judgment" means any judgment, decree, or order 
of a court of the United States or of any other court or an order of 
an administrative body of any state regarding the support of a child, 
spouse, or former spouse or the establishment of paternity which is 
entitled to full faith and credit in this state. 
(Emphasis added.) As the tribe argues, because the disjunctive conjunction "or" 
precedes the referenced language, the limitations therein apply only to 
administrative bodies, not courts. 
The tribe notes that Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 7, 655 P.2d 895, 
901 (1982) held: "Tribal court decrees ... are ... entitled to full faith and credit." 
The Johnsons contend that Sheppard was based upon an interpretation of 28 
U.S.C. § 1738 which has since been "supplanted" by courts in other jurisdictions. 
These courts have held that "judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, 
Territory or Possession," as set out in the statute, do not include 
tribal court proceedings. The Sheppard court noted the existence of such 
authority, but chose specifically not to follow it. The court held: 
[Wle agree with those courts which have found the 
phrase "Territories and Possessions" broad enough to 
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include Indian tribes, at least as · they are presently 
constituted under the laws of the United States. Jim v. CIT 
Financial Services, 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975); In re 
Adoption of Buehl, 87 Wash.2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976); 
Raymond v. Raymond, 83 F. 721 (8th Cir.1897); but see 
Brown v. Babbit Ford, Inc., 117 Ariz. 192, 571 P.2d 689 
(Ariz.App.1977) (tribal decrees entitled to comity but not full 
faith and credit); In re Marriage of Red Fox, 23 Or.App. 393, 
542 P.2d 918 (1975). See generally Ragsdale, Problems in 
the Application of Full Faith and Credit for Indian Tribes, 7 
N.M.L.Rev. 133 (1977); Comment, Conflicts Between State 
and Tribal Law: The Application of Full Faith and Credit 
Legislation to Indian Tribes, 1981 Ariz.St.L.J. 801 (1981). 
We believe that this holding will facilitate better relations 
between the courts of this state and the various tribal courts 
within Idaho. 
Sheppard, 104 Idaho at 8, 655 P.2d at 902 (emphasis added). In footnote 2, the 
court stated: 
It has come to the attention of this Court that, in an action 
related to this case, the Shoshone-Bannock appellate court, in 
reversing the tribal trial court, held that it was not required to 
give full faith and credit to the decrees of Idaho state courts. In 
part this decision was based on the belief that state courts 
did not accord tribal courts full faith and credit. As we have 
shown, some state courts, including this one, do. Secondly, 
the tribal court failed to acknowledge 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which 
requires "every court within the United States" to give full faith 
and credit to decrees of state courts. Along with this opinion 
extends the hope of a good working relationship between state 
and tribal courts, and we hope, therefore, that the Shoshone-
Bannock courts will reconsider the application of full faith and 
credit in their proceedings. Indeed the commentators 
unanimously agree that tribal courts must afford other states full 
faith and credit. 
Id. fn. 2 (emphasis added). 
The Johnsons claim that because Sheppard involved a tribal court decree of 
adoption, the decision in Sheppard to accord tribal judgments full faith and credit 
was limited to family law judgments only. Nothing in the opinion, however, 
limited full faith and credit in that manner. Sheppard has not been overturned or 
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modified by a later opinion by the Idaho appellate courts. The district courts are 
bound to follow the pronouncements of the appellate courts. Sheppard is 
controlling precedent in Idaho and the rule of stare decisis dictates that lower 
courts follow it, unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be 
unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious 
principles of law and remedy continued injustice. Houghland Farms, Inc. v. 
Johnson, 119 Idaho 97, 803 P. 2d 978, (1990). The Idaho Supreme Court, not 
the district court, is the only court that can decide whether or not the Sheppard 
case is manifestly wrong, has proven to be unjust or unwise over time, or must 
be overruled to remedy an injustice. 
Based on the plain language of I.C. §10-1031 and upon the Sheppard 
case, the court finds that tribal court judgments may be enforced under the 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. However, just because tribal court 
judgments can be enforced under this act does not necessarily mean that the 
judgment against the Johnsons is enforceable in this case. 
8(2) Did the tribal court have both subject matter jurisdiction and 
personal jurisdiction over the Johnsons to allow an Idaho court to grant full faith 
and credit to the tribal court judgment? 
The Johnson's claim that the tribal court judgment should not be 
enforceable against them because the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the 
judgment. A judgment entered by a foreign state that lacked personal or subject 
matter jurisdiction to enter the judgment is void, and should not be accorded full 
8 \L\ \ 
faith and credit. Schwilling v. Horne, 105 Idaho 294, 669 P.2d 183 (1983); Sierra 
Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 596 P.2d 1068, (1978). The Johnsons 
cite to Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, (9th Cir. 1997) in support of their 
position. This Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision is based upon federal law, 
not state law, so it is not controlling in Idaho in light of the Sheppard case. Even if 
principles of comity outlined in Wilson v. Marchington applied to this case, the 
analysis is the same: if the tribal court lacked proper subject matter and personal 
jurisdiction, then the judgment should not be recognized and enforced. 
Tribal court jurisdiction over non-tribal members is a rather controversial 
subject. The United States Supreme Court has attempted to clarify this area of 
the law in a series of decisions beginning with Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian 
Tribe, 431 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978), superseded on other 
grounds by 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2), (4) (1990). In Oliphant, the Court specifically 
held that a tribal court has no jurisdiction to criminally charge or incarcerate non-
Indians. Later cases have established a set of precedents that impose limitations 
on the ability of a tribal court to exercise jurisdiction over a non-tribal member in a 
civil case. 
In Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 
493 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that the inherent sovereign 
powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to non-members of the tribe. The court 
also held that there are two exceptions to this rule. They are commonly referred 
to as "the consensual relations" exception and the "direct effects" exception. 
Though Oliphant only determined inherent tribal 
authority in criminal matters, the principles on which it 
relied support the general proposition that the inherent 
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sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the 
activities of nonmembers of the tribe. To be sure, Indian 
tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some 
forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their 
reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may 
regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the 
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual 
relationships with the tribe or its members, through 
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other 
arrangements.(citations omitted) A tribe may also retain 
inherent power to exercise civil authority over the 
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its 
reservation when that conduct threatens or has some 
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic 
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. (citations 
omitted) 
Montana v United States, 450 U.S. 455, (1981), at 565-566 (citations and 
footnote omitted). 
There is no basis for applying the "consensual relations" exception here. 
The Johnson s have done nothing to support a finding that they have engaged in 
consensual relationships with the Tribe or its members in any way, shape, or 
form. This case does not arise out of a business transaction or a contract 
between the Johnsons and the Tribe or its members. They have not agreed to 
submit to the tribal court's jurisdiction. They are not tribal members. The Tribe 
does not own their land. As non-tribal members they have no say in tribal 
government issues, including any lake regulations and the operation of the tribal 
court system. 
The second exception of Montana v. United States is more problematic. 
Under this exception, a tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil 
authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when 
10 
,~3 
that conduct threatens, or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the 
economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe. Id. The United States 
Supreme Court has recognized the authority of the Tribe to regulate that portion 
of the bed and the banks of the St. Joe River that lie within the Coeur d'Alene 
reservation. See, Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262,121 S. Ct. 2135, 150 L. 
Ed. 2d 326 (2001 ). The Tribe's ability to regulate the activities affecting Coeur 
d'Alene Lake and the St. Joe River, such as encroachments, water quality, or 
other use of the natural resources, is an important aspect of the treaty rights that 
were recognized by the court. If the non-Indians who used the lake, or the river, 
or more specifically to this case, those who allegedly encroach on the submerged 
bed and banks of the waterways were not subject to the Tribe's rules, then the 
ruling by the United States Supreme Court in Idaho v. United States would 
certainly be a hollow victory for the Tribe. Any non-Indian could simply thumb 
their nose at the tribal enforcement efforts without any risk of consequence. The 
regulatory authority of the tribe would be meaningless with regard to non-Indians. 
The lake and the St Joe River are important to the tribe and the inability to control 
the conduct of non-Indians when it directly affects the lake and the St Joe River 
fall within the category of conduct that threatens or has some direct effect on the 
political integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe. 
This is not the first time an Indian tribe has exercised regulatory control 
over a waterway pursuant to treaty rights granted long ago. The Confederated 
Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation were involved in a long 
running battle over the control of a portion of Flathead Lake. See, Confederated 
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Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Resetvation v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951 
(1982). After years of litigation, the tribe's right to control the activities of non-
tribal members was recognized when the activities affected that portion of 
Flathead Lake within the reservation boundaries. Much like the tribes involved 
with Flathead Lake, the Coeur d'Alene Tribe is exercising similar control over that 
portion of the bed and banks of the lake and the St. Joe River within the 
reservation. 
There is another reason why the tribal court judgment in this case should 
be given full faith and credit, or be recognized as a matter of comity as is done in 
the federal court system. When a non-Indian defendant is sued in a tribal court 
and wishes to challenge the ability of the tribal court to exercise jurisdiction over 
them, the non-Indian defendant is normally required to challenge the tribal court's 
jurisdiction over them in the tribal court and exhaust all tribal remedies through 
every level of the tribal court system before they will be allowed to raise the 
jurisdictional issue in another forum. Nat'/ Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe 
of/ndians, 471 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985). 
The Johnsons never appeared in tribal court to raise a jurisdictional 
challenge. The tribal court judgment in this case made a specific finding that it 
had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute, and that the Johnsons 
were given notice of the suit and the opportunity to appear. The tribe contends 
that the tribal court judgment is entitled to full faith and credit because the 
Johnsons failed to exhaust their remedies in tribal court before challenging 
recognition of the tribal judgment in state court. Evans v. Shoshone-Bannock 
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Land Use Policy Comm'n, 736 F.3d 1298, 1302 (9th Cir.2013) set out four 
exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. The court stated: 
"Exhaustion is prudential; it is required as a matter of comity, not as 
a jurisdictional prerequisite." Boozer [v. Wilder], 381 F.3d [931,] at 
935 [9th Cir. 2004)] (citations omitted). To this end, the Supreme 
Court has recognized four exceptions to the exhaustion 
requirement: "(1) when an assertion of tribal court jurisdiction is 
'motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith'; (2) 
when the tribal court action is 'patently violative of express 
jurisdictional prohibitions;' (3) when 'exhaustion would be futile 
because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the 
tribal court's jurisdiction;' and (4) when it is 'plain' that tribal court 
jurisdiction is lacking, so that the exhaustion requirement 'would 
serve no purpose other than delay.' " Elliott [v. White Mountain 
Apache Tribal Court}, 566 F.3d [842,] at 847 [(9th Cir. 2009)] 
(quoting Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 369, 121 S.Ct. 2304, 150 
L.Ed.2d 398 (2001) (internal alteration omitted) .... 
To determine whether tribal court jurisdiction is plainly lacking, we 
analyze whether such "jurisdiction is colorable or plausible .... " 
Elliott, 566 F.3d at 848 (quoting Atwood v. Fort Peck Tribal Court 
Assiniboine, 513 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir.2008) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The plausibility of tribal court jurisdiction depends 
on the scope of the Tribes' regulatory authority, as "a tribe's 
adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction." 
Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 330, 128 S.Ct. 2709 (quoting Strate 
v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 137 
L.Ed.2d 661 (1997)). 
Evans, 736 F.3d at 1302. 
The Johnsons have not shown that any exception applies. They have 
presented no evidence supporting the first two exceptions. There is no evidence 
in the record that would support a finding that the tribal court proceedings were 
motivated by a desire to harass or were conducted in bad faith. Because the 
tribal court action arose out of the Tribe's authority to regulate the portion of the 
St. Joe River within the reservation boundaries, the tribal court action is not 
plainly violative of any express jurisdictional prohibition. 
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Concerning the third exception, the Johnsons essentially contend that it 
would have been futile to challenge jurisdiction in tribal court because the tribal 
ordinance in which the tribe claims control over the riverbed was enacted by the 
Tribe. They allege that the Tribe is biased on questions of ownership regarding 
the submerged lands beneath the St. Joe River. They contend that the tribal 
court is dominated by tribal government, the plaintiff in the case. These bare 
allegations are not supported by the record in this case. The tribal court gave the 
Johnsons notice and an opportunity to be heard. No evidence has been 
presented that this notice and opportunity to be heard would not have been 
adequate for the Johnsons to present competent evidence supporting their claim 
that their dock was not located on the area of the riverbed lawfully controlled by 
the tribe, or otherwise challenge the assertion of jurisdiction over them in this 
case by the tribal court. An example of another approach to challenging a tribal 
court's jurisdiction over a non-Indian defendant is County of Lewis v. Allen, 163 
F.3d 509, (9th Cir. 1998). In that case, a tribal member filed a civil action in the 
Nez Perce Tribal Court seeking damages against Lewis County and several non-
Indian law enforcement officers. Rather than ignore the proceedings, the non-
Indian defendants challenged the tribal court's exercise of jurisdiction over them 
every step of the way, eventually obtaining a ruling that the tribal court did not 
have jurisdiction and invalidated the jury verdict against the defendants. The 
entire process only took eleven years. 
With regard to the fourth exception, Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev., LLC v. 
'Sa' Nyu Wa Inc., 715 F .3d 1196 (9th Cir.2013), cited by the Tribe, the court 
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considered whether the jurisdiction of the Hualapai tribal court was plainly 
lacking. That court held: 
[A]lthough the main rule in Montana v. United States, [450 U.S. 
544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981)] is that a tribal court 
lacks regulatory authority over the activities of non-Indians unless 
one of its two exceptions apply, this case is not Montana. Montana, 
450 U.S. at 565-66, 101 S.Ct. 1245. Montana considered tribal 
jurisdiction over nonmember activities on non-Indian land, held in 
fee simple, within a reservation. Id. at 547, 565-66, 101 S.Ct. 1245. 
The land underlying this case, however, is federal Indian land held 
in trust for the Hualapai Tribe. The dispute arose out of an 
agreement related to the development, operations, and 
management of the Skywalk, an asset located in Indian country. 
With the exception of Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 121 S.Ct. 
2304, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001), the Supreme Court has applied 
Montana "almost exclusively to questions of jurisdiction arising on 
non-Indian land or its equivalent." Water Wheel [Camp 
Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance], 642 F.3d [802,] at 809 [(9th 
Cir.2011)]. When deciding whether a tribal court has 
jurisdiction, land ownership may sometimes prove dispositive, 
but when a competing state interest exists courts balance that 
interest against the tribe's. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360, 370, 121 
S.Ct. 2304. Here, as the dispute centers on Hualapai trust land 
and there are no obvious state interests at play, the Hicks 
exception is unlikely to require Montana's application. At the very 
least, it cannot be said that the tribal court plainly lacks jurisdiction. 
Grand Canyon Skywalk at 1205 (emphasis added). 
The Johnsons have not shown a state interest that competes with the 
tribe's interest in regulating docks located on the riverbed controlled by the tribe. 
The Johnsons contend, however, that their dock is not located on an area of the 
riverbed that is lawfully controlled by the tribe. This argument was never 
presented to the tribal court by the Johnsons. The Johnsons argument may have 
a legal and factual basis, but it should have been presented to the tribal court in 
the first instance. 
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Defendant Kenneth Johnson has submitted an affidavit. apparently in 
support of this argument. Johnson states that he removed part of the dock, but 
he has not supplied any evidence concerning when this occurred. 
The tribe has moved to strike this affidavit. It argues that Johnson has not 
shown competence to make certain statements contained therein. Included in 
the affidavit are water levels as measured by Johnson on certain pilings in the 
riverbed. The affidavit makes reference to certain markings on the pilings that 
are apparently depicted in images attached to the affidavit. To the extent that the 
images and affidavit depict measurements of the distance between the bed of the 
river and the surface of the water as it came in contact with those pilings, 
Johnson is likely competent to make such measurements and to state what those 
measurements were. 
Johnson also set out his observation of a measurement of the elevation of 
the surface of the river allegedly contained on the website of the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The affidavit does not indicate where 
this measurement was allegedly taken by NOAA. A river, by definition, would 
have a higher elevation at its source than at its mouth. Johnson does not allege 
that NOAA measured the elevation of the surface of the river where his property 
is located. It therefore does not prove such a fact. 
Moreover, as the tribe contends, it is hearsay. The Johnson's argue that it 
is within the public records hearsay exception, citing Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 
Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 220 (D.N.H.2011), aff'd sub nom. Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. 
Co., 678 F.3d 30 (1st Cir.2012), rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 186 L. Ed. 2d 607 (2013) 
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which admitted under Federal Rules of Evidence 803(8) and 902 the f()U~wing 
document: John K. Jenkins, Director, FDA Office of New Drugs, Analysis and 
recommendations for Agency action regarding NSAIDs and cardiovascular risk 
12 (Apr. 6, 2005) as posted on the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's website. 
Plaintiff does not submit any public record however. Instead, he submits his 
observations of an alleged public record. Therefore, even if the alleged record 
itself were admissible, Johnson's hearsay statement concerning that alleged 
record would not, in turn, be admissible. Johnson's statement concerning 
NOAA's website should therefore be stricken. 
Johnson states, in addition, that NOAA's measurement is "four inches 
below the summer river level." No foundation is laid for Johnson's opinion of the 
"summer river level," and it is based upon inadmissible hearsay concerning 
NOAA's website. As such, this statement should be stricken as well. 
The Johnsons have not shown that their dock has not been located at any 
relevant time on the riverbed lawfully controlled by the tribe. They have not 
shown that the tribe's jurisdiction was plainly lacking, not colorable, or 
implausible. 
Where a party to a state court action fails to exhaust his remedies in a 
prior tribal court action, full faith and credit principles require enforcement of the 
tribal judgment. See Simmonds v. Parks, 329 P.3d 995, 1007-08 (Alaska 2014). 
Since the Johnsons did not exhaust their remedies in tribal court, and since no 
exception to the exhaustion rule has been shown to apply, full faith and credit 
should be extended to the tribal court judgment against them. 
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The Johnsons also generally allege that the tribal court was biased 
against them. Bias does not appear to be a relevant consideration in this 
context. Stewart v. Stewart, 289 S.E.2d 652 (W.Va.1980) stated: 
[l]n Morris Lapidus Associates v. Airportels, Inc., 240 Pa.Super. 80, 
84, 361 A.2d 660,663 (1976) ... a New York judgment was sought 
to be enforced in Pennsylvania. The contention was made that the 
New York judgment was based on a New York arbitration award 
which had been rendered by biased arbitrators and that the award 
therefore violated due process concepts. The court in declining to 
permit this attack against full faith and credit principles stated: 
[E]ven were we to conclude that the appearance of 
bias in arbitrators is a denial of due process, we could 
not permit the collateral attack on the judgment 
attempted by appellees in this case. The cases cited 
by appellees for the proposition that a judgment 
obtained in violation of due process is not entitled to 
full faith and credit are not on point. In those cases, 
the due process denied had the result of depriving the 
litigant of an opportunity to appear and defend. See 
Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 66 S.Ct. 556, 90 L.Ed. 
635, reh. denied, 328 U.S. 876, 66 S.Ct. 975, 90 
L.Ed. 1645 (1946); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 61 
S.Ct. 115, 85 L.Ed. 22 (1940); Wetmore v. Karrick, 
205 U.S. 141, 27 S.Ct. 434, 51 L.Ed. 745 (1907). 
Stewart, 289 S.E.2d at 656. 
Even if bias were relevant, the Johnsons have not shown bias here. They 
claim "the tribal court is dominated by the tribal government" which is allegedly 
"biased" due to a tribal law providing for a $500 per day fine. A maximum fine 
applicable to all dock owners who violate tribal law concerning those docks does 
not show bias against the Johnsons. Moreover, this allegation of bias is 
undermined by the fact that the tribe actually fined them a lesser $100 per day 
amount instead. In addition, the Johnsons claim bias is shown by the fact that 
the tribe claims control of the riverbed. The existence of such a claim does not 
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show that the tribe would also exert regulatory control over areas of the riverbed 
that it knows are not held in trust for the tribe. 
8(3)Does the Penal Law Rule prohibit recognition and enforcement of the 
Tribal Court Judgment? 
The Johnsons claim the penal law rule, which prohibits enforcement of the 
penal judgments of other countries where there is no treaty for such 
enforcement, also prohibits enforcement of the tribal court judgment here. They 
have not provided any authority that this rule is applicable to tribal judgments, 
and independent research by the court has revealed none. The tribal court 
judgment in this case is not a penal judgment in any event. The judgment 
imposes a civil fine and allows for removal of a dock and pilings. The Johnsons 
are not subject to criminal prosecution or incarceration pursuant to the tribal court 
judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
This Memorandum Opinion shall constitute the Court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Coeur d'Alene Tribal Court in tribal case no. CV-SC-2014-260 is RECOGNIZED 
AS VALID AND FULLY ENFORCEABLE under the laws of the State of Idaho. 
,--
DATED this J ~ day of July, 2016. 
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I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent this \:5:" day 
of July, 2016, as follows: 
Norman M. Semanko 
Sarah A. McCormack 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rick & Fields, Chartered 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701 
Fax: (208) 385-5384 
_JS_ via e-mail: norm@iwua.org & sam@moffatt.com 
__ via fax: (208) 385-5384 
via first class mail 
Everett 8. Coulter Jr. 
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. 
818 W. Riverside Avenue, Ste. 250 
Spokane, WA 99201-0910 
.X- via e-mail: ecoulter@ecl-law.com 
__ via fax: (509) 455-3632 
via first class mail 
DEANNA BRAMBLETT, Clerk of Court 
By: ci_ 
-----~------Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DI~ .RICT 
---==:::...-~-
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-2016-"aiE 
JUDGMENT 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
fl 
''TY 
, I 
1. The plaintiff's Motion for Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment is granted. 
Dated this 
,-
'~ day of July, 2016. 
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via first class mail 
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818 W. Riverside Avenue, Ste. 250 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIALZrtbt~~ ,-,. 1! I[ u ! 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTg'yP~H .:L 1_ 1 
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally CASE NO. CV-2016-~5 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ORDER STAYING ENFORCEMENT 
OF JUDGMENT 
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON, 
Defendants. 
The Court has now entered a Final Judgment in this case. Pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 10-1303(c), enforcement of the judgment can begin five days 
after the judgment is filed. 
This case is very important to the Johnsons and to others who may be 
similarly situated. They have raised legitimate questions regarding the 
enforceability of the tribal court judgment entered against them. This case is 
also very important to the Tribe because it may have an impact on the Tribe's 
ability to enforce the Tribe's regulations relating to Coeur d'Alene Lake and 
1 
the St. Joe River against non-tribal members. Both sides potentially have a lot 
at stake. 
The Court has reviewed an enormous amount of legal research and case 
law relating to the issues in this case. The Court has attempted to make the 
correct decision in light of Idaho law and existing precedent. The Court is 
also aware that there are valid arguments being presented by both sides. If 
reviewed on appeal, the Court's decision may be reversed or modified by an 
appellate court. It could also be affirmed. The parties now a have the Court's 
opinion to review and they should have time to evaluate what steps they may 
wish to take, or not take, in the future with regard to the judgment in this case. 
To alleviate the potential pressure of the five day waiting period and 
looming enforcement proceedings, the court is exercising its discretion and 
granting a stay of enforcement proceedings pursuant to I.R.C.P. 62. The stay 
may be conditioned for the security of the adverse party "as are proper." The 
court finds that an appropriate condition would be to make the stay 
temporary, rather than open ended in length. The court does not find it 
appropriate to require the Johnsons to post any additional security in support 
of the temporary stay. 
Enforcement proceedings shall be stayed for 42 days from the date of the 
judgment in this case. The stay shall automatically be lifted at the end of the 
42 days unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
The Court would also encourage the parties to consider attempting to 
resolve the case without engaging in protracted litigation. The parties may 
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wish to consider the use of a mediator to assist them in resolving this case. 
The litigation process can be lengthy, costly, and sometimes ends with a 
result that neither party likes. With litigation, the parties lose all control over 
the outcome of the case. With mediation, the parties retain control over the 
outcome. Both parties may benefit, in the long run, by an agreement in this 
case. 
--Dated this / 5 day of July, 2016. 
SCOTT WAYMAN 
District Judge 
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BENEWAH COUNTY 
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BY: ,. ..- __.DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
CODER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
TO: CLERK OF THE COURT 
Case No. CV-2016-0025 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
PARTIES TO THE CASE AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN: 
1. The above-named Appellants, Kenneth and Donna Johnson (the 
"Johnsons"), appeal against the above-named Respondent, Couer d'Alene Tribe (the "Tribe"), to 
the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Judgment entered by the district court in the above-
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 Client:4224096.1 \ loO 
entitled action, District Judge Scott Wayman presiding, on July 15, 2016, including the Court's 
Memorandum Opinion of the same date. 
2. The Johnsons have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
Judgment described in paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
Rule 1 l(a)(l). 
3. The issues on appeal include: 
( a) Whether the district court erred by recognizing the tribal judgment 
against the Johnsons; 
(b) Whether the district court erred by holding that the Johnsons 
cannot collaterally attack the jurisdiction of the tribal court to enter the tribal judgment subject to 
domestication in the above-entitled action because the Johnsons failed to present such 
jurisdictional challenge to the tribal court; 
( c) Whether the district court erred when it did not account for the fact 
that the extent of the Tribe's jurisdiction is limited solely to submerged lands in which the Tribe 
holds an ownership interest; 
( d) Whether the district court abused its discretion by accepting the 
tribal court's jurisdictional determination when the scope and extent of the tribal court's 
jurisdiction is the subject of litigation in another case pending in Idaho district court; 
( e) Whether the district court erred by giving effect to a tribal 
judgment enforcing the penal and revenue laws of the Tribe, including fines and penalties; 
(f) Whether the tribal judgment is entitled to full faith and credit or 
comity in Idaho courts; 
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(g) Whether the tribal judgment for civil penalties allegedly owed to 
the Tribe may be enforced pursuant to Idaho Code Section 10-1301 et seq.; 
(h) Whether the tribal judgment allowing the Tribe's removal of 
encroachments may be enforced pursuant to Idaho Code Section 10-1301 et seq.; and 
(i) Whether the district court properly struck certain testimony offered 
by the Johnsons in support of their asserted jurisdictional challenge. 
4. The Appellants request the preparation of the reporter's standard transcript 
as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 25(a), which recorded the pending motions hearings on 
May 13, 2016, and June 10, 2016, respectively. 
5. The Appellants request the preparation of the clerk's record in accordance 
with Idaho Appellate Rule 28, as well as the following additional documents: 
(a) The Motion for Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment, dated 
March 4, 2016; 
(b) The Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Order of 
Recognition of Foreign Judgment, dated March 4, 2016; 
( c) The Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Order of 
Recognition of Foreign Judgment, dated May 6, 2016; 
(d) The Tribe's Reply in Support of Motion for Order of Recognition 
of Foreign Judgment, dated May 20, 2016; 
(e) The Affidavit of Kenneth Johnson in Opposition to Plaintiffs 
Motion for Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment, dated June 1, 2016; 
(f) The Tribe's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Kenneth Johnson, dated 
June 6, 2016; 
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(g) The Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Strike 
Affidavit of Kenneth Johnson, dated June 8, 2016; 
(h) The Memorandum Opinion, dated July 15, 2016; and 
(i) Any and all other documents filed with the Court applicable to the 
June 10, 2016, hearing on the motions. 
6. I certify: 
(~) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the 
reporter; 
(b) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fees 
for preparation of the reporter's transcript as required by Idaho Appellate Rule 24; 
(c) That the estimated fees for preparation of the clerk's record have 
been paid; 
( d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
DATED this '2...-s'day of August, 2016. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
MOFFA TT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
, t1._. By_-______ ___ _ 
Norman M. Semanko-2£:!1 e1Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this '1-( day of August, 2016, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to the following: 
Everett B. Coulter Jr. 
Ev ANS CRAVEN & LACKIE, PS 
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250 
Spokane, WA 99201-0910 
Facsimile (509) 455-3632 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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.(>4-U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
~Facsimile 
Client:4224096.1 \ lg--\ 
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HE IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DI . .RICT 
.} '-"""'---~-;Lii.1':1 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-2016-.:a,5 
JUDGMENT 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The plaintiffs Motion for Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment is granted. 
Dated this 
,-
/ 5> day of July, 2016. 
1 
· I hereby certify a true ari-.. . .;orrect copy of the foregoing was! .,nt this \'5 day of 
July, 2016, as follows: 
Norman M. Semanko 
Sarah A. McCormack 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rick & Fields, Chartered 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701 
Fax: (208) 385-5384 
-2f_ via e-mail: norm@iwua.org & sam@moffatt.com 
__ via fax: (208) 385-5384 
via first class mail 
Everett 8. Coulter Jr. 
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. 
818. W. Riverside Avenue, Ste. 250 
Spokane, WA 99201-0910 $- via e-mail: ecoulter@ecl-law.com 
__ via fax: (509) 455-3632 · 
via first class mail 
DEANNA BRAMBLETT, Clerk of Court 
By: 6 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE F°tRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON, 
Defendants. 
I 
I 
I 
I CASE NO. CV-2016-25 
I 
I MEMORANDUM OPINION 
I 
I 
I 
I 
_________ I 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Every year, in courts all across the State of Idaho, judgments entered in 
\ 
other state courts and federal courts are enforced in Idaho pursuant to the 
. 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. I.C. §10-1301 et. seq. This case 
presents the question whether a judgment by the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Court 
against a non-tribal member may be enforced in similar fashion. While the 
question is simple to state, the answer is not so simple. The answer involves the 
,. 
interplay of state law, federal law, and tribal law. The answer also involves the 
1 
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examination of state "'"'Urt decisions, federal court decisi,....:,s and tribal court 
I ( J 
decisions. 
The Coeur d'Alene Tribe requests recognition of a default judgment issued 
by its tribal court in tribal case no. CV-SC-2014-260, fining defendants Kenneth 
and Donna Johnson, and entitling the Tribe to remove a dock encroaching on a 
riverbed held in trust for the tribe by th~ federal government. See, Idaho v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 262, 121 S. Ct. 21:35, 150 L. Ed. 2d 326 (2001). The 
Johnsons oppose recognition of the judgment. 
This appears to be a case of first impression in Idaho. · Neither party has 
cited the court to a controlling opinion from an Idaho appellate court. Nor has the 
Court's research found any controlling legal authority. 
II 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Plaintiff is the Coeur d'Alene Tribe (the Tribe), a federally recognized 
Indian Tribe. The defendants, Kenneth and Donna Johnson, (the Johnsons), 
own river front real property on the St. Joe River in Benewah County. The 
Johnsons have a dock and pilings that extend into the river from their property. 
The Johnsons are not members of the Tribe. The Tribe does not own the 
Johnson's real property. 
The Tribe filed a lawsuit against the Johnsons in the tribal court of the 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe seeking damages and removal of the Johnson's dock 
because the Johnsons did not obtain a dock permit from the Tribe to allow them 
2 
\ lo<iS 
encroacn upon 1ary"~ controlled by the fribe: the subrr--qed lands beneath 
' I 
the St. Joe River within the boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Reservation. 
Although the Johnsons were served with the summons and complaint in the tribal 
court proceeding, they did not appear or answer. As a result of their failure to 
appear in the tribal court proceeding, a default judgment was entered against 
them imposing a civil penalty of $17,400 and entitling the Tribe to remove the 
encroachments. 
The tribal court judgment was entered on April 1, 2015. It remains 
I 
unsatisfied. 
On January 22, 2016 the Tribe filed an Affidavit/Petition for Recognition of 
Foreign Judgment seeking an order validating and recognizing the tribal court 
judgment in order to ~egin enforcement efforts. The Tribe has satisfied the 
procedural requirements of I.C. §10-1301 et seq. by filing a certified copy of the 
tribal court judgment and supporting affidavit. After receiving notice of the filing 
of the judgment, the Johnsons retained counsel and have objected to the Tribe's 
request to have the tribal court judgment recognized by the State of Idaho. 
Both parties have submitted legal memoranda in support of their 
respective positions. Both parties have submitted supporting affidavits. The 
Tribe has moved to strike the affidavit of Kenneth Johnson on the basis that it 
was untimely filed, is irrelevant, and contains hearsay. The Court will not strike 
the affidavit, but- the Court will only consider the portions of the affidavit that 
would be admissible under the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
3 
Ill 
ISSUE 
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT SHOULD ISSUE AN ORDER 
RECOGNIZING A JUDGMENT FROM THE COEUR D'ALENE TRIBAL COURT 
AGAINST A NON-TRIBAL 'MEMBER FOR PURPOSES OF THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT. 
IV 
DISCUSSION 
A The Coeur d'Alene Tribe's Motion 
The Tribe's legal position is very straight forwa_rd. Pursuant to the 
decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in Sheppard v Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 655 
P.2d 895, (1982), tribal court decrees are entitled to full faith and credit. The 
Tribe has satisfied the procedural requirements of I.C. §10-1301 et seq, and is 
now entitled to enforce the tribal court judgment in state court. 
The application of the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act in most 
cases is simply a ministerial act as long a judgment creditor complies with the 
procedural requirements of the act. Enforcement of the foreign judgment can 
begin five days after the date the judgment is filed. I.C. §10-1303(c). The Tribe 
has not sought to enforce its judgment. Instead, and to the credit of both parties, 
the Johnsons and the Tribe have sought a court ruling before any enforcement 
actions have been sought based upon the tribal court judgment. 
Whether or not an Idaho court will recognize a foreign judgment is a 
discretionary determination. Even if all of the procedural requi~ements of the 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Act have been satisfied, an Idaho court is not 
required to recognize a foreign judgment if the foreign judgment is not entitled to 
full faith and credit in this state. For example, if the court issuing the foreign 
4 
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judgment allegedly di,.' 1ot have personal jurisdiction over ···13 Idaho defendant, 
i ' 
the Idaho Court can inquire into the jurisdictional basis of the foreign court's 
decision to see whether the judgment is entitled to full_faith and credit. Schwilling 
v. Hotne, 105 Idaho 294, 669 P.2d 183,(1983). A similar challenge can be made 
to enforcement of a foreign judgment on the basis of a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction by the foreign court. Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 
596 P.2d 1068, (1978). 
Once the foreign judgment has been filed and recognized in Idaho, the 
judgment has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses, 
and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a district 
court of this state. I.C. §10-1302. If the foreign judgment has been reversed or 
modified by the issuing state, the Idaho court has the discretion to deny 
enforcement of the foreign judgment. P & R Enterprises, Inc. v. Guard, 102 
Idaho 671,637 P. 2d 1167, (1981). 
B. The Johnson's Objections 
The Johnsons arguments against recognizing the tribal court judgment 
against them may be summarized as follows. First, they contend that the tribal 
court judgment cannot be recognized under the plain language of I. C. §10-1301. 
Second, they argue that the tribal court judgment should not be given full faith 
and credit ,or be recognized as a matter of comity, because the tribal· court 
lacked both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, and that the 
Johnson's were denied due process of law. Third, they argue that enforcement 
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OT rne tnbal court judrl""lent is prohibited by. the penal law -· ,ie. Each of these 
challenges will be addressed below. 
8(1) Can a Tribal Court judgment be recognized under Idaho Code §10-
1301? 
The Johnsons argue that the tribal judgment cannot be recognized by the 
state pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1301, which, according to the Johnsons, is 
limited to judgments regarding support or the establishment of paternity. That 
provision states: 
In this act "foreign judgment" means any judgment, decree, or order 
of a court of the United States or of any other court Q! an order of 
an administrative body of any state regarding the support of a child, 
spouse, or former spouse or the establishment of paternity which is 
entitled to full faith and credit in this state. 
(Emphasis added.) As the tribe argues, because the disjunctive conjunction "or" 
precedes the referenced language, the limitations therein apply only to 
administrative bodies, not courts. 
The tribe notes that Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 7, 655 P.2d 895, 
901 (1982) held: 'Tribal court decrees ... are ... entitled to full faith and credit." 
The Johnsons contend that Sheppard was based upon an interpretation of 28 
U.S.C. § 1738 which has since been "supplanted" by courts in other jurisdictions. 
These courts have held that "judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, 
Territory or Possession," as set out in the statute, do not include 
tribal court proceedings. The Sheppard court noted the existence of such 
authority, but chose specifically not to follow it. The court held: . 
TWTe agree with those courts which have found the 
phrase "Territories and Possessions" broad enough to 
6 
include 'ridian tribes·,-··ac-least ·as ··they ~re presently 
constitu{ under the laws: of the United Stai Jim v. CIT 
Financial Services, 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975); In re 
Adoption of Buehl, 87 Wash.2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976); 
Raymond v. Raymond, 83 F. 721 (8th Cir.1897); but see 
Brown v. Babbit Ford, Inc., 117 Ariz. 192, 571 P.2d 689 
(Ariz.App.1977) (tribal decrees entitled to comity but not full 
faith and credit); In re Marriage of Red Fox, 23 Or.App. 393, 
542 P.2d 918 (1975). See generally Ragsdale, Problems in 
the Application of Full Faith and Credit for Indian Tribes, 7 
N.M.L.Rev. 133 (1977); Comment, Conflicts Between State 
and Tribal Law: The Application of Full Faith and Credit 
Legislation to Indian Tribes, 1981 Ariz.St.L.J. 801 (1981). 
We believe that this holding will facilitate better relations 
between the courts of this state and the various tribal courts 
within Idaho. 
Sheppard, 104 Idaho at 8, 655 P.2d at 902 (emphasis added). In footnote 2, the 
court stated: 
It has come to the attention of this Court that, in an acti_on 
related to this case, the Shoshone-Bannock appellate court, in 
reversing the tribal trial court, held that it was not required to 
give full faith and credit to the decrees of Idaho state courts. In 
part this decision was based on the belief that state courts 
did not accord tribal courts full faith and credit. As we have 
shown, some state courts. including this one. do. Secondly, 
the tribal court failed to acknowledge 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which 
requires "every court within the United States" to give full faith 
and credit to decrees of state courts. Along with this opinion 
extends the hope of a good working relationship between state 
and tribal courts, and we hope, therefore, that the Shoshone-
Bannock courts will reconsider the application of full faith and 
credit in their proceedings. Indeed the commentators 
unanimously agree that tribal courts must afford other states full 
faith and credit. 
Id. fn. 2 (emphasis added). 
The Johnsons claim that because Sheppard involved a tribal court decree of 
adoption, the decision in Sheppard to accord tribal judgments full faith and credit 
was limited to family law judgments only. Nothing in the opinion, however, 
limited full faith and credit in that manner. Sheppard has not been overturned or 
7 
, ,vu,111::u uy a 1a1er opinion by the Idaho appellate courts. ,-,.,e district courts are 
'· 
bound to follow the pronouncements of the appellate courts. Sheppard is 
controlling precedent in Idaho and the rule of stare decisis dictates that lower 
courts follow it, unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be 
unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious 
principles of law and remedy continued injustice. Houghland Farms, Inc. v. 
Johnson, 119 Idaho 97, 803 P. 2d 978, (1990). The Idaho Supreme Court, not 
the district court, is the only court that can decide whether or not the Sheppard 
case is manifestly wrong, has proven to be unjust or unwise over time, or must 
be overruled to remedy an ·injustice. 
Based on the plain language of I.C. §10-1031 and upon the Sheppard 
case, the court finds that tribal court judgments may be enforced under the 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. However, just because tribal court 
judgments can be enforced under this act does not necessarily mean that the 
judgment against the Johnsons is enforceable in this case. 
B(2) Did the tribal court have both subject matter jurisdiction and 
personal jurisdiction over the Johnsons to allow an Idaho court to grant full faith 
and credit to the tribal court judgment? 
The Johnson's claim that the tribal court judgment should not be 
enforceable against them because the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the 
judgment. A judgment entered by a foreign state that lacked personal or subject 
matter jurisdiction to enter the judgment is void, and should not be accorded full 
8 
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ta,m and creait. ::,cnw;m11g v. Horne, 105.Jdaho-294, 669 P,"'--l 183 (1983);-Sierra 
Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 596 P.2d 1068, (1978). The Johnsons 
cite to Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, (9th Cir. 1997) in support of their 
position. This Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision is based upon federal law, 
not state law, so it is not controlling in Idaho in light of the Sheppard case. Even if 
principles of comity outlined in Wilson v. Marchington applied to this case, the 
analysis is the same: if the tribal court lacked proper subject matter and personal 
jurisdiction, then the judgment should not be recognized and enforced. 
Tribal court jurisdiction over non-tribal members is a rather controversial 
subject. The United States Supreme Court has attempted to clarify this area of 
the law in a series of decisions beginning with Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian 
Tribe, 431 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978), superseded on other 
grounds by 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), (4) (1990). In Oliphant, the Court specifically 
held that a tribal court has no jurisdiction to criminally charge or incarcerate non-
Indians. Later cases have established a set of precedents that impose limitations 
on the ability of a tribal court to exercise jurisdiction over a non-tribal member in a 
civil case. 
In Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 
493 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that the inherent sovereign 
powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to non-members of the tribe. The court 
also held that there are two exceptions to this rule. They are commonly referred 
to as "the consensual relations" exception and the "direct effects" exception. 
Though Oliphant only determined inherent tribal 
authority in criminal matters, the principles on which it 
relied support the general proposition that the inherent 
9 
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activities1 10nmembers of the tribe. To be sur, ,1dian 
tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some 
forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their 
reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may 
regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the 
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual 
relationships with the tribe or its members, through 
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other 
arrangements.(citations omitted) A tribe may also retain 
inherent power to exercise civil authority over the 
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its 
reservation when that conduct threatens or has some 
direct eff~ct on the political integrity, the economic 
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. (citations 
omitted) 
Montana v United States, 450 U.S. 455, (1981), at 565-566 (citations and 
footnote omitted). 
There is no basis for applying the "consensual relations" exception here. 
The Johnson--s have done nothing to support a finding that they have engaged in 
consensual relationships with the Tribe or its members in any way, shape, or 
form. This case does not arise out of a business transaction or a contract 
between the Johnsons and the Tribe or its members. They have not agreed to 
submit to the tribal court's jurisdiction. They are not tribal members. The Tribe 
does not own their land. As non-tribal members they have no say in tribal 
government issues, including any lake regulations and the operation of the tribal 
court system. 
The second exception of Montana v. United States is more problematic. 
Under this exception, a tribe may als~ retain inherent power to exercise civil 
authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when · 
10 
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economic security, or the health and welfar~ of the tribe. Id. The United States 
Supreme Court has recognized the authority of the Tribe to regulate that portion 
of the bed and the banks of the St. Joe River that lie within the Coeur d'Alene 
reservation. See, Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 121 S. Ct. 2135, 150 L. 
Ed. 2d 326 (2001 ). The Tribe's ability to regulate the activities affecting Coeur 
d'Alene Lake and the St. Joe River, such as encroachments, water quality, or 
other use of the natural resources, is an important aspect of the treaty rights that 
were recognized by the court. If the non-Indians who used the lake, or the river, 
or more specifically to this case, those who allegedly encroach on the submerged 
bed and banks of the waterways were not subject to the Tribe's rules, then the 
ruling by the United States Supreme Court in Idaho v. United States would 
certainly be a hollow victory for the Tribe. Any non-Indian could simply thumb 
their nose at the tribal enforcement efforts without any risk of consequence. The 
regulatory authority of the tribe would be meaningless with regard to non-Indians. 
The lake and the St Joe River are important to the tribe and the inability to control 
the conduct of non-Indians when it directly affects the lake and the St Joe River 
fall within the category of conduct that threatens or has some direct effect on the 
political integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe. 
This is not the first time an Indian tribe has exercised regulatory control 
over a waterway pursuant to treaty rights granted long ago. The Confederated 
Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation were involved in a long 
running battle over the control of a portion of Flathead Lake. See, Confederated 
11 
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0u,,.,11 a1 ,u nOOtf:j11a1 T~;1ies of the /-lathe.ad ReseJVation v. t- '-=tmen, 665 F .2d 951 
(1982). After years of litigation, the tribe's right to control the activities of non-
tribal members was recognized when the activities affected that portion of 
Flathead Lake within the reservation boundaries. Much like the tribes involved 
with Flathead Lake, the Coeur d'Alene Tribe is exercising similar control over that 
portion of the bed and banks of the lake and the St. Joe River within the 
reservation. 
There is another reason why the tribal court judgment in this case should 
be given full faith and credit, or be recognized as a matter of comity as is done in 
the federal court system. When a non-Indian defendant is sued in a tribal court 
and wishes to challenge the ability of the tribal court to exercise jurisdiction over 
them, the non-Indian defendant is normally required to challenge the tribal court's 
jurisdiction over them in the tribal court and exhaust all tribal remedies through 
every level of the tribal court system before they will be allowed to raise the 
jurisdictional issue in another forum. Nat'/ Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe 
of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985). 
The Johnsons never appeared in tribal court to raise a jurisdictional 
challenge. The tribal court judgment in this case made a specific finding that it 
had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute, and that the Johnsons 
were given notice of the suit and the opportunity to appear. The tribe contends 
that the tribal court judgment is entitled to full faith and credit because the 
Johnsons failed to exhaust their remedies in tribal court before challenging 
recognition of the tribal judgment in state court. Evans v . . Shoshone-Bannock 
12 
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LEI/JU Use ,--a/icy Lrorrnin;-736 f-.3d 1298;-·1302 (9th c-,--?013) set out four 
exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. The court stated: 
"Exhaustion is prudential; it is required as a matter of comity, not as 
a jurisdictional prerequisite." Boozer [v. Wilder], 381 F.3d [931,] at 
935 [9th Cir. 2004)] (citations omitted). To this end, the Supreme 
Court has recognized four exceptions to the exhaustion 
requirement: "(1) when an assertion of tribal court jurisdiction is 
'motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith'; (2) 
when the tribal court action is 'patently violative of express 
jurisdictional prohibitions;' (3) when 'exhaustion would be futile 
because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the 
tribal court's jurisdiction;' and (4) when it is 'plain' that tribal court 
jurisdiction is lacking, so that the exhaustion requirement 'would 
serve no purpose other than delay.' " Elliott [v. White Mountain 
Apache Tribal Court], 566 F.3d [842,] at 847 [(9th Cir. 2009)] 
(quoting Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 369, 121 S.Ct. 2304, 150 
L.Ed.2d 398 (2001) (internal alteration omitted) .... 
To determine whether tribal court jurisdiction is plainly lacking, we 
analyze whether such "jurisdiction is colorable or plausible . . . ." 
Elliott, 566 F.3d at 848 (quoting Atwood v. Fort Peck Tribal Court 
Assiniboine, 513 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir.2008) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The plausibility of tribal court jurisdiction depends 
on the scope of the Tribes' regulatory authority, as "a tribe's 
adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction." 
Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 330, 128 S.Ct. 2709 (quoting Strate 
v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 137 
l.Ed.2d 661 (1997)). 
Evans, 736 F.3d at 1302. 
The Johnsons have not shown that any exception applies. They have 
presented no evidence supporting the first two exceptions. There is no evidence 
in the record that would support a finding that the tribal court proceedings were 
motivated by a desire to harass or were conducted in bad faith. Because the 
tribal court action arose out of the Tribe's authority to regulate the portion of the 
St. Joe River within the reservation boundaries, the tribal court action is not 
plainly violative of any express jurisdictional prohibition. 
13 
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would have been futile to challenge jurisdiction in tribal court because the tribal 
ordimmce in which the tribe claims control over the riverbed was enacted by the 
Tribe. They allege that the Tribe is biased on questions of ownership regarding 
the submerged lands beneath the St. Joe River. They contend that the tribal 
court is dominated by tribal government, the plaintiff in the case. These bare 
allegations are not supported by the record in this case. The tribal court gave the 
Johnsons notice and an opportunity to be heard. No evidence has been 
presented that this notice and opportunity to be heard would not have been 
adequate for the Johnsons to present competent evidence supporting their claim 
. . 
that their dock was not located on· the area of the riverbed lawfully controlled by 
the tribe, or otherwise challenge the assertion of jurisdiction over them in this 
case by the tribal court. An example of another approach to challenging a tribal 
court's jurisdiction over a non-Indian defendant is County of Lewis v. Allen, 163 
F.3d 509, (9th Cir. 1998). In that case, a tribal member filed a civil action in the 
Nez Perce Tribal Court seeking damages against Lewis County and several non-
Indian law enforcement officers. Rather than ignore the proceedings, the non-
Indian defendants challenged the tribal court's exercise of jurisdiction over them 
every step of the way, eventually obtaining a ruling that the tribal court did not 
have jurisdiction and invalidated the jury verdict against the defendants. The 
entire process only took eleven years. 
With regard to the fourth exception, Grand Canyon Skywa/k Dev., LLC v. 
'Sa' Nyu Wa Inc., 715 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir.2013), cited by the Tribe, the court 
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lacking. That court held: 
[A]lthough the main rule in Montana v. United States, [450 U.S. 
544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981)] is that a tribal court 
lacks regulatory authority over the activities of non-Indians unless 
one of its two exceptions apply, this case is not Montana. Montana, 
450 U.S. at 565-66, 101 S.Ct. 1245. Montana considered tribal 
jurisdiction over nonmember activities on non-Indian land, held in 
fee simple, within a reservation. Id. at 547, 565-66, 101 S.Ct. 1245. 
The land underlying this case, however, is federal Indian land held 
in trust for the Hualapai Tribe. The dispute arose out of an 
agreement related to the development, operations, and 
management of the Skywalk, an asset located in Indian country. 
With the exception of Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 121 S.Ct. 
2304, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001), the Supreme Court has applied 
Montana "almost exclusively to questions of jurisdiction arising on 
non-Indian land or its equivalent." Water Wheel [Camp 
Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance], 642 F.3d [802,] at 809 [(9th 
Cir.2011)]. When deciding whether a tribal court has 
iurisdiction. land ownership may sometimes prove dispositive, 
. but when a competing state interest exists courts balance that 
interest against the tribe's. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360, 370, 121 
S.Ct. 2304. Here, as the dispute centers on Hualapai trust land 
and there are no obvious state interests at play, the Hicks 
exception is unlikely to require Montana's application. At the very 
least, it cannot be said that the tribal court plainly lacks jurisdiction. 
Grand Canyon Skywalk at 1205 (emphasis added). 
The Johnsons have not shown a state interest that competes with the 
tribe's interest in regulating docks located on the riverbed controlled by the tribe. 
The Johnsons contend, however, that their dock is not located on an area of the 
riverbed that is lawfully controlled by the tribe. This argument was never 
presented to the tribal court by the Johnsons. The Johnsons argument may have 
a legal and factual basis, but it should have been presented to the tribal ·court in 
the first instance. 
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oi::::~JanC"', ~:nni::7-Joh11.:iv1, hc::1:s tiUbrrmced an . affidavit .. apparently in 
support of this argument. Johnson states that he removed part of the dock, but 
he has not supplied any evidence concerning when this occurred. 
The tribe has moved to strike this affidavit. It argues that Johnson has not 
shown competence to make certain statements contained therein. Included in 
the affidavit are water levels as measured by Johnson on certain pilings in the 
riverbed. The affidavit makes reference to certain markings on the pilings that 
are apparently depicted in images attached to the affidavit. To the extent that the 
images and affidavit depict measurements of the distance between the bed of the 
river and the surface of the water as it came in contact with those pilings, 
Johnson is likely competent to make such measurements and to state what those 
measurements were. 
Johnson also set out his observation of a measurement of the elevation of 
the surface of the river allegedly contained on the website of the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The affidavit does not indicate where 
this measurement was allegedly taken by NOAA. A river, by definition, would 
have a higher elevation at its source than at its mouth. Johnson does not allege 
that NOAA measured the elevation of the surface of the river where his property 
is located. It therefore does not prove such a fact. 
Moreover, as the tribe contends, it is hearsay. The Johnson's argue that it 
is within the public records hearsay exception, citing Bartlett v. Mut. Phann. Co., 
Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 220 (D.N.H.2011), affd sub nom. Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm . 
. Co., 678 F.3d 30 (1st Cir.2012}, rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 186 L. Ed. 2d 607 (2013} 
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r-~/2/fi""" 
wmcn adrrnneo unaer i=-eaeral Ruies of .c.:v.19.~nc~ t393(i:s) P"'i ~UL_ the tallowing i . ·- { . ~ . . -· -- . . 
document: John K. Jenkins, Director, FDA Office of New Drugs, Analysis and 
recommendations for Agency action regarding NSAIDs and cardiovascular risk 
12 (Apr. 6, 2005) as posted on the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's website. 
Plaintiff does not submit any public record however. Instead, he submits his 
observations of an alleged public record. Therefore, even if the alleged record 
itself were admissible, Johnson's hearsay statement concerning that alleged 
record would not, in turn, be admissible. Johnson's statement concerning 
NOAA's website should therefore be stricken. 
Johnson states, in addition, that NOAA's measurement is "four inches 
below the summer river level." No foundation is laid for Johnson's opinion of the 
"summer river level," and it is based upon inadmissible hearsay concerning 
NOAA's website. As such, this statement should be stricken as well. 
The Johnsons have not shown that their dock has not been located at any 
relevant time on the riverbed lawfully controlled by the tribe. They have not 
shown that the tribe's jurisdiction was plainly lacking, not colorable, or 
implausible. 
Where a party to a state court action fails to exhaust his remedies in a 
prior tribal court action, full faith and credit principles require enforcement of the 
tribal judgment. See Simmonds v. Parks, 329 P.3d 995, 1007-08 (Alaska 2014). 
Since the Johnsons did not exhaust their remedies in tribal court, and since no 
exception to the exhaustion rule has been shown to apply, full faith and credit 
should be extended to the tribal court judgment against them. 
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The Johnsons- <llso generally allege that the trir-' court was biased 
, I 
against them. Bias does not appear to be a relevant consideration in this 
context. Stewart v. Stewart, 289 S.E.2d 652 (YV.Va.1980) stated: 
[l]n Morris Lapidus Associates v. Airportels, Inc., 240 Pa.Super. 80, 
84, 361 A.2d 660, 663 (1976) ... a New York judgment was sought 
to be enforced in Pennsylvania. The contention was made that the 
New York judgment was based on a New York arbitration award 
which had been rendered by biased arbitrators and that the award 
therefore violated due process concepts. The court in declining to 
permit this attack against full faith and credit principles stated: 
[E]ven were we to conclude that the appearance of 
bias in arbitrators is a denial of due process, we could 
not permit the collateral attack on the judgment 
attempted by appellees in this case. The cases cited 
by appellees for the proposition that a judgment 
obtained in violation of due process is not entitled to 
full faith and credit are not on point. In those cases, 
the due process denied had the result of depriving the 
litigant of an opportunity to appear and defend. See 
Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 66 S.Ct. 556, 90 L.Ed. 
635, reh. denied, 328 U.S. 876, 66 S.Ct. 975, 90 
L.Ed. 1645 (1946); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 61 
S.Ct. 115, 85 L.Ed. 22 (1940); Wetmore v. Karrick, 
205 U.S. 141, 27 S.Ct. 434, 51 L.Ed. 745 (1907). 
Stewart, 289 S.E.2d at 656. 
Even if bias were relevant, the Johnsons have not shown bias here. They 
claim "the tribal court is dominated by the tribal government" which is allegedly 
"biased" due to a tribal law providing for a $500 per day fine. A maximum fine 
applicable to all dock owners who violate tribal law concerning those docks does 
not show bias against the Johnsons. Moreover, this allegation of bias is 
undermined by the fact that the tribe actually fined them a lesser $100 per day 
amount instead. In addition, the Johnsons claim bias is shown by the fact that 
the tribe claims control of the riverbed. The existence of such a claim does not 
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that it knows are not held in trust for the tribe. 
8(3)0oes the Penal Law Rule prohibit recognition and enforcement of the 
Tribal Court Judgment? 
The Johnsons claim the penal law rule, which prohibits enforcement of the 
penal judgments of other countries where there is no treaty for such 
enforcement, also prohibits enforcement of the tribal court judgment here. They 
have not provided any authority that this rule is applicable to tribal judgments, 
and independent research by the court has revealed none. The tribal court 
judgment in this case is not a penal judgment in any event. The judgment 
imposes a civil fine and allows for removal of a dock and pilings. The Johnsons 
are not subject to criminal prosecution or incarceration pursuant to the tribal court 
judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
This Memorandum Opinion shall constitute the Court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Coeur d'Alene Tribal Court in tribal case no. CV-SC-2014-260 is RECOGNIZED 
AS VALID AND FULLY ENFORCEABLE under the laws of the State of Idaho . 
.--
DATED this J ~ day of July, 2016. 
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